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Executive summary
• The report notes the emergence of new organisational
forms in response to market uncertainty and volatility.
• In particular, it notes moves to focus the organisation
around core activities.
• This has led organisations to outsource and subcontract
non-core production and service activities.
• The project identifies key questions which are asked of
management accounting in this business scenario,
including the types of calculations and practices used in
the decision to outsource, and the role of management
accounting in the outsourcing process.
This work is grounded in contemporary evidence on the
emergence of new organisational forms in the UK, and the
consequent adoption of management accounting practices.
After setting out the relevant theoretical and empirical
background, the work evaluates the emergence of new forms,
and the growth of outsourcing and subcontracting.
The quantitative questionnaire data points to a gradual
emergence of new forms and, notably, to the delayering of
organisations and an increase in outsourcing activities, new
management teams and a desire to reduce fixed costs and to
concentrate on core activities were major motivators.
Given the growth in outsourcing, all of the case study
organisations had invested heavily in the supply chain
function, which was seen as a key competitive business
variable. In general, traditional management accounting
practices and metrics were used, although the ‘Balanced
Scorecard’ was prominent, based on a number of key financial
and non-financial indicators. The main changes in the
management accounting function were the ways in which
they were integrated into the business and the tasks that
they were asked to perform. With the case study
organisations moving far more to multi-functional working,
management accountants were far more integrated into core
business areas, working alongside colleagues from other core
functions. Management accountants were also increasingly
taking on the role of business analysts, including a greater
forecasting role.
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List of figures and tables
The research reported in this volume will identify the
ways in which management accounting is informed
by developments in new organisational forms. In
general the existing literature would point to new
organisational forms emerging in response to
heightened business competition brought about by
globalisation and a compression of decision-making
times due to developments in information and
communication technologies. Such new forms have a
variety of configurations but, in general, are flatter,
leaner, less hierarchical and more flexible than the
traditional bureaucratic forms.
A variety of methods are being deployed to achieve the new
flatter and flexible firms including downsizing and delayering,
brought about, in part, by a growth in subcontracting and
outsourcing as part of an attempt by business to focus on
core activities. The key questions in this project are to assess
the extent of the introduction of such new organisational
forms in contemporary UK business, and its consequent
implications for management accounting. Key issues to be
examined are: the influence of subcontracting on the
organisation’s management accounting; the management of
buyer-supplier relationships and the impact of a changing
organisational form on corporate performance. The subjects
chosen for investigation, because of observed developments
in their organisational form, are: a public sector organisation;
a retail franchise operation; a major UK food retailer; an
engineering manufacturer; and a food manufacturer. Two
methods are used to gather the data for analysis: a series of
in-depth face-to-face interviews; and a postal questionnaire.
The former provides a set of detailed case studies, based on
meetings with designers and users of management
accounting systems; the latter will provide a larger
representative sample of responses on which more
sophisticated statistical analysis can be performed. The
conclusions reached through qualitative analysis will be
supported by statistical evidence.
To achieve these objectives, the report is divided into nine
further chapters. Chapter two will provide the theoretical
background and chapter three will outline the research
methodology used. Chapters four to nine will outline the
empirical research findings, with chapter four concentrating
on the results of our questionnaire surveys, and chapters five
to nine each concentrating on one of our case study
organisations. Chapter ten draws conclusions to the report.
1. Introduction
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2.1 Introduction
At the turn of the millennium there have been profound
changes in organisational structure, strategy and form. More
specifically, there has been a move from the bureaucratic
hierarchical organisational form, deemed inappropriate and
ineffective in the context of increased market volatility,
uncertainty and increased competition. Replacing these, ‘post
bureaucratic’ or ‘post hierarchical’ forms have been
championed which are leaner and flatter and thus more
responsive, flexible and focussed (Kanter, 1989; Mouritsen,
1999). At their extreme this has been characterised by the
‘donut shaped’ or ‘virtual’ organisational form. The new
organisational forms have, it is argued, been both driven by
and led to major internal restructuring involving, inter alia,
overall employee reductions via downsizing (Radcliffe et al,
2001), centralisation of core activities, the outsourcing of
non-core activities, the creation of alliances (Doz and Hamel,
1999), a reduction in the levels of hierarchy (delayering) and
a more general redesign of core activities (Deakin and
Mitchie, 1997; Dunford, 1995; Felstead and Jewson, 1999;
Gibbons, 1998; Grabher, 1993; Nittin and Eccles, 1992).
At their extreme such new organisational forms may be
unrepresentative. However, they represent an extreme of a
general trend towards the decoupling of ownership and the
production of goods and/or provision of services. Moreover,
such trends are found in both private and public sectors, in
services and manufacturing, and in new technology and older
technology sectors. This has been variously described as
externalisation (Pfeffer and Baron, (1988); the flexibilisation
of employee relations (Atkinson and Meager, 1991), the
growth of knowledge intensive work and service work (Adler,
2001; Das and Tang, 2001; Herriot and Pemberton, 1995) and
‘cascading’ subcontracting (Appay, 1998).
2.2 The impact on and of management accounting
These changes in organisational form give rise to several
questions concerning management accounting (Lapsley and
Pallot, 2000). Such questions include the following: Are new
management accounting techniques being developed by
companies with new organisational forms? Even if
management accounting techniques have undergone no
change in themselves, are they being used in different ways
than previously (for example in terms of frequency of
reporting, level of reporting, types of decision in which
information is used)? In an examination of the consequences
of exercising planning and control across organisational
boundaries, Tomkins (2001, p.164) notes, for example, that
‘basic accounting techniques may not need revision, but the
way in which accountants perceive their roles and employ
their techniques and information bases may well change’.
Seal et al (1999) identify three areas in an organisation,
concerned with supply chain management, where
management accounting has an important role to play. These
are: first, in deciding whether to make or buy, and which
outsourcing partners to use; second, in managing the
partnership, once established; and third, in providing a
measure of the benefits received from engaging in such a
contractual arrangement. Thus an important consideration
would be, if new accounting techniques have been developed
to cope with outsourcing and subcontracting, then what
precise new techniques have emerged? Where did these new
techniques come from (consultants, imitation of ‘best’
industry practices, developed internally)? Did these new
techniques predate or precede change in organisation form?
How are they used in these companies? What effects if any,
both intended and unintended, have they had on the way
companies operate and on the performance capabilities of
firms? For example, in a case study used to examine the
functioning of a ‘flexible firm’, Mouritsen (1999, p.51) finds
that ‘the subcontractors…were integrated in its management
control system as factors in a computer program. They were
represented as variable costs, could be compared with each
other, and could be rewarded on their productivity’.
Similarly, if management accounting techniques have not
significantly changed but their use has, then why did such
companies feel that no change in techniques was required? In
what ways has the use of previous management accounting
information change after the change in organisation form?
What are the intended and unintended consequences on
corporate functioning and performance of the changes in the
use of management accounting information? If neither
management accounting techniques nor the way in which
they are used has changed, what effects did this lack of
change have on corporate performance? After all, as Roodhoft
and Warlop (1999, p.363) point out, ‘outsourcing is only
desirable when expected governance and coordination costs
resulting from asset specific investments in the relationship
with the future supplier are lower than the production cost
advantage that the supplier may bring’.1
Does it really matter whether or not changes in management
accounting take place when organisations change their
forms? Radcliffe et al (2001, p.152) find, for example, that
‘the influence of accounting on downsizing is much more
about process than about particular techniques or critical
numbers…(and) its contribution to the restructuring
phenomena is not unique but instead part of a broader
ascendancy of financial accounting control’.
1 See also Chalos (1995) and Baiman & Rajan (2002).
2. Theoretical background
Previous researchers have addressed some of these questions
by either exploring management accounting change within
the broader institutional context (Burns and Ezzamel, 1999;
Burns and Scapens,1998; Dekker, 2003; Langfield-Smith &
Smith, 2003; Mouritsen et al, 2001; Reid, Mitchell and Smith,
2000; Van Deer Meer Karsistra and Vosselman, 2000), or in
the context of other changes in management practice, such
as team working (Ezzamel and Willmott, 1998) and
reorganisation of manufacturing space (Miller and O’Leary,
1993; 1994). Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998), for
example, examine the role of management accounting in
developing new performance management systems in
organisations undergoing change. They identify five factors
that are seen to influence the participation by management
accountants in ‘change activities’, as follows: (i) ‘a shared view
among managers and accountants of the role that the
accounting functions can play within change programs’; (ii)
‘accountants are less likely to participate in change when
support for the development of accounting innovations is
neglected by senior managers’; (iii) ‘an ‘accounting champion’
may be required to promote the role of accounting in change
activities’; (iv) there is a ‘need for well-developed technical
and social skills among accountants’; and (v) ‘a reliance by
management accountants on the formal structure for their
authority was found to be an impediment to their
involvement in change programs that involved team-based
structures’ (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998, pp.382-3).
Lapsley and Pallot (2000) too explore the role played by
management accounting in organisational change; this study,
however, concentrates on practice in local government. In the
UK, they observe that its role has been limited. However, in
New Zealand, they find that ‘the introduction of a new breed
of entrepreneurial accountant has shifted accounting from an
external legitimating device with a limited impact on core
activities to an integral part of all aspects of organizational
life’ (Lapsley and Pallot, 2000, p.227). Thus, as Covaleski et al
(1996, p.28) observe, ‘political events and ideologies, cultural
norms and forces, social patterns of interaction and societal
presuppositions, technological changes and subjective
meanings that impel people to act in certain ways, all
potentially impinge on the roles and nature of management
accounting. It is in this manner that a different light is shed
on the role and nature of management accounting practices
by the research which draws from organizational and
sociological theories’. However, the changes in organisational
form and the impact of these changes on management
accounting practices has not been fully and systematically
considered by previous researchers. Thus this report makes a
first attempt at evaluating empirically the changing role and
importance of accounting under a variety of new
organisational forms.
2.3 Organisational context
The organisational context for understanding new forms is
the breakdown of hierarchy. ‘Flexible’, ‘lean’, ‘flat’ and
‘responsive’ all entered the lexicon of organisational theory,
primarily through the ‘guru’ literature (Drucker, 1992; Handy,
1995; Kanter, 1989; Peters, 1992), alongside the need to be
adaptable and cost conscious. Bureaucratic organisations,
staffed by legions of middle managers, were, it is argued, core
to the problems of UK and US organisational malaise. The
‘end of hierarchy’ was thus to be achieved through
down-sizing, delayering and business process re-engineering.
Such organisational restructuring was purportedly
widespread, although previous research (Ezzamel et al, 1995;
1996) has questioned the extent of change; while in the US,
Cappelli et al (1997) and Ichniowski et al (1996) have argued
that, contrary to earlier assertions, the new forms of
governance have introduced potential problems for
organisational coherence and also potentially weakened
long-term financial viability.
Gietzmann and Larsen (1998) investigate the changes that
would be necessary for Western organisations to move to
Japanese-style practices, which would involve organisations
working more closely with their subcontractors or outsourced
suppliers. Such a move, it has been argued, should improve
flexibility, amongst other things (cf. Asanuma, 1989).
However, they note that the relatively unsuccessful
implementation in the West of such Japanese practices can
be attributed, to some extent, to ‘continued reliance upon
traditional accounting governance structures, such as the
make or buy competitive bidding calculus’ (Gietzmann and
Larsen, 1998, p.287). Thus, in order for outsourcing and/or
subcontracting to work, perhaps there needs to be some
innovation in the management accounting practices which
monitor and control these contractual agreements.
Despite grandiose claims of widespread organisational
transformation and new forms, academic research remains
largely anecdotal and/or based on casual empiricism. If there
is transformation, it would seem that this may well be
confined to ‘leading edge’ organisations in, for example, high
technology sectors (Kanter 1989; Powell et al, 1996; Reid and
Smith, 2003; Walsh, et al 1997; Williamson, 1991). They may
well presage a wider diffusion of new organisational forms,
and there may be an ‘emulation’ effect from non-leading
edge organisations in both private and public sectors.
However, by the same token, they may just be different due
to their differing business environments and may thus be
somewhat unrepresentative of organisations as a whole.
Moreover, separate research (Farrell and Morris, 2003;
Ezzamel et al 1999) indicates that organisations, particularly
in the public but also in the private sector, are motivated to
organisational restructuring as much by cost cutting as a
vision of becoming flexible, responsive or whatever. Further,
earlier research (Ezzamel et al, 1996) echoes this sentiment,
arguing that change is occurring, but that it is incremental,
rather than transformational.
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Ratto et al (2001) discuss the impact of proposed
Government changes to the National Health Service (NHS).
These involve the setting of ‘team-based incentives’. How,
they wonder, should such teams be identified? For example,
where teams consist of individuals in different organisations,
then ‘the organisational structure can be quite complicated’
(Ratto et al, 2001, p.30). Difficulties arise when it comes to
assessing team performance, considering the usual agency
risk problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard,
and the potential for free-riders.2 Furthermore, as Ratto et al
(2001, p.30) note, ‘possible conflicts between professional
values and team member priorities may emerge and this
makes it more difficult for team members to identify
themselves as part of a team’. Thus such impacts and
changes in organisational form throw up new problems for
management accountants, in terms of monitoring and
controlling resource allocations.
Whilst being cautious of the wilder claims of organisational
transformation, three important developments would seem
apparent. First, new organisational forms are emerging in new
sectors, alongside restructuring in existing organisations. For
example, Kulp (2002) examines the sharing of accounting
information within a retail setting, and finds that both
manufacturer and retailer ‘expect that through coordination
and information sharing, VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory)
will increase supply-chain profits and efficiency’ (Kulp 2002,
p.654). In fact, she concludes (p.670) that ‘VMI is more likely
to lead to higher supply-chain profits if both companies
commit to sharing precise internal accounting information
and reliably transmitting, receiving, and using this
information for inventory decisions’. Second, these new forms
may be found in fast-growing sectors (for example, ‘call
centres’). Third, these new organisational forms are predicated
upon the outsourcing of core and non-core activities,
facilitated by, although not solely dependent on, dramatic
changes in telecommunications and information technology.
2 See, for example Gibbons (1998) and Holmström and Roberts (1998)
for more on the agency problem. See also Baiman et al (1995), who
investigate organisational differences within a simple agency framework,
and explore their effect on task allocation and compensation risk
decisions.
What is evident, therefore, are changing boundaries of the
organisation in relation to internal and external labour
markets, based on new and/or increasingly important forms
of organisation and of contractual relationships such as
public-private partnerships, networked organisations, alliances
and long-term supplier relationships. These types of
relationships are selected in this study for their capacity to
offer rich opportunities to analyse the links between
organisational change and management accounting practices
(cf. Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998). There is evidence,
for example, that the effects of the audit explosion
associated with the introduction of new organisational forms
and new systems for the management of performance may
have been dysfunctional, creating conflicts between the
overall objectives of the organisation and specific measures
of performance. This ‘audit explosion’ refers to the spread of
system of auditing, monitoring and evaluating business
performance both to a wider range of organisations and
further down organisational hierarchies (Power, 1997).
Caplan and Kirschenheiter (2000) explore the outsourcing of
internal audit services to a public accounting firm, citing
Kralovetz’s (1996) finding that 12 per cent of companies
outsource at least some of their internal audit work. They too
acknowledge the agency problems that can arise under such
contractual arrangements. However, in the case of auditing,
they note (p.396) that ‘outsourcing does not significantly
affect management’s ability to monitor internal auditing’ as,
according to the US rules under which their sample of firms
operates, ‘public accountants providing outsourcing services
cannot direct the internal audit function; the top internal
audit position must remain inside the firm. Hence, the ability
of senior management and the audit committee to monitor
the individual who has overall responsibility for the internal
audit function appears unchanged. This individual’s
relationship with the audit staff changes, but the basic
hierarchy of audit supervision and work remains in place’.
Thus the extent to which management accounting is affected
by outsourcing or subcontracting activities might depend, to
a great extent, on the nature of the activity being outsourced.
2.4 Conclusion
The questions posed by this research proposal are best
addressed using an inter-disciplinary approach (cf. Covaleski
et al, 1996). A good means of understanding management
accounting practices is to examine their emergence and
functioning within their broader organisational context. This
does not necessarily mean that management accounting
always follows where management practices lead; for we
wish equally to consider those situations where management
practices, and indeed changes in organisational form, are
promoted by certain management accounting practices. By
locating management accounting practices within their
organisational context, we wish to underscore the argument
that both management and accounting practices can mediate
and condition each other.
The emerging organisational forms we have mentioned above
are clearly interesting in themselves, but they also have
important implications for management accounting
(Tomkins, 2001). What is at issue here is the extent to which
management accounting practices are deemed central to
these developments. The running themes include: when and
from whom it would be deemed advantageous to the
company to subcontract; what are the attendant issues of
managing dynamic and complex buyer-supplier relations
(Seal et al, 1999); and what is the impact of the new
organisational form on corporate performance. Some
statements already exist in the literature, particularly in the
form of consultant pronouncements, concerning what is
deemed to be desirable attributes of management
accounting in support of new organisational forms such as
outsourcing (see, for example, Stacey, 1998). However, this
literature amounts to no more than a straightforward listing
of some of these desirable management accounting
attributes which, however valuable, are not contextualised to
account for the specific history, ownership attributes,
technological and market characteristics of individual firms.
Assessing the impact of new organisational forms on
corporate performance has received very little attention. So
far, some researchers have alluded to the desirability of
employing ‘aggregate performance measures’, including such
aspects as product quality, delivery etc, in addition to
financial indicators on efficiency and effectiveness to assess
the performance of networks and supplier chains (Beamon,
1999; Berry et al, 1999; Cohen and Lee, 1988; Oliver and
Delbridge, 1999). These findings, however, are fairly tentative
and research in this area remains at an embryonic stage. The
increased reliance upon subcontracting which has been noted
recently by many writers runs counter to the conventional
arguments in support of vertical integration when the
activities to be subcontracted could be produced by the firm
(this is not an obvious option, at least in the short term, for
retailers). Here, we are concerned with identifying the role of
management accounting practices in the context of three
inter-related questions centred around subcontracting: the
decision to outsource; managing the supplier chain; and the
impact of outsourcing on corporate performance. Chapter 3
now introduces the methodology by which we strive to
achieve this aim.
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3.1 Introduction
Our aim is to understand management accounting practices
in change situations by examining their emergence and
functioning within the context of emerging supply chain
relations. This research falls within the broader research
category that seeks to contextualise the role of accounting
practices within the broader organisational context. Previous
work has, for example, included: analysis of the interface
between organisational issues and management accounting
(Ezzamel et al, 1995; Ezzamel and Wilmott, 1996; 1998); the
investigation of alternative organisational forms from a
management perspective (Farrell and Morris, 1999; 2003);
and studies of venture capital, developments in information
systems and organisational form (Reid et al, 1997; 2000;
Smith, 1999a; 1999b).
In this research project we employ a combination of
qualitative and quantitative research methods; a mailed
questionnaire and case studies in five organisations. At the
core of the project are the case studies discussed in Chapter
five to nine, representing various organisational form
archetypes. Case study research affords an in-depth analysis
and interpretation of emerging forms of supply chain
relations, and offers rich, contextualised and longitudinal
understanding of micro-processes of organisational change
situations. However, findings from case studies are difficult to
generalise, partly because of the small number of
organisations that can be studied in-depth and partly
because qualitative research employs different research
methods and methodologies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hartley,
1994). In order to provide a more general understanding of
accounting and supply chain relations in modern
organisations, we complemented the case studies by the
quantitative data gathered by means of a questionnaire
survey, as discussed in Chapter four.
3.2 Research sites 
In order to evaluate the changing role of accounting under
new organisational forms, the research aimed to cover five
archetypes of forms which include manufacturing and service
sectors and high and medium level technologies, all in the
private sector, and one public sector organisation. Recent
research has identified various emerging organisational
archetypes in the area of supply chain. These may include:
• Vertically disintegrated manufacturing companies in
engineering and engaged in extensive sub-contracting
relations.
• Vertically integrated manufacturers, such as those in the
food industry, that rely on retailers to sell the bulk of their
products while having some own outlets to sell a small part
of their produce to the final customer.
• Franchise type of organisation such as that found in the
manufacturing or retailing sector.
• Retail organisations which are dependent sub-contract
manufacturers to stock up their shelves either with
manufacturers own brands or with retailers brands
manufactured for them by third parties.
• Quasi-market public sector organisations, such as hospitals
and local education authorities.
• Hollow (donut-shaped) organisations, such as those
working in software engineering.
In our selection of case study organisations to represent such
a wide variety of organisational forms, we were naturally
restricted by availability of good quality access. We were able
to match five organisations to five of the above archetypes;
the one missing category is the hollow form. As we restricted
our number of case studies to five organisations to ensure
our ability to gain in-depth and rich understanding of
organisational processes, one category had to be sacrificed.
The hollow form, while interesting, was the most difficult for
us to secure access to in reasonable time. Nonetheless, our
five organisations in which we held interviews cover a
diversity of organisational forms, and display varying
characteristics (in terms of ownership, size, age, industry,
etc.). Our intention is that this research project captures
variations as well as similarities in management accounting
practices for supply chain relations across different
organisational forms.
3. Research methods
3.2.1 Vertically disintegrated manufacturing subcontract
links
Manufacturing companies, in industries such as engineering,
automotives and consumer electronics, have a long history of
subcontracting out the production of components. However,
the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a considerable breaking
down of large vertically integrated manufacturing complexes
in the UK, USA and elsewhere, largely influenced by the
success of Japanese manufacturers in these industries. Indeed,
not only are many non-core manufacturing functions being
outsourced, but the logic of ‘make or buy’ decisions is being
turned on its head. The dominant question is now ‘why not
outsource’, rather than ‘why outsource’ (Anderson et al, 2000;
Imrie and Morris, 1992; Morris and Imrie, 1991). Moreover,
the definition of what are deemed ‘core’ and ‘non-core’
activities is no longer entirely, or even largely, dependent
upon technical operating arguments but is becoming
increasingly predicated upon the cost of making internally
compared to the cost of buying by outsourcing externally
(Ezzamel et al, 1999). These relationships are, however,
characterised as long term partnership networks. While such
a form offers flexibility for the large firms and potential
cost-savings, it also adds considerably to the organisational
complexity. To represent this organisational form, we selected
a company in the automotive industry.
3.2.2 Vertically integrated manufacturer/retail supplier 
Vertically integrated suppliers to retailers (notably in food
and drink, clothing and other sectors) have been increasingly
drawn into close links with large UK retailers, as a
consequence of a number of factors. First, the growing
concentration of retail in the UK; second, the growing
proportion of sales through large retailers and third, due to
the increasing burden of demands that the large retailers are
placing on suppliers as they seek to use their supply chain as
part of their competitive advantage. Large, mass producers in,
for example, the food industry are expected to be increasingly
flexible to meet frequent small batch demands of retailers
and to look into their increasingly sophisticated supply
chains. To represent this organisational form we selected a
large multinational food manufacturer.
3.2.3 Franchise operation
In the late 1980s franchising was viewed amongst some as a
representation of the enterprise economy. From 1985 to
1990, there was a five fold increase in franchise activity with
17,000 franchised outlets and nearly 150,000 employed
either as franchisees or unit personnel (Felstead, 1991). By
1998, over 300,000 people were directly employed in the
franchising sector, which accounted for 29% of all retail sales
(NatWest, 1999). While franchises operate without close and
direct supervision they are required to follow procedures
clearly laid down and subject to unilateral change (Quinn,
1999; Falbe et al, 1999). Moreover, while they receive profits
(after payment to the franchiser) and either buy or lease the
means of production, the latter are similarly open to
restrictions. Typically franchises are found in service provision
(e.g. Molly Maid UK) or retail services, retail outlets (e.g. Body
Shop International Plc), building maintenance (e.g. DynoRod
Developments Ltd), health and leisure (e.g. Tanning Shop) and
hotels and catering (e.g. Global Travel Group). To represent
this organisational form, we selected a
manufacturer/franchiser of chocolate, ice-cream and other
confectionery.
3.2.4 Retailer buyer-supplier relations
Retailers have typically been vertically disintegrated, relying
on third parties for the production of retail products and
solely concentrating on the selling of these products. Broadly,
this encompasses two types of arrangements. First, there are
retailers who largely sell products branded by the
manufacturer, and second, there are retailers who sell own
brands manufactured by an independent supplier. For
example, clothing retail may be typified by the example of
Marks and Spencer (M&S) in the UK. Although M&S has little
control in ownership terms over its subcontract clothing
manufacturers, it has an extremely strong de-facto control
over subcontractors due to the large volumes of garments
that it subcontracts out and the high dependence
(sometimes close to 100%) that subcontractors have upon
M&S as virtually sole customer.
While these types of relationship are well established, two
recent features have added considerable complexity. First, in
the case of M&S, it has largely abandoned its ‘buy British’
policy and is now securing the majority of its garments from
overseas. This adds considerable logistical complexity (Gereffi,
1996). Garment production, for example, is often
subcontracted to a ‘middle man’ in Hong Kong who in turn
subcontracts production to mainland China. Second, in the
UK there have been a number of new retail entrants into this
field, such as ASDA with its ‘George’ label. As an example of
retailing, we chose a large UK retailer that does not engage in
manufacturing but sells both the branded products of other
manufacturers or its own labels manufactured by external
suppliers.
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3.2.5 Public sector
Public sector organisations have undergone a dramatic
change in their form, structure and functions. Central to this
change has been the growth of private outsourcing of
services. Aside from legislative improvements (through CCT
and Best Value), there have been the contradictory demands
of capital spending and constraints at the same time as
increasing demands for new skills and technologies and rapid
productivity and performance improvements (Vincent et al,
2000). As a result there has been pressure to outsource
non-core functions such as, in the NHS, non-medical services
and information services (Boyne, 1998). Such outsourcing has
led to the emergence of a partnership model involving new
organisational forms, typically networked-based, which span
organisational boundaries (Buckley and Mitchie, 1996; Farrell
and Morris, 1999; Hoggett, 1996; Machado and Burns, 1998).
To cover this organisational form, we selected a major
teaching NHS Trust hospital.
3.2.6 Case study sample
In practice, the research sites to be used for the case studies
were selected for their representativeness, in terms of the
organisational forms that we wished to investigate, and for
the participants’ willingness to cooperate over a period of
time. Easterby-Smith et al recommend (2002, p.91) that
researchers ‘avoid being over-anxious about getting all the
data in one go. Relationships take time to form’. The sample
finally chosen is as outlined below, although specific
organisations are not identified, due to the confidentiality
agreement made at the initial point of contact. Some
additional information pertinent to the project is also given,
in support of the decision to choose them for interview.
Case 1: The vertically disintegrated manufacturer
This Company has been around for 100 years, and is an
integral part of the automotive industry. The Company’s
Chairman and CEO stated in their annual report for 2002
that ‘our plan focuses on the fundamentals that drive success
in our business: great products built with high quality at a
low cost and strong relationships with employees, suppliers
and dealers. For the year we exceeded nearly all the
commitments of our plan’. He referred to a number of
initiatives that the company had put in place to maintain
Case one’s competitive edge in the marketplace. For example,
he explained that ‘one of the processes we are expanding to
accelerate cost reduction and quality improvement is…a
data-driven methodology that uses statistical tools to reduce
waste and variability’.
Another process that the company intends to expand is what
they call Team Value Management (TVM). As the Chairman
explained ‘TVM brings our engineering, purchasing,
manufacturing and finance areas together with our suppliers
in commodity-focused teams to improve value while
maximizing quality…TVM is a key component in achieving
our financial objectives for the year’. Finally, he reports that
‘in January 2003 we added a new process aimed exclusively
at systematically accelerating our cost cutting. Our
leadership team identified cost-reduction bottlenecks in two
broad categories, global and operational, and assigned a
cross-functional team led by a high-ranking executive to
every issue. The teams and their leaders are responsible for
finding faster and better ways to reach our cost reduction
goals, and will report their progress to senior management on
a monthly basis’. All of this is aimed at making Ford’s plants
throughout the world ‘lean, flexible and cost-efficient’.
Case 2: The vertically integrated manufacturer/supplier
This case is the world’s leading food company and
Switzerland’s largest industrial company. It’s recent
performance has been achieved through ‘managing
complexity…delivering operational efficiencies…driving
growth…and creating winning environments’. A priority for
the Group in 2002, as stated in its Management Report 2002,
was ‘to lay the foundations for continued improvements in
business efficiency and EBITA (earnings before interest, tax
and amortisation of goodwill) margins’. With this aim in
mind, the company has pushed forward its GLOBE
programme, which they define as below:
‘GLOBE is designed to improve the performance and
operational efficiency of our businesses worldwide and is
making good progress with its three objectives: to establish
best practice in business processes; to align data standards
and data management and to use common information,
systems and infrastructure’.
Of particular interest to this project is the company’s aim of
standardising data, which in turn consisted of three parts:
establishing definitions for the data standards they wished to
identify; data conversion, including ‘cleansing, converting,
comparing and loading; and finally, data management, which
involved ‘the implementation of new processes, organisations
and tools’.
The results of the trials of the company’s GLOBE initiative
were successful, and summarised as follows in the group’s
Management Report (2002):
‘A better understanding of our purchasing data has allowed
us to identify on a global basis what we buy from which
supplier…markets within a region are individually buying
the same materials, even including globally and regionally
traded items, from the same suppliers…it is clear that we
have not been using our size as a strength and that we will
be able to realise substantial savings from this initiative’.
Case 3: Manufacturer/franchisor
The company is involved in the retailing and manufacturing
of high-quality chocolates, toffee, ice-cream and other
confectionery. The Chief Executive’s business overview for
2002 stated that: ‘I make no apologies for putting an internal
organisational initiative as a key strategic priority. The
improvement in like-for-like sales in own stores and
franchised locations has not arrived by accident, nor merely
through improvements to the product range alone. Over the
last two years, we have improved a number of internal
processes and systems which have produced good results,
particularly the management of stocks to avoid overhangs at
the key seasons whilst assuming we do not run the risk of
missing sales through stock shortages in stores. However, a
recent review of the systems supporting our own stores
identified that store managers we still spending an excessive
amount of time on cumbersome administrative processes,
not enough time on selling to customers and coaching their
colleagues. We realised there was a golden opportunity to
unlock this time and so further enhance like-for-like sales by,
for example, redesigning the weekly stock ordering process
and the planning of colleague hours.’
Further, and in relation to third party distribution, he added
that ‘we have now developed the wider distribution of (Case
3’s) branded product through additional channels working in
partnership with others, and we look to expand into further
outlets in time. For this new business to be successful, we
have to ensure we properly and professionally manage these
new relationships and fully understand the different
requirements needed from product development through to
product distribution. This again will demand that we adapt
our internal structure and processes to meet the exacting
requirements of our new partners’.
Case 4: The retailer 
This retailer has grown since its formation in 1924 as a small
grocery store. It is currently one of Britain’s leading food
retailers, but is also now an International Group, providing,
amongst other things, financial services and what they term
‘non-food’ items across the globe. Some of the company’s
success can be put down to its innovative ‘step change
programme’, introduced on the principles of providing goods
and services that were ‘better, simpler and cheaper’. Case 4’s
systems are summarised in the company’s Annual Review as
follows:
• ‘Our continuous replenishment system, where products are
ordered automatically based on continuous information
flows from our checkouts, is now operating on nearly all
food and drink lines, raising availability and simplifying
operations.
• Using the world’s first store-specific merchandising system
we can now tailor each store range to meet the precise
needs of its customers. Linked to continuous
replenishments, product space is allocated to demand.
• A new automatic scheduling system in stores works out
the optimum staffing levels required at checkouts, to
match 12 million customers per week with 18,000
checkouts.’
In addition, the company has extended its supply chain
process, appointing a new team ‘to increase our efficiency by
better managing the movement of goods between suppliers
and our regional distribution centres. By working with
suppliers, hauliers and consolidators we can reduce costs,
miles travelled, empty and lead times. We expect significant
savings in the next three years’.
Case 5: The NHS Trust hospital 
This NHS Trust provides acute hospital services to people
living in Northern England, as well as specialist services to
people from further afield who require specialist heart
surgery, treatment for burns, plastic surgery, cancer services,
renal services and rehabilitation for those with major physical
disabilities. There is less in the public domain for the Trust
than for the rest of our sample, given the nature of the
organisation. However, we do have access to a Clinical
Governance Review Report on the Trust, undertaken by the
Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) in 2002.
Amongst other things, the CHI report concluded that ‘the
trust needs to develop strategies to ensure that progress on
clinical governance covers the whole organisation. These
strategies should help to extend its work or clinical
governance across boundaries with partner organisations. CHI
saw good examples of clinical governance working in clinical
teams, but the trust needs to put structures in place to make
sure that this is the norm and not the exception’. In terms of
the Trusts organisation, the CHI observed that ‘there have
been many changes in the senior team in the recent past and
also big organisational changes. This has left some staff
feeling unsupported and the trust needs to find ways to listen
to staff and provide supportive leadership to develop
openness in the trust’.
3.3 Research questions
Having appraised the literature, a number of areas of concern
were identified as being central to the role of management
accounting in the context of supply chain relations and,
therefore, worthy of investigation in the study. We have
grouped the detailed issues we consider in our research under
three headings: the role of management accounting
calculations in the supply chain; the relationship between
management accounting and the management of
supplier-chain relations; and management accounting and
the impact of outsourcing on corporate performance. These
issues are detailed below.
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3.3.1 The role of management accounting calculations in
the supply chain
• What types of accounting calculations and practices are
used in the decision to outsource? Have new accounting
techniques been developed for that purpose? If yes, what
are these new techniques, and where did they come from?
Or are existing management accounting calculations being
used in new and different ways from previously? If so, how?
• When a company has manufacturing facilities, what is the
role of management accounting in deciding upon which
activities are to be outsourced and which activities are to
be performed internally? 
• What other arguments, other than accounting, impact
upon this decision? What is the role of management
accounting in defining the terms ‘core’ and ‘non-core’? 
• How, and to what extent do these definitions of ‘core’ and
‘non-core’ vary over time and how does the role of
management accounting in this context change over time?
3.3.2 Accounting and the management of supplier-chain
relations
• Have new management accounting techniques been
developed to manage emerging supplier-chain relations? If
so, what are these new techniques, and where did they
come from? Or are current management accounting
techniques being used in new ways to manage
supplier-chain relations? If so, what are the changes in the
way management accounting information has been used? 
• What is the role of management accounting in the writing
of outsourcing contracts?
• What role does management accounting play in overseeing
the exercise and revision of outsourcing contracts?
• What is the impact of accounting calculations on the
determination of the length of the outsourcing contract?
• What is the role of management accounting in enforcing
outsourcing contracts? In cases of breach of contract, how
are sanctions defined and what role does accounting play in
this context? Also, how are the costs to the company of
breach of contract assessed? How is the impact of this
failure upon the performance of other units/departments
within the company assessed?
• How are different suppliers compared? What precise
accounting metrics are used to rank suppliers? When is it
felt desirable to terminate contracts with specific suppliers? 
• To what extent do management accounting practices
underpin network relations and facilitate or frustrate the
development of mutual trust between the supplier and the
company?
• How is expertise (technical, product design, etc.)
assembled, promoted, and transferred within and across the
supplier chain? Is this transfer of knowledge subjected to
any form of accounting calculation? If so, how?
• Is there a transfer of accounting and finance skills from the
company to the supplier? If yes, how is this achieved, and
what are the perceived benefits?
3.3.3 Management accounting and the impact of
outsourcing on corporate performance
• Is the impact of outsourcing on corporate performance
assessed? If so, how? 
• What measures of efficiency and effectiveness are used by
companies? What is the accounting input in these
measures?
• How, if at all, is value creation measured? Similarly, how is
value capture measured?
• What is the basis for deciding to continue with
outsourcing? Is it earning a predetermined profit target
based on company’s previous performance? Or is it based
on bench-marking against major competitors? Or
bench-marking against industry norms?
3.4 Research instruments
Two research instruments were designed around the themes
identified above, in order to elicit the data required for the
project. The first, a semi-structured interview schedule, was
designed to enable the interviewer to cover a number of key
topics, but also to give the respondent the opportunity to
talk quite freely about the subject. A completely unstructured
interview would provide ‘large amounts of rich, fertile but
disorganised data’ (Jancowicz (2000, p.237)), whereas the
more guided approached taken here allows specific identified
issues to be addressed in some detail.
The second research instrument, a postal questionnaire, was
designed to be sent out to a larger sample of firms and
organisations. The main advantage with questionnaires is that
‘it allows you to standardise your questioning to such an
extent that a more numerate, statistically-based analysis is
possible, and permits you to test out hypotheses more
explicitly’ (Jancowicz, 2000, p.269).
3.4.1 Schedule for semi-structured interviews
Table 3.1 gives the semi-structured interview agenda that
was designed for use during the face-to-face interviews with
our case study sample. The full interview schedule is
contained in Appendix 2 to this report.
Table 3.1 Semi-structured interview agenda
1. Deciding to outsource
2. Managing suppliers
3. Accounting implications
4. Company performance
The first section of the semi-structured interview schedule
covered the decision by the company to undertake
outsourcing in the first place. Respondents were given the
following definition, before being asked to consider the
rationale behind outsourcing their organisation’s functions:
‘Outsourcing is an arrangement whereby a third party
provider assumes responsibility for performing functions at
a pre-determined price and according to predetermined
performance criteria’.
We were interested in the extent to which business activities
were outsourced, as well as the effect on costs that they
expected to see through outsourcing. It was also of interest
to us to determine the motivation behind outsourcing, and
the outcomes experienced compared to those anticipated.
Section two was concerned with the impact on the
management of the organisation’s suppliers. This covered the
size and duration of contracts with specific suppliers, and the
ways in which they were managed or controlled. Respondents
were also asked to identify any ‘hidden costs’ or otherwise
unanticipated problems with outsourcing, and to describe
any ways in which these problems had been alleviated. In this
regard, privacy and confidentiality were two issues that were
addressed explicitly.
The third section of the interview schedule addressed the
accounting implications of undertaking new outsourcing
and/or subcontracting deals. This began with a look at the
types of accounting calculations made to assist in making
decisions about whether to outsource or not, and which
suppliers to choose. We were also interested in determining
whether any new accounting techniques had been developed
explicitly to cope with these new contracts, and who would
be involved in assisting these developments. We wanted to
find out whether our sample companies had any influence
over the accounting system of their outsourcing
organisations, and the nature of any such influence. Finally,
the last section of the semi-structured interview schedule
enquired about the effect of outsourcing or subcontracting
on organisational performance. This might be in financial
terms, or it might be in terms of the quality of product or
service the company offered.
3.4.2 Postal questionnaire
The postal questionnaire was developed along the same
themes as the schedule for semi-structured interviews, but
had five main headings, as in Table 3.2. The full questionnaire,
as sent to the private sector companies in the sample, is
contained in Appendix 4. The first section was designed to
elicit some basic information on the organisation concerned.
It covered items like the nature of the organisation, and its
size, in terms of turnover and employees. It also enquired as
to the extent of organisational change that had occurred
during the previous three years, and the main reasons for the
occurrence of such change.
Table 3.2 Postal questionnaire agenda
1. Company Information
2. The Decision to Outsource
3. Managing Suppliers and the Supply Chain
4. Accounting Implications
5. The Impact on Company Performance
The remaining section of the postal questionnaire covered
much the same topics as in the semi-structured interview
schedule. However, some notable differences are worthy of
comment. First, the postal questionnaire was to be sent to
three different organisational types: private sector companies
(Private); local authorities (LA); and national health service
trusts (NHS). Therefore modifications were made to the
introductory letter (see Appendix three) and throughout the
questionnaire, where necessary, to reflect the organisational
type being approached. For example, we might expect to see
a different response for private sector compared to public
sector organisations when we ask questions about
competitors and/or benchmarking.
The other main difference between the semi-structured
interview schedule and the postal questionnaire is in the
design of specific questions. With the postal questionnaire,
questions were designed to elicit definite responses, which
could be coded and classified for detailed statistical analysis,
rather than written discursive comments, which are of more
use for case studies. So, for example, many of the responses
in the postal questionnaire could be coded as (0,1), or binary,
variables, where ‘1’ signifies a positive response. Other
variables were simply numerical – for example, ‘how many
employees do you have?’ or ‘what was your latest annual
turnover?’ And many of the responses were measured on a
Likert scale, to gauge the respondent’s strength of feeling
about a particular statement. For example, ‘on a scale of 1 to
5, where 1 is weak and 5 is strong, how much do you agree
with the following statements? …’.3 These could then easily
be entered onto a database for later analysis, as contained in
chapter 4 below.
3.5 Interviewing
One potentially problematic area in the case studies is the
issue of organisational access. Given research contacts in the
UK gained over an extensive period by the three applicants,
there were few, if any problems, in accessing the chosen
research sites. However, good practice requires maintaining a
good working relationship with the subjects of the research.4
Potential respondents were therefore approached first of all
with a preletter (see Appendix 1). This described the nature of
the study, and was designed to elicit their participation, by
promising to treat their responses with confidentiality.
3 See, for example Easterby-Smith et al (2002), Chapter 5: Qualitative
Methods, for more information.
4 See, for example, Jancowicz (2000) Chapter 7 on ‘gaining entry’, for a
discussion of best practice.
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Once the pre-letter had been sent, follow-up phone calls
were made to arrange appointments with one, or a number,
of key personnel within the organisation. Meetings then took
place with key staff, including both designers and users of
management accounting systems (for example, strategy
makers, managers at various organisational levels, staff
involved in the supply chain, management accountants, and
so on) in each of the case study organisations.
The interviews themselves began by the researchers
introducing themselves and explaining that they were part of
a multi-disciplinary project team examining the role of
management accounting in processes of organisational
change, with particular reference to supply chain relations.
This enabled the respondents to learn about the main aims of
the project and what the sponsors were hoping to gain from
it. They were told that the researchers would like to conduct a
number of interviews in the organisation and, in this way,
additional contact names were obtained for possible future
interviewees. Respondents were encouraged to participate by
assurances of confidentiality and, once they felt comfortable
with the researchers and the fieldwork methods being used,
they generally agreed to the interviews being tape-recorded.
Following the interview, a thank you letter was sent to those
who had participated, and the recorded interview was
transcribed in order for them to be analysed. In total, 93
interviews of between one and two hours were conducted.
3.6 Postal questionnaire
The postal questionnaire (Appendix 4), in its varying forms,
was sent out along with the descriptive pre-letter (Appendix
3) to a sample of organisations. The private organisations
selected were the Times 500 companies. For the sample of
Local Authorities, the Guardian Local Authority Directory was
consulted. The NHS Trusts sample was taken from The
Fitzhugh Directory of NHS Trusts. The number of valid
responses received from the mail shot were n=73 (private
sector organisations), n=29 (National Health Service (NHS)
Trusts), and n=30 (Local Authorities (LA)). Overall, this
represents a response rate of around 15 per cent, which is
about what would typically be expected using such data
collection method.
In some instances, the questionnaire was returned
unanswered or not returned at all. In these cases a follow-up
letter and additional questionnaire were posted, and
potential respondents were given the opportunity to state
why they had refused to complete the questionnaire, or why
they felt unable to do so. Occasionally, the original
questionnaire had been misplaced, or misdirected, so this
additional follow-up enabled the sample to be extended to
some (albeit small) degree.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the methodology used in
collecting the data for this study. Two new research
instruments were designed for use: (a) in semi-structured
fieldwork interviews; and (b) as postal questionnaires. A
description is given of the ideal research sites to be used in
addressing the research questions identified. Then, the actual
sample of organisations approached is described in some
detail, without being identified explicitly. An illustration is
given of the interviewing process, as it was undertaken.
Finally, the ways in which the postal questionnaire survey was
undertaken are outlined. The next chapter now goes on to
discuss the information obtained from the postal
questionnaires.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents our findings from the data gathered by
postal questionnaire. It covers a representative sample of
responses from private sector companies, NHS Trusts, and
Local Authorities. Thus it provides preliminary evidence of the
ways in which management accounting is influenced by
developments in organisational forms. The key issues
examined are as identified in earlier chapters, and include: the
influence of subcontracting on the organisation’s
management accounting, the management of buyer-supplier
relations and the impact of a changing organisational form
on corporate performance.
4.2 Background information
Figures 4.1 to 4.3 show the breakdown of organisational
types into their constituent parts. First, in Figure 4.1, we have
the private sector companies who participated in the survey.
Manufacturing accounts for just over a third of respondents
(36%), followed by retail and wholesale at just under one
quarter (23%), then financial services at 13%. Figure 4.2 gives
the National Health Service (NHS) Trusts breakdown.
Hospital Trusts, unsurprisingly, were the largest group, at 44%,
followed by Mental Health Trusts (25%),
Ambulance/Paramedic Trusts (19%) and Community Trusts
(12%). Finally, the geographic operations of the Local
Authorities who responded were primarily District (66%),
followed by London or Metropolitan (14%), then County and
Borough at 10% each. Thus we have a good distribution of
respondents from across our organisational forms.
Figure 4.1 Private sector companies
4. Analysis of questionnaire results
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Figure 4.2 National Health Service (NHS) Trusts
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Table 4.1 now summarises some of the key features of the
organisations approached. Respondents were asked to
indicate on the questionnaire which size grouping they fell
into, in terms of the number of employees (EMPLOY). Private
sector companies (PRIVATE) had, on average, between 5,001
and 10,000 employees; NHS Trusts (NHS) between 2,001 and
5,000; and Local Authorities (LA) the same, between 2,001
and 5,000. The extent of organisational change (CHANGE)
experienced during the last three years was most marked in
the NHS (=3.80), and similar for private companies (=3.57)
and LAs (=3.5), where the variable was coded on a Likert
scale from 0 (= no change) to 5 (= extreme change).
4.2.1 The extent and form of organisational change
Dummy variables (0-1; 0 = no change; 1 = change) were
introduced to capture the nature of the recent change that
had occurred in organisational form. First, in terms of formal
or legal structure, about one half of private companies had
been involved in a merger or acquisition (MERGAQ =51%);
and 43% of NHS Trusts had seen a merger or amalgamation.
Just under one quarter of private companies had been
through a demerger or a divestment of part of its activities
(DEMDIV =23%), but this was relatively unimportant in the
NHS (=17%) and LAs (=13%). On the other hand, the NHS
had been most likely to see a strategic alliance or partnership
come about (STRATALL =43%), followed by one third of LAs
(=35%).
The internal effects of these changes varied across
organisational types. The NHS had been most likely to see an
increase in the number of departments (INCDIV =50%),
whereas about one third of private companies (=31%) had
experienced an increase in the number of departments or
divisions. LAs, on the other hand, were more likely to have
seen a reduction in the number of departments (REDDIV
=58%). Reductions were less likely in private companies
(=26%) or NHS Trusts (=20%). However, the removal of
managerial layers (REMLAY) to simplify and flatten
organisational structure was quite common throughout (LA
=55%; Private =44%; NHS =37%). The NHS was the most
likely type to have seen the introduction of a completely new
structural form or model (NEWFORM =77%); though the
majority of LAs (=68%) had also seen similar developments.
Just over one half of private companies (=55%) had, similarly,
seen new structures introduced. Thus the changes in
organisational form discussed in the literature are evident in
the sample analysed in our study.
Respondents were given the opportunity to identify the
factors which were most likely to have influenced changes in
organisational form. The questions measured the importance
of a given statement on a Likert scale where ‘1’ signifies
‘unimportant’ and ‘5’ signifies ‘very important’ (‘irrelevant’
was coded as ‘0’). Their responses are graphed in Figure 4.4
below. Clearly, the most important factor in influencing
change in form was the introduction of new leadership or
senior management team to the organisation. This was
followed by a response to the general product market
conditions. Of lesser importance, though still quite influential,
was the need to reduce staffing or fixed costs, the wish to
focus on core, rather than peripheral, activities, or the
imposition of new government policy. A desire to emulate
best practice was also relatively important, but changes in
customer demands or tastes, and competition from rival
companies were seen to have little influence on
organisational form.
Table 4.1 Summary information
Private NHS LA Total
1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean Mean Mean Mean
EMPLOY 5694.08 3163.79 3429.69 4629.56
CHANGE 3.57 3.80 3.55 3.61
MERGAQ .51 .43 .19 .42
DEMDIV .23 .17 .13 .20
STRATALL .23 .43 .35 .30
INCDIV .31 .50 .03 .29
REDDIV .26 .20 .58 .32
REMLAY .44 .37 .55 .45
NEWFORM .55 .77 .68 .62
MA .95 .97 .41 .83
MASTAFF 7.36 10.03 5.00 7.75
OUTSOUR 2.60 2.67 2.66 2.63
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66% district 
Figure 4.3 Local authorities
Looking at the information on management accounting
facilities by organisational type, nearly all private sector firms
had a specialist management accounting function
(MA =95%), as did most NHS Trusts (=97%); compared to
only 41% of LAs. For those who did have such a function, the
average number of management accounting specialists
working in the organisation was 10 (NHS), 7 (Private),
and 5 (LA).
Figure 4.5 gives evidence on the use of management
accounting consultants. Overall, more than half (54%) of
respondents said that they had no plans to use consultants
for management accounting purposes. Just over one third
(34%) had previously used consultants, but 27% said that
they would only use them as a last resort. Only a minority of
all of the respondents to the questionnaire said that they
currently used management accounting, whether for routine
purposes, new projects or to develop new techniques.
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Figure 4.4 Factors influencing change in organisational form
new leadership/senior management 4.1
general product market conditions 3.4
reduction in staffing costs 3.2
reduction of fixed costs 3.2
focus on core activities 3.2
government policy 3.2
emulation of best practice 3.1
changes in customer demands/tastes2.4 2.4
competition from rival companies 2.3
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Figure 4.5 The use of management accounting consultants
do not plan to use 54%
have previously used 34%
use as a last resort 27%
plan to use in future 13%
currently use 8%
currently use to develop new MA techniques 4%
currently use for all new MA projects 2%
currently use for all MA functions 0%
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4.3 The decision to outsource
The questionnaire contained the following explanation in
relation to outsourcing, so that respondents were fully
conversant with what was required: ‘by outsourcing, we mean
an arrangement whereby a third party provider performs
functions for your company to meet pre-determined price
and performance criteria’.
4.3.1 The extent of outsourcing and subcontracting
Across all organisational types, the extent of outsourcing and
subcontracting (OUTSOUR) was similarly moderate, on
average (Private =2.6; NHS =2.67; LA =2.66), on a scale from
0 (none) to 5 (a great deal) (cf. Table 4.1). Overall data on the
nature of outsourcing is contained in Table 4.2. The activities
which are currently outsourced are listed in the first column
from most to least important. So cleaning and catering top
this list, with security and maintenance also being outsourced
by more than half of respondents. Payroll and distribution
were equally likely to be outsourced (38%), then computing
or IT facilities. Of least significance, and probably to be
expected, only 8% of organisations subcontracted or
outsourced part of their core business. The third column in
table 4.3 shows, for those who currently outsource an
activity, the percentage that had previously conducted this
activity in-house. The most striking observations are on
payroll and core business. One half (50%) of those who now
outsourced payroll had previously handled this activity
in-house. Two thirds (64%) of organisations outsourcing core
business had previously dealt with this in-house.
Possibly of more interest is the final column of this table,
which shows whether the activity now being outsourced was
calculated, or perceived by our respondents to cost more
than, less than, or the same as previously, when it was
undertaken in-house. Most activities appear, on average, to
cost the organisation less under outsourcing and
subcontracting. Two are seen to cost the same, these being
computing or IT facilities, and those core business activities
which were subcontracted. Only training and recruitment
were reported to cost more under outsourcing.
Table 4.2 The nature of outsourcing
Service/activity Percentage Of those outsourcing, Activity now costs
contracting out percentage previously
in-house
Cleaning 77% 35% Less
Catering 61% 38% Less
Security 57% 34% Less
Maintenance 52% 40% Less
Payroll 38% 50% Less
Distribution 38% 30% Less
Computing 28% 40% Same
Printing 19% 42% Less
Training 18% 41% More
Recruitment 15% 41% More
Core business 8% 64% Same
However, these are functions at which an organisation would
not necessarily be adept, and so paying others to improve the
skills of the organisation may be seen as a benefit which
outweighs the additional costs incurred.
Table 4.3 gives additional information on the reasons for
which particular activities were first outsourced. Of those
outsourcing their core business, 73% reported that they did it
primarily to save money. The cost-benefit analysis undertaken
must have suggested this would be the eventual outcome,
though our evidence from table 4.2 shows that, on average,
these costs stayed the same, as noted above. The activity
most likely to be outsourced in order to improve the service
was training (50%), followed by computing (47%). This is
consistent with the earlier evidence; organisations are clearly
willing to pay the additional costs if they believe that the
skills of their staff will improve. Delegating recruitment was
important to half of our respondents (50%) for the prime
reason that they wished to concentrate more on core
activities. Again, this is consistent with our findings above
that, although outsourcing recruitment costs the organisation
more, this is a cost that they are willing to bear if it will free
up time for them to concentrate more on their core business.
Finally, training was outsourced by 27% of firms in order to
improve their flexibility.
4.3.2 The main factors in decision-making
Figure 4.5 shows the respondents’ responses to statements
about the most important factors in making the decision
whether or not to outsource the organisation’s activities. As
earlier, these were measured on a Likert scale from 1
(‘unimportant’) to 5 (‘very important’). The most important
reasons for outsourcing an activity were to achieve:
reductions in fixed costs; an improvement in quality; access
to specialised skills; and a greater focus on the organisation’s
core activities. Economies of scale and improved flexibility
were additional benefits that the organisation hoped to
experience. Factors such as improved organisational
accountability and a clarification of responsibilities were seen
to have lesser importance than the rest.
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Table 4.3 Reasons for outsourcing
Activity Save money Activity Improve Activity Focus Activity Improve 
service on core flexibility
Core business 73% Training 50% Recruitment 50% Training 27%
Printing 57% Computing 47% Distribution 48% Core business 20%
Security 47% Payroll 38% Catering 46% Recruitment 19%
Maintenance 47% Maintenance 29% Cleaning 41% Maintenance 16%
Cleaning 45% Security 26% Printing 39% Distribution 16%
Catering 45% Catering 26% Computing 38% Catering 13%
Payroll 40% Recruitment 25% Maintenance 33% Computing 12%
Distribution 34% Core business 20% Core business 30% Cleaning 11%
Recruitment 33% Printing 18% Security 27% Security 10%
Computing 26% Distribution 18% Training 23% Payroll 7%
Training 14% Cleaning 17% Payroll 21% Printing 5%
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We used the data we have gathered to correlate the extent
of organisational change and outsourcing with the nature of
such change, and the results are reported in Table 4.4. First,
private companies associated organisational change with an
increased importance of focusing on core activities
(FOCUSCOR = 0.272; Prob. val. = 0.022). Conversely, those
who had experienced a greater extent of outsourcing were
less likely to agree that focusing on core activities was a key
concern in decision-making (FOCUSCOR = -0.280; Prob. Val.
= 0.021). Of all our organisational types, only private
companies showed a positive association between
outsourcing and the use of MA consultants for all new MA
projects (USENEW = 0.335; Prob. Val. = 0.012).
The NHS showed some strong positive associations between
the extent of outsourcing and the nature of organisational
change. Thus it was associated with new Trust leadership or
senior management (NEWLEAD = 0.538; Prob. Val. = 0.004);
a need to focus on core activities (FOCUSCOR = 0.461; Prob.
Val. = 0.016); and a wish to emulate ‘best practice’ (BETPRAC
= 0.439; Prob. Val. = 0.022). Local authorities only showed
significant correlation between the extent of outsourcing and
the introduction of new senior management
(NEWLEAD = 0.381; Prob. Val. = 0.041). Whilst these are
measures of association, rather than of causality, it might
reasonably be assumed that new management and/or
leadership have been the instigators of an increase in the use
of subcontracting or outsourcing in public sector
organisations like the NHS and LAs.
Figure 4.6 Main factors in decision-making
reductions in fixed costs 3.75
improvement in quality 3.65
access to specialised skills 3.65
focus on core business 3.6
economies of scale 3.4
improved flexibility 3.3
improved organisational accountability 2.7
clarification of responsibilities 2.6
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Table 4.4 Outsourcing and nature of change
Private NHS Local Authorities
Change Extent of Change Extent of Change Extent of
in form outsourcing in form outsourcing in form outsourcing
NEWLEAD -0.069 -0.075 0.163 0.538** 0.279 0.381*
FOCUSCOR –0.272* -0.280* 0.208 0.461* 0.116 0.048
BESTPRAC –0.162 -0.104 0.283 0.439* 0.349 0.103
USENEW –0.060 –0.335* 0.176 n.a. n.a. n.a.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
4.4 Management accounting implications
In this section we present the results pertaining to the
management accounting techniques used by our respondents
in the context of outsourcing decisions, and the effects of
outsourcing activities upon management accounting.
4.4.1 Management accounting techniques in use
An important goal of our work is to identify the role of
management accounting in the decision to outsource and/or
to choose between alternative suppliers. We were interested
in discovering whether new accounting techniques were
being developed for such purposes. If so, what were those
new techniques, and where did they come from? Or was
existing management accounting being used in new and
different ways from previously? Table 4.5 gives evidence on
the use of traditional management accounting techniques in
each of our three organisational types. The NHS is shown to
be the most intensive user of these ‘tried’ and ‘tested’
methods, rating the importance of each option as higher than
did both private sector firms and local authorities. For
example, cost-benefit analysis (COSTBEN) was given a mean
value of 4.04, where the scale ranged from 0 (irrelevant) to 5
(very important).
Whilst the mean observations give us an intuitive idea of how
important is each technique to the different organisational
forms, we can employ more rigorous statistical testing to
examine this further. Table 4.6 contains the results of a
nonparametric test, which computes ranks for the variables
being observed. In this example, the variables are ranked from
least (lowest number) to most (highest number) important
(Mean Rank), but have been re-ordered, and numbered 1 to 6,
from most to least important. The test statistic, Kendall’s W,
is the coefficient of concordance. Essentially, here, it
measures the extent to which respondents agree in the
rankings they assign to variables. Thus for Private Sector firms
42.8% of respondents agree on the order in which they rank
our variables. This result is highly statistically significant
(Prob. val. = 0.000). Indeed, our results are consistently
significant across organisational types.
All methods were rated as important to some degree. In order
of importance, following cost-benefit analysis, were: net
present value (NPV = 3.52); payback (PAYBACK = 3.43);
discounted cashflow (DCF = 3.41); and breakeven analysis
(BRKEVN = 3.30). Private sector firms placed most
importance on cost-benefit analysis (COSTBEN = 4.01) when
making the decision to outsource, or evaluating alternative
suppliers, followed by the time taken to pay back (PAYBACK
= 3.13). These were also the two methods on which local
authorities placed most importance (COSTBEN = 3.80;
PAYBACK = 3.17). We also included at this point a variable to
examine whether or not non-financial measures (NONFIN)
were used to help organisations assess the decision whether
or not to outsource and/or to choose between alternative
suppliers. This variable was measured on a scale of ‘0-1’; ‘0’ =
‘no’ and ‘1’ = ‘yes’. As we can see, across the board, non-
financial measures were deemed to be of some, but not
much, importance (NONFIN = 0.54, 0.65, 0.56, for Private,
NHS and LA, respectively).
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Table 4.5 Accounting techniques
Private NHS LA Total
Mean Mean Mean Mean
NPV 2.91 3.52 2.97 3.06
DCF 2.96 3.41 3.03 3.07
BRKEVN 2.76 3.30 2.67 2.85
COSTBEN 4.01 4.04 3.80 3.97
PAYBACK 3.13 3.43 3.17 3.21
NONFIN 0.54 0.65 0.56 0.57
Table 4.6 Ranking of techniques
Private NHS LA
Mean rank Mean rank Mean rank
4.88 1. COSTBEN 4.60 1. COSTBEN 4.85 1. COSTBEN
3.79 2. PAYBACK 3.90 2. NPV 4.06 2. PAYBACK
3.75 3. DCF 3.88 3. DCF 3.83 3. DCF
3.66 4. NPV 3.75 4. PAYBACK 3.69 4. NPV
3.39 5. BRKEVN 3.69 5. BRKEVN 3.23 5. BRKEVN
1.52 6. NONFIN 1.19 6. NONFIN 1.35 6. NONFIN
N 64 24 26
Kendall’s W 0.428 0.500 0.547
Chi-Square 136.927 60.03 71.154
df 5 5 5
asymp.Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000
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In terms of the order in which techniques are ranked, private
sector companies thought that cost benefit analysis was
most important, followed by payback, discounted cash flow,
net present value, breakeven analysis and non-financial
analysis, in that order, which is consistent with our mean
values, but is now given statistical support. Local Authorities
agreed with this ranking. The NHS Trusts, however, differ
slightly. They too regard cost benefit analysis as the most
important technique. However, the ranks for payback and
NPV are exchanged, with NPV being second most important,
and payback being fourth. We can explore these differences
further by computing an analysis of variance from the mean
for the NHS, as compared to the others. In fact, there are two
variables that stand out as being significantly more important
to the NHS than to the other organisational forms. These are
NPV (Prob. val. = 0.058) and breakeven analysis (Prob. val. =
0.065). So while breakeven analysis is ranked only fifth out of
six, in terms of importance, across all organisational forms, as
a technique for deciding upon major decisions like
outsourcing it is statistically more important to the NHS
Trusts than to our other two organisational forms. We
conclude that older, more traditional management
accounting techniques still play an important role in
decision-making in modern organisational forms. Cost benefit
analysis remains important, especially in the public sector,
where expenditure often must be justified, but it is not clear
why NPV might be more important to the NHS than to
others.
4.4.2 Effects of outsourcing on management accounting
Having established that traditional methods are still
important, our next goal was to examine the extent to which
a given list of changes in and effects on management
accounting systems had taken place in the organisation since
beginning to outsource or subcontract. Table 4.7 gives the
mean responses, which were, again, graded on a scale from 0
(no change at all) to 5 (great change). In general, there was
no strong agreement with any of the alternatives offered. The
strongest agreement of private companies was with the
statement that: ‘we have introduced new cost centres to
account for outsourced activities’ (ACOUTE = 2.37); followed
by ‘management accounting staff are involved in evaluating
the costs of a failure of contractual relationships’ (ACOUTG =
2.36). NHS trusts agreed slightly more strongly with both of
these statements (ACOUTE = 2.64; ACOUTG = 2.84). Local
authorities also were most likely to have established new cost
centres (ACOUTE = 2.77). Their next strongest agreement
was with the statement that ‘we have increased the level of
responsibility of those staff involved in reporting’
(ACOUC = 2.50).
Table 4.7 Effects of outsourcing on
management accounting
Private NHS LA Total
1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean Mean Mean Mean
ACOUTA 1.57 1.60 2.03 1.69
ACOUTB 2.24 1.84 2.37 2.19
ACOUTC 2.10 1.96 2.50 2.17
ACOUTD 2.23 1.84 2.40 2.19
ACOUTE 2.37 2.64 2.77 2.52
ACOUTF 2.31 2.20 2.47 2.32
ACOUTG 2.36 2.84 2.07 2.39
ACOUTH 2.11 2.16 1.87 2.06
ACOUTI 1.43 1.24 1.57 1.43
While there was only limited agreement with the
aforementioned statements, there was even less agreement
with the remaining statements. These were:
• ‘we have changed the frequency of reporting’ (ACOUTA)
• ‘we have increased the level of detail in our reporting’
(ACOUTB)
• ‘we have modified our budgeting processes’ (ACOUTD)
• ‘we have developed new management accounting
techniques and measurements to cope with new
requirements’ (ACOUTF)
• ‘we make specific calculations on the cost of contractual
failure on company performance’ (ACOUTH)
• ‘there has been a significant transfer of accounting skill and
information to suppliers’ (ACOUTI).
Respondents were next asked to indicate how strongly they
agreed with statements about the nature of any change in
management accounting systems. Their mean responses are
contained in Table 4.9. There was fairly strong agreement
overall for the statement that ‘we set budgets as part of our
master budget for each outsourced activity’ (ACSYSJ = 3.71
(Private), = 3.74 (NHS), = 3.73 (LA)). There was also a general
consensus that outsourced suppliers were treated as on-going
‘partners’ (ACSYSL = 3.68 (Private), = 3.78 (NHS), = 3.63
(LA)). Across all three organisational forms, monitoring of
outsourced suppliers was common (ACSYSN = 3.67 (Private),
= 3.33 (NHS), = 3.77 (LA)).
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Table 4.8 Correlation of outsourcing with change in management accounting
Private NHS Local Authorities
Extent of outsourcing Extent of outsourcing Extent of outsourcing
ACOUTA -0.034 0.469* 0.230
ACOUTD –0.168 0.241 0.453*
ACOUTF –0.182 0.332 0.376*
ACOUTH –0.001 0.581** 0.262
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
So far, there is little evidence to suggest that changes in
organisational form, of the nature we have discussed above,
have any great impact upon the development of accounting
systems used within organisations. We chose, therefore, to
investigate whether there was any significant correlation
between the extent of outsourcing and subcontracting
undertaken and the level of agreement with statements
about changes in MA systems. Table 4.8 contains the
significant relationships observed. It is interesting to note
that there was no significant relationship between the extent
of outsourcing and management accounting change for
private companies. However, there were positive significant
associations between outsourcing and change in MA systems
for both the NHS and LAs. First, the greater the degree of
outsourcing, the more frequent was MA reporting in the
NHS, since beginning to outsource (ACOUTA = 0.469; Prob.
Val. = 0.028). In addition, the greater the extent of
outsourcing, the more likely were the NHS to make specific
calculations of the cost of contractual failure on their
organisational performance (ACOUTH = 0.581; Prob. Val. =
0.005). For local authorities, more outsourcing had led to a
modification of budgeting processes (ACOUTD = 0.453; Prob.
Val. = 0.014). Further, it often meant that new MA techniques
and measurements had been developed in order to cope with
the new requirements it imposed (ACOUTF = 0.376; Prob.
Val. = 0.044). Thus we do observe a positive impact of
outsourcing on management accounting systems.
Table 4.9 Changes in management accounting
Private NHS LA Total
1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean Mean Mean Mean
ACSYSA 1.75 1.57 2.13 1.80
ACSYSB 3.28 3.29 3.35 3.30
ACSYSC 2.22 2.29 2.67 2.34
ACSYSD 1.18 1.00 1.40 1.20
ACSYSE 1.77 1.93 2.37 1.95
ACSYSO n/a 1.74 2.07 1.91
ACSYSF 3.50 3.25 3.50 3.45
ACSYSG 2.88 2.67 2.87 2.83
ACSYSH 2.49 1.75 2.00 2.22
ACSYSI 1.61 1.26 1.68 1.55
ACSYSJ 3.71 3.74 3.73 3.72
ACSYSK 3.03 2.58 3.43 3.03
ACSYSL 3.68 3.78 3.63 3.69
ACSYSM 3.11 2.26 2.70 2.84
ACSYSN 3.67 3.33 3.77 3.62
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Respondents disagreed with many of the statements they
were given. The strongest disagreement overall was with the
statement that ‘our new ideas for management accounting
come from hired consultants’ (ACSYSD = 1.18 (Private),
= 1.00 (NHS), = 1.40 (LA)). There was also disagreement that
‘we exert considerable control over our outsourcing suppliers’
accounting systems’ (ACSYSI = 1.61 (Private), = 1.26 (NHS),
= 1.68 (LA)).
In general, there was also disagreement, though weaker than
in the above cases, with the following statements:
• ‘we have had to make major changes in our management
accounting systems’ (ACSYSA)
• ‘we have had to develop our own methods of analysis to
cope with outsourced contracts’ (ACSYSC)
• ‘our new ideas for management accounting come from
imitating other organisations’ (ACSYSE)
• ‘deciding which functions are ‘core’ and which should be
outsourced depends largely on cost considerations’
(ACSYSH)
• ‘our new ideas for management accounting come from
imitating private sector organisations’ (NHS and LA only)
(ACSYSO).
In Table 4.10 we present further correlations between
organisational change and outsourcing and the effect of
these on accounting systems. In private companies, greater
outsourcing was associated with a greater agreement that
new ideas for management accounting were developed
internally (ACSYSF = 0.255; Prob. Val. = 0.036); and also that
there had been a change in the types of decision for which
MA information was used (ACSYSG = 0.295; Prob. Val. =
0.014). With the NHS, we observe that greater outsourcing
was positively associated with the increased exertion of
control over outsourcing suppliers’ accounting systems
(ACSYSI = 0.440; Prob. Val. = 0.031); and with the imitation
of private sector organisations for new MA ideas (ACSYSO =
0.430; Prob. Val. = 0.036).
The local authorities associated change in organisational form
with a number of MA issues. The greater the change, the
more likely were they to agree that: they had needed to
develop their own methods of analysis to cope with
outsourced contracts (ACSYSC = 0.411; Prob. Val. = 0.024);
but also that they had developed new ideas for MA with the
help of hired consultants (ACSYSD = 0.548; Prob. Val. =
0.002); and by imitating other public sector organisations
(ACSYSE = 0.456; Prob. Val. = 0.011). There was also a
positive association with change and largely using costs to
determine which functions were ‘core’ and which should be
outsourced (ACSYSH = 0.555; Prob. Val. = 0.001). Further, LAs
which had experienced greater change were more likely to
treat outsourced suppliers as on-going ‘partners’ (ACSYSL =
0.388; Prob. Val = 0.034); and to have developed new ideas
for MA through imitating private sector organisations
(ACSYSO = 0.488; Prob. Val. = 0.006). Finally, the greater the
extent of outsourcing undertaken by LAs, the more likely
were they to agree that they would continually monitor
those outsourced suppliers (ASSYSN = 0.423; Prob. Val. =
0.022).
Table 4.10 Outsourcing and its effects on management accounting
Private NHS Local Authorities
Change Extent of Change Extent of Change Extent of
in form outsourcing in form outsourcing in form outsourcing
ACSYSC –0.204 –0.087 -0.294 0.089 0.411* –0.134
ACSYSD –0.028 –0.026 -0.089 0.295 0.548** -0.081
ACSYSE –0.027 -0.110 -0.076 0.298 0.456* -0.085
ACSYSF -0.085 –0.255* -0.151 0.253 0.191 –0.071
ACSYSG –0.147 –0.295* -0.079 0.359 0.303 –0.007
ACSYSH –0.020 –0.015 –0.136 0.26 0.555** –0.048
ACSYSI –0.024 -0.117 -0.091 0.440* 0.291 –0.159
ACSYSL -0.053 –0.040 -0.010 0.189 0.388* –0.354
ACSYSN -0.033 –0.214 -0.329 0.248 0.278 –0.423*
ACSYSO –n.a. –n.a. -0.156 0.430* 0.488** –0.049
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
In terms of the effect on management accounting systems of
the decision to outsource, we can make a number of
observations. First, the least impact would appear to be in our
private sector companies. These were the most likely to use
hired MA consultants for new projects, the more they
undertook outsourcing. However, they also had developed
their own new techniques for accounting for outsourced
contracts, and found that there had been changes in the
types of decision for which MA was used.
In both types of public sector organisations, new leadership
or senior management was associated with changes in
organisational form, increased outsourcing and subsequent
impacts on management accounting. In the NHS, greater
outsourcing led to more frequent reporting of management
accounts, a greater likelihood of analysing the potential costs
of a breakdown in contractual relations, increased control
exerted over subcontractors’ accounting systems, and an
increased chance of getting management accounting ideas
through imitation of private sector companies. Local
authorities that experienced more outsourcing also noted
increased changes in methods of budgeting, and the
development of new MA techniques. They got new ideas for
MA through imitation of both private and public sector
bodies, but also would hire in consultants for help, alongside
developing their own ideas. And while increasing their
monitoring of outsourced suppliers, they would also see them
as on-going partners with whom they could work in tandem.
4.5 Managing the supply-chain 
The term ‘supply chain management’ was defined for
respondents as ‘the coordination of all aspects of
manufacturing, purchasing, distribution and sales, whether
performed within or beyond the organisation’. The next
section of the questionnaire was concerned, therefore, with
the management of suppliers and the supply chain. We were
interested in finding out whether new management
accounting techniques had been developed to manage
emerging supplier-chain relations and, if so, what were those
new techniques, and from where did they come. Perhaps
management accounting techniques were being used in new
ways to manage supplier-chain relations. Table 4.11 gives the
summary statistics on supply chain management within our
three organisational forms. In general, respondents were
almost neutral on the statement that ‘we need to modify our
existing administration practices for our outsourced
functions’ (MANAGF = 2.99 (Private), = 3.21 (NHS), = 3.28
(LA)). There was moderate disagreement with the additional
statement that ‘we treat every outsourcing supplier as a
separate cost centre’ (MANAGG = 2.45 (Private), = 2.76
(NHS), = 2.88 (LA)). Thus there is little to suggest that
management accounting was strongly influenced by the
introduction of new outsourced suppliers.
We therefore probed further into the role of management
accounting in the writing of outsourcing contracts. For
example, what roles might management accounting play in
overseeing the exercise and revision of outsourcing
contracts? What was the impact of accounting calculations in
determining the length of the contract, and what was the
role of management accounting in enforcing outsourcing
contracts? In cases of breach of contract, how were sanctions
defined and what role did accounting play in this context?
Respondents expressed some strong agreement in this
section. For example, the statement that ‘we need to
incorporate back-out clauses in case we are unhappy with
suppliers’ (MANAGD) gave averages of 4.03 (Private), 4.14
(NHS) and 4.00 (LA), showing quite strong agreement. There
was also some level of agreement for the statement that
‘being tied into contracts is a disadvantage if we want to
change our company strategy or direction’ (MANAGC = 3.27
(Private), = 3.14 (NHS), = 3.34 (LA)). Only LAs mildly agreed
that the administration and transaction costs of monitoring
contracts were burdensome (MANAGE = 3.03). And there
was mild disagreement overall with the remaining
statements that ‘it is important to try small, short-term
contracts until we get to know our suppliers better’
(MANAGA), and ‘long-term contracts tie the company down
and are too restrictive’ (MANAGB).
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Table 4.11 Supply chain management
Private NHS LA Total
1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean Mean Mean Mean
MANAGA 2.92 2.48 2.50 2.72
MANAGB 2.97 2.34 2.88 2.81
MANAGC 3.27 3.14 3.34 3.26
MANAGD 4.03 4.14 4.00 4.04
MANAGE 2.58 2.69 3.03 2.71
MANAGF 2.99 3.21 3.28 3.11
MANAGG 2.45 2.76 2.88 2.62
MANAGH 2.58 2.52 2.63 2.57
MANAGI 2.58 2.86 2.81 2.69
MANAGJ 2.14 1.52 1.84 1.93
MANAGK 3.27 3.03 3.26 3.22
MANAGL 2.26 2.69 2.88 2.50
MANAGM 2.67 2.76 3.42 2.86
MANAGN 2.01 1.93 2.25 2.05
MANAGO 1.37 1.59 1.56 1.46
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Next, respondents were questioned on the impact on their
organisation of having introduced subcontracting or
outsourcing. For example, to what extent did management
accounting practices underpin network relations and facilitate
or frustrate the development of mutual trust between the
supplier and the company? Firstly, there was mild
disagreement with both statements that ‘outsourcing has led
to an erosion of staff skills within our company’ (MANAGH),
and ‘we have employed supervisors to oversee our
outsourced functions’ (MANAGI). Local authorities were the
only organisation type to agree, albeit mildly, that ‘our
existing staff have experienced a change in the nature of their
job since we started to outsource’ (MANAGM = 3.42). Private
sector companies and the NHS Trusts disagreed with this
statement. Strong disagreement across the board was voiced,
however, for the statement that ‘since we started to
outsource, we have suffered a breach of confidentiality’
(MANAGO = 1.37 (Private), = 1.59 (NHS), = 1.56 (LA)).
Respondents generally did not think that their existing staff
were unhappy about the decision to outsource (MANAGL).
Nor did they agree that outsourcing had led to any loss of
privacy (MANAGN).
Finally, within this section, we enquired into how expertise
(technical, product design, etc) might be assembled,
promoted, and transferred within and across the supply chain.
For example, might the transfer of knowledge be subject to
any form of accounting calculation? Did a transfer of
accounting and finance skills exist between company and
supplier, how was this achieved, and what were the perceived
benefits? In general, there was strong disagreement from all
that ‘we impose changes on our outsourced suppliers’
accounting systems’ (MANAGJ = 2.14 (Private), = 1.52
(NHS), = 1.84 (LA)). However, there was mild agreement that
‘we require regular reporting of financial measures from our
outsourced suppliers’ (MANAGK = 3.27 (Private), = 3.03
(NHS), = 3.26 (LA)).
CHANGE measures the extent of organisational change
experienced over the previous three years. OUTSOURC
measures the extent of outsourcing in each organisation.
Table 4.12 correlates CHANGE and OUTSOURC, for each
type of organisation, with the extent of agreement with a
number of statements about supply chain management.
There was no significant agreement between any of our
statements about supply chain management and change in
organisation or the extent of outsourcing, as far as our
private companies were concerned. For the NHS, there was
some positive association between the extent of
organisational change and the feeling that it was important
to try small short-term contracts until they got to know their
suppliers better (MANAGA = 0.421; Prob. Val. = 0.023).
Additionally, the greater the extent of outsourcing, the more
likely were the NHS staff to have experienced a change in the
nature of their job since starting to outsource
(MANAGM = 0.470; Prob. Val. = 0.015).
Table 4.12 Change, outsourcing and the supply chain
Private NHS Local Authorities
Change Extent of Change Extent of Change Extent of
in form outsourcing in form outsourcing in form outsourcing
MANAGA -0.111 -0.006 0.421* –0.095 –0.117 -0.073
MANAGB -0.092 0.083 0.072 -0.013 -0.356* -0.086
MANAGF 0.152 0.004 0.290 –0.141 –0.395* –0.085
MANAGG 0.174 -0.010 -0.117 –0.029 –0.379* –0.184
MANAGK 0.018 -0.138 -0.020 –0.218 –0.426* –0.435*
MANAGM 0.089 0.149 0.015 –0.470* –0.333 –0.293
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Local authorities were more likely to agree with our given
statements, the greater their change in organisational form.
For example, it was positively associated with a need to
modify existing administration practices for outsourced
functions (MANAGF = 0.395; Prob. Val. = 0.025); the treating
of every outsourcing supplier as a separate cost centre
(MANAGG = 0.379; Prob. Val. – 0.032); and a requirement for
regular reporting of financial measures from outsourced
suppliers (MANAGK = 0.426; Prob. Val. = 0.017). Furthermore,
the greater the extent of outsourcing, the stronger the
agreement with a need for regular financial reporting
(MANAGK = 0.435; Prob. Val. = 0.016). An interesting
observation here is the negative correlation between the
extent of organisational change and agreement with the
statement that long-term contracts tie the organisation
down and are too restrictive (MANAGB = -0.356;
Prob. Val. = 0.045). In other words, the greater the change, the
less likely are LAs to believe that long-term contracts are too
restrictive, which is an encouraging result, from the point of
view of sub-contracting organisations. On the contrary,
greater organisational change in LAs would appear to actively
encourage the use of outsourcers or subcontractors on
long-term basis.
A greater use of outsourcing by private sector companies had
no significant impact on the ways in which the supply chain
was managed. In the NHS, where change had been
introduced, our respondents indicated that staff had
experienced a change in the nature of their jobs since
outsourcing had been started. However, they were also rather
cautious in thinking it important to try out small contracts
with outsourcers, before getting tied in to long term
contracts, a result which echoes the ‘conservatism’ of health
care organisations found by Roodhoft and Warlop (1999). In
local authorities, a change in organisational form was
associated with administrative changes, for example, through
the introduction of new cost centres. Long-term contracts
with outsourcers were not thought to be restrictive, but LAs
kept a close eye on them through regular financial reporting.
4.6 The impact of outsourcing on corporate performance
The final part of the questionnaire was aimed at determining
the extent to which outsourcing had improved (or otherwise)
the organisation’s performance. The initial question has to be
whether or not the impact of outsourcing on corporate
performance is assessed. If it is, what measures of efficiency
and effectiveness are used by companies, and what is the
accounting input in these measures? How, if at all, are value
creation and value capture measured? Furthermore, what
bases do organisations use when deciding to continue with
outsourcing?
The final data are contained in Tables 4.13 and 4.14. Overall,
private sector companies were most likely to agree with the
statements relating to the improvement in performance. For
example, outsourcing and/or subcontracting had improved
‘our financial performance’ (IMPACTB = 3.05), ‘our access to
specialised skills’ (IMPACTC = 3.27), ‘our company
responsiveness and/or flexibility’ (IMPACTD = 3.34), and
‘the extent of our cost savings’.
(IMAPCTE = 3.24). They disagreed mildly that it had
improved ‘the quality of our product or service to customers’
(IMPACTA = 2.92). The NHS Trusts showed mild disagreement
with all of the above statements, and the local authorities
agreed only that their access to specialised skills had
improved.
In terms of measuring the impact of outsourcing, private
sector firms were most likely to do this in financial ways
(IMPACTG = 3.82). They disagreed that they might use any of
the other given measures, including predetermined profit
levels (IMPACTH), or by benchmarking against industry norms
(IMPACTI), competitors (IMPACTJ) or ‘best practice’
(IMPACTK). The NHS and LAs agreed that financial measures
were used to assess the impact of outsourcing (IMPACTG =
3.58 and 3.59, respectively). However, the NHS trusts were
most likely of all to measure success in non-financial terms
(IMPACTP = 3.88). Both methods were also relatively
important to the LAs (IMPACTG = 3.59, IMPACT P = 3.48).
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Table 4.13 Impact on performance
Private NHS LA Total
1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean Mean Mean Mean
IMPACTA 2.92 2.88 2.97 2.92
IMPACTB 3.05 2.88 2.67 2.93
IMPACTC 3.27 2.88 3.20 3.18
IMPACTD 3.34 2.52 2.72 3.04
IMPACTE 3.24 2.92 2.97 3.11
IMPACTF 1.83 1.56 2.07 1.83
IMPACTL 2.20 2.90 2.57
IMPACTM 2.12 1.76 1.93
IMPACTN 2.40 2.03 2.20
IMPACTO 1.76 1.62 1.69
IMPACTG 3.82 3.58 3.59 3.72
IMPACTP 3.88 3.48 3.66
IMPACTH 2.52 3.25 3.10 2.80
IMPACTI 2.55 2.21 2.90 2.56
IMPACTJ 2.34 2.25 2.62 2.39
IMPACTK 2.89 2.92 3.20 2.97
HAPPY 2.82 2.43 2.59 2.69
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The NHS and LAs were given a number of additional areas to
assess, in terms of the impact of outsourcing (IMPACTL to
IMPACTO). They were asked whether it had improved: the
timing of their supplier deliveries, the lead-time for the
delivery of orders, the quality of deliveries and their credit
terms. There was disagreement from both organisational
types with each of these statements, most strongly with
IMPACTO, that credit terms had improved. The final question
in this section enquired into whether or not respondents
were happy that they had the best possible contracts with
their outsourced suppliers (HAPPY). Across the board, there
was some disagreement with this statement, showing that
most thought there was room for improvement in the
relations with their outsourced suppliers.
Table 4.14 contains correlations between the extent of
organisational change, outsourcing and agreement with
statements about organisational performance. Only one is
significant for private companies; the greater is their level of
outsourcing, the more likely are they to be happy that they
have the best possible contracts with their outsourced
suppliers (HAPPY = 0.276; Prob. Val. = 0.029). This suggests
that the more happy organisations are with the relationship
with their outsourced suppliers or subcontractors, the more
likely they are to outsource additional activities. The greater
the extent of outsourcing in the NHS, the more likely were
they to measure its success by benchmarking against
industry norms (IMPACTI = 0.541; Prob. Val. = 0.009), and the
more likely too were they to measure success by
benchmarking against ‘best practice’ (IMPACTK = 0.522; Prob.
Val. = 0.013).
Finally, LAs showed the most significant correlations. First,
greater change in organisational form was associated with
improvements in organisational performance (IMPACTB =
0.373; Prob. Val. = 0.042); better responsiveness or flexibility
(IMPACTD = 0.493; Prob. Val. = 0.007); and enhanced quality
of deliveries (IMPACTN = 0.443; Prob. Val. = 0.016). The
greater the degree of outsourcing, the more likely were LAs
to agree that: the quality of service to customers had
improved (IMPACTA = 0.492; Prob. Val. = 0.008); and that
financial performance was better than previously (IMPACTB =
0.553; Prob. Val. = 0.002).
Table 4.14 Change, outsourcing and impact on performance
Private NHS Local Authorities
Change Extent of Change Extent of Change Extent of
in form outsourcing in form outsourcing in form outsourcing
IMPACTA -0.211 0.112 –0.087 –0.216 0.327 0.492**
IMPACTB -0.095 0.204 –0.203 –0.401 0.373* 0.553**
IMPACTD -0.169 0.179 –0.023 –0.352 0.493* 0.345
IMPACTI –n.a. n.a. -0.055 –0.541** 0.306 0.199
IMPACTK -0.115 0.072 -0.144 –0.522* 0.243 0.245
IMPACTN –n.a. n.a. -0.009 –0.089 0.443* 0.173
HAPPY -0.119 0.276* -0.071 -0.039 0.079 0.152
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
4.7 Conclusion
Overall, our findings from the questionnaire suggest that
management accounting systems are influenced by changes
in organisational form. Our analysis of the summary
information yields some interesting results. Change in
organisational form, across types, during the previous three
years, was shown to have existed, although on average it was
not great overall. The existence of outsourcing or
subcontracting was only moderate, on average. The changes
observed therefore support earlier findings of incremental,
rather than transformational, change (cf. Ezzamel et al, 1996).
As such, we might not necessarily expect massive
breakthroughs in the nature of change in management
accounting systems. In fact, we find that traditional
management accounting methods, such as net present value,
discounted cashflow, breakeven analysis, payback and,
especially, cost-benefit analysis, are still considered to be
amongst the most important techniques available to the
modern manager when considering issues such as
outsourcing decisions.
The impacts of outsourcing that we might have expected to
see on management accounting were not as great as
anticipated overall, with the major effect being the
introduction of new cost centres to account for the
organisation’s outsourced activities, and to facilitate the
monitoring of the organisation’s outsourcing suppliers. Our
further enquiry into the nature of management accounting
change found that standard accounting techniques were
generally considered to be adequate for the purpose, but that
any new management accounting techniques or would
mainly be developed internally rather than by hiring
consultants or imitating other organisations.
There is evidence to suggest that managing the supply chain
relationship has increased the burden of monitoring on
organisations. For example, our respondents generally agreed
that they had needed to modify their administration
practices to cope with outsourced functions, and that regular
reporting of financial measures was required by suppliers. In
order to protect against unsatisfactory relations, back-out
clauses were usually built into contracts with suppliers. In
terms of the overall impact of outsourcing on company
performance, there was some agreement that it had
improved the organisation’s access to specialised skills, and
therefore the company’s flexibility and/or responsiveness
(cf. Atkinson and Meager, 1991). And there was additional
agreement with the statement that outsourcing had led to
cost savings. Thus support exists here too for the earlier
findings of Ezzamel et al (1999).
While our evidence shows only moderate change and
adaptability, overall, it does suggest a relationship between
the extent of both organisational change and outsourcing
and the impact on management accounting systems. This is
probably least evident in private sector companies. They
would develop new systems and techniques internally (and
sometimes, though not frequently, through employing
consultants), and were happier with their outsourced
activities, the more extensive these were. The NHS and LAs
together appear to have experienced more change, and
therefore their MA systems have been affected to a greater
degree. For example, new senior management corresponded
with more outsourcing or subcontracting. This in turn led to
greater requirements for reporting, the development of new
cost centres, and administrative changes. LAs in particular,
had reported improvements in performance related to
changes in form, including improved flexibility and quality of
service.
What we have presented here is some new evidence on
changes in three types of organisation: private sector
companies, NHS Trusts and Local Authorities in the United
Kingdom. We have explained the nature of this change by
reference to the extent of outsourcing and/or subcontracting
in each of these organisational forms. We have discussed if,
and how, management accounting systems were modified
and/or developed in the face of the changes experienced. The
following chapters present five in-depth illustrative case
studies which highlight a number of the issues raised in this
larger scale statistical analysis, but in much greater detail, and
link these developments to the specific context of each of
the case studies.
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5.1 History and context
FoodUK is a major subsidiary of a major international
corporation that is one of the largest food companies in the
world. The parent company was founded abroad in the 1860s,
its workforce now is nearly a quarter of a million people, with
over 500 factories in more than 80 countries. FoodUK began
its manufacturing activities in the late 1880s, and now has
about 12,000 employees with turnover of nearly £1.6 billion
with many of its products having become household names.
FoodUK is organised into five product divisions, with many
plants scattered across the UK and overseas, and a number of
corporate functions providing services and information across
the divisions. Each division has profit responsibility and
semi-autonomous discretion over decisions with the
European Headquarters retaining considerable control over
issues deemed to be key to the survival of the group. In the
1980s the FoodUK expanded its size significantly, mainly
through acquisitions of existing well-known brands. In 2001 a
number of brands were sold and others acquired in
reorganising one of the divisions in an effort to focus on what
were deemed to be key and profitable brands.
Prior to the 1990s, FoodUK ‘had no function core supply
chain, neither did it really have anything that was doing that
job with a different name’ (former Supply Chain Director).
During that phase, the company had a logistics operation
which did not include ‘upstream’ physical distribution but it
combined planning and customer services together. No
customer services role was set up within the company, only a
stock and order management group existed within
distribution. Many of the activities that now come under the
banner of ‘supplier-chain relations’ were managed by the
buyer/seller relationship, a trend that was typical of the
industry at the time, so that the national accounts manager
dealt with the buyer in each of FoodUK customers.
Twenty years ago or so, it was claimed, the industry was
characterised by the mode of ‘direct store delivery’, with each
store ordering and getting deliveries individually, a direct
route that cut out a lot of supply chain noise, even though it
may lead to a ‘messy distribution set up.’ As customer stocks
tended to be relatively high, a few days delay in delivery were
not thought to be serious, particularly in the case of ambient
products, like many of those produced by FoodUK. Gradually,
however, retailers began to set up regional distribution
centres which created a new demand for supply chain within
the industry. But the initial reason why retailers set up
regional distribution centres was to take costs out of their
supply chain.
While the establishment of regional distribution centres was
reported to have taken some costs out of the supply chain, it
gave rise to two other consequences. First, retailers began to
realise that a lot of their costs occurred in the ‘last 100 yards’,
particularly when the retailer had no warehouse at the back
of the stores and goods are delivered more than once daily.
Secondly, retailers began to notice inefficiencies in their
systems that did not clearly show product shelf availability. In
their quest to taking the cost out of the supply chain,
retailers began to request more frequent deliveries daily from
FoodUK, instead of the previous Day 1 to day 4 system (order
on day 1 is delivered on day 4).
Following a very large acquisition by the FoodUK in the early
1990s, a new Chairman was appointed, and among the
changes he introduced was the setting up of a supply chain
re-engineering team in order to look into ways to improve
customer services. The exiting approach based on one-to-one
relations between the national accounts manager of FoodUK
and the customer buyer was now considered unsatisfactory
because communication between the national accounts
manager and FoodUK was not always effective and because
there was no face-to-face contact with customers. This
approach, characterised as ‘lobbing an order over the wall’,
was made worse by the inadequacies of the EPOS data-based
information system prevalent at the time. One manager
explained how under this approach customer orders were
filled. The store manager would check stores then ask the
regional depot for a given quantity of the product to be
delivered. The depot will then add up all the stores it services
and report the aggregate quantities needed to head office,
and the latter would adjust these quantities to reflect other
factors such as brand promotions, and after that an order is
issued which ‘had taken days to accumulate in the pipeline
and more importantly did not reflect actual customer uptake’
(Director, Supplier Chain). Measures of delivery performance
used at that time were later construed as being partial and
the performance of FoodUK was considered unsatisfactory
even using such partial measures. The most important
measure was case fill against order was not measured across
the whole business but was calculated for only certain
activities. Further, even using this partial case against fill
measure, the company was achieving something between
94% – 97%, with the average towards the bottom end, which
was not considered high enough for the industry.
5.2 Launching the supply chain function
To deal with the above limitations, the over-riding aim was to
move the customer service performance of the company
within three years to be in the top three within the industry,
while also reducing working capital. This new approach
sought to promote supply chain thinking and concepts that
are linked to information systems, and to ensure that there is
consistency, direction and uniformity in what the different
parts of the business are doing. The new supply chain
function incorporated purchasing, logistics development,
distribution, finance and customer service, thereby
integrating both downstream and upstream activities into
one function. Also, for each of the product divisions supply
chain functions were established.
5. FoodUK
A more ambitious target of customer service (case fill) of
981/2% was set in the belief that if customer service improves
on a consistent basis, then it would be easier to get new
products launched, and product promotions agreed with the
customers. To facilitate this, the company set about trying to
work more closely with its main customers, jointly planning
events and making use of customer EPOS data bases. FoodUK
also gives its customers software platforms to work with and
they use customers’ software platforms to exchange
information, to help plan things together such as brand
promotions. A whole new way of monitoring customers’
shelves was also sought. Previously, once orders were
delivered by FoodUK to customers, it was left to the
customer to check product availability on their own shelves.
FoodUK began to cultivate the idea with their customers
that, given their common interests, it would be profitable to
both if they worked closer together. Apparently, the
customers have come a long way to recognise the
importance of co-operating with FoodUK as their supplier.
Customers, however, are still pushing for more costs to be
taken out of the supply chain by asking for more frequent
deliveries at much shorter time intervals than previously.
Informants in FoodUK find this particularly frustrating, given
that the bulk of their products are ambient products with a
long shelf life.
5.3 Integrating the supply chain function: from farm
to fork
In 2002, a new Director of the supply chain function was
appointed, and he set about to develop the supply chain
function further by seeking to create a more integrated
supply chain ‘from farm to fork’ via a demand-led model that
began with customer demands and ended with physical flows
required to meet that demand. The previous strategy was
criticised for being focused upon reducing cost rather than
driving growth; hence the new focus upon growth. The supply
chain function was conceptualised as an integrated 4x4
wheel: four processes: serving the customer, planning and
forecasting, product availability, and buying; four enablers:
people, data, systems and finance. The underlying motif was
one of driving growth and adding value through customer
focus, by ‘making the supply chain better, faster, simpler, and
closer to customers and suppliers’ (internal document) by
promoting innovation and improving distribution channels.
The super-imposing of these four processes upon the four
enablers were expected, or assumed, to lead to the
emergence of a new organisation with new key attributes.
First, it will be an organisation that actively promotes best
price, best service and best value in all sourcing decisions.
Second, it will demonstrate a relentless commitment to
customer service. Third, its supply chain will become a source
of competitive advantage commercially. Fourth, FoodUK will
become the supplier of choice for customers seeking supply
chain development. And finally, FoodUK will become
recognised as an integral part of, and lead player in, all zone
and global developments.
5.4 Networking with customers
With over 1100 customers of FoodUK products, the top four
account for about 70% of total sales and the top eleven
account for about 90%, so the focus is mainly on the ‘Big
Four’ followed by the remaining ‘Big Seven’. Because of the
strength of the brands produced by FoodUK, the initial
relation between the company and any of its customers is
not organised through formal and detailed written contracts.
Essentially, the customer would place an order of a given
number of products of a particular size at a previously agreed
price and state expected times of delivery. Some of these
details are written in fairly short statements, others are
agreed verbally over the telephone or negotiated through a
member of staff who is ear-marked to deal specifically with a
particular large customer. FoodUK assigns responsibility for
liaising with each of the top 4 customers to one manager
who heads a small team. The responsibility of this manager
and the team is to develop a network with the customer
based on information sharing, regular contacts, visits, and
staff placements at customer locations in order to ensure
that customer needs are met and to also explore possible
opportunities of mutual benefit such as launching new
product categories, new brand promotions, etc. These
arrangements are vested in perceived mutual interest and is
typically underpinned by cost considerations and key
performance indicators. Managing customer relations is based
on a number of strategies shown below.
5.4.1 Cultivation of trust ties
There seems to be an element of deferral to the other’s
competencies within the supply chain network and in the
process seemingly promoting a strong measure of trust. This
trust covers both elements of confidentiality over ‘sensitive’
information shared between supplier and customer and also
technical competence. Such trust needs to exist in order for
the flow of sensitive information to run smoothly. Benefits
include better forecasting and more flexibility of order and
stock management. This cultivated trust extends to
expectations by each party of the network that the other
party will honour its commitment. Thus, customers expect
FoodUK to deliver the required product range on time, with
the correct quantities and requisite qualities at the agreed
prices. Similarly, FoodUK expects its customers to place its
products on the shelves appropriately, to sell them at the
right price and to ensure that they do not run out of the
product. These trust relations do not seem to be constituted
in broad terms but are rather targeted at specific areas.
Nevertheless, it was recognised that as customer and
supplier, the two parties to the network are likely to
encounter situations of tension, friction and conflict in
interest because each side is commercially-driven.
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5.4.2 Focusing upon own competencies 
The explicit recognition by customers and FoodUK of their
differing core competencies was reported to lead to careful
and considered assessment by each side of new proposals
that surface through network interaction. Here the concern is
whether or not the proposals fall within what is considered a
core competency and also whether the ‘numbers add up’. For
example, one customer sought to tempt FoodUK to go into
organic foods, which is fundamentally different from
FoodUK’s focus upon functional foods but FoodUK turned
that down because it did not fit with its core plans. Such
considerations are also affected strongly by cost-benefit
calculus. Alternative opportunities were subjected to this
calculus to decide their acceptability in terms of the marginal
contribution of the alternative; at the very least the
alternative had to be ‘cost neutral’ to be accepted.
5.4.3 Managing by levers and negotiations 
The relationship between FoodUK and its customer seems to
be managed predominantly via negotiations and the use of
levers, and to a much smaller extent by reference to clauses
in written contracts. It seems that there are situations where
seeking to enforce writing detailed contracts simply would
not work. The ‘dynamics of the business’ militates against
extensive use of detailed written contracts, because the
customer decision time-frame is not long enough. Further,
the dynamics of product innovation in the market and the
strength of the brand name militate against heavy reliance
upon written contracts. One of the key reasons why such a
negotiated arrangement could work is the nature of the
interlocking relationship within the network and the regular
contacts and visits between the two parties. Informants told
us that when problems arise, for example failure to meet
targets, rather than seek immediate financial penalties based
on some reading of a written contract, the two parties
engage in a mature debate, with each side using whatever
levers they have to reach agreement. Many of these
negotiations are underpinned by a close understanding
between FoodUK and its customers, built over a long period
of trading together.
5.5 Accounting for the supply chain in FoodUK
In FoodUK, it seems that the role of accounting in the writing
of contracts with customers has been minimal, simply
because few contracts were, if ever, written. However,
accounting played crucial roles in the various stages of the
supply chain.
5.5.1 Accounting measures for the supply chain
Once an order from a customer was identified, a process of
gathering ‘data elements’ began, seeking together detailed
information about the order: quantities and qualities of items
required, location of transactions, customer codes and
supplier codes, times, dates weeks and months of sourcing,
manufacturing and delivering products, and quantities of
deliveries. This basic model of supply chain information flow
was complemented by a cycle of continuous improvement
beginning with objectives, through measuring performance
and analysis to reviewing processes and objectives. The aim
of this cycle was to enhance supply chain efficiencies in three
areas: reliability, speed and cost. A hierarchy of information
flow (both financial and non-financial) was developed, and it
showed at its apex key performance indicators (KPIs),
followed by process performance indicators, process control
information and operational support information. The KPIs
covered a range of areas, including customer service as
measured by case fill and line fill percentages, demand plan
accuracy, schedule attainment, supplier service, inter-market
supply, finished goods and raw materials stock cover, cost of
distribution, cost of manufacture, cost of raw and packaging
materials, and cost of failure in delivering orders classified by
customer code. The remaining three categories in the
information support hierarchy cover other complementary
measures. For example, process performance indicators seek
to monitor the extent to which a particular process
contributes to the overall KPI performance, whereas process
control information focuses upon the extent to which current
processes are considered complete. All these measures are of
a historical nature, essentially comparing an actual statistic
against a pre-specified target. The key focus is upon rendering
the various elements of supply chain costs visible. The KPIs
were subordinated to two bottom-line financial measures:
Real Internal Growth (RIG) and Earnings Before Interest on
Total Assets (EBITA). RIG adjusts for the impact of inflation
and currency fluctuations, and also takes into account the
effects of acquisitions and other changes in the shape of the
organisation. Two additional measures are also emphasised:
market share and overheads.
5.5.2 Commercial profitability analysis
The accounting function in FoodUK took major steps to liaise
with and provide strong support to marketing staff, with the
aim of making them financially aware, by reporting and
analysing information on brand contribution, profit
forecasting, and customer contribution in a manner that
made sense to the marketing staff. New designations of
accountants as ‘marketing financial analysts’ and ‘sales
accountants’ were earmarked, and courses for customer
contribution were run annually by accountants for the benefit
of the marketing staff, with several reviews conducted every
year with each accounts manager to check the extent to
which the manager is on target to deliver key customer KPIs.
Previous emphasis in FoodUK was centred on volume, in
terms of how many tons were being sold in a given period. To
mark the shift in emphasis towards greater commercialism,
profitability analysis began to be performed at the levels of
brands, product categories (the pack format the product is
being sold in), customers and channels. Sometimes, profit per
category was broken down to a finer level of sub-category in
order to prompt correct decisions. In FoodUK customer
profitability analysis (CPA) is dubbed customer contributions
statements (CCS). Although CCS was known for years within
the Group, its use began to occur on a large scale within the
Group and FoodUK in 2000.
The calculation of CCS begins with sales revenue from a
particular customer, and taking out of that the costs of
various relevant trade discounts. The cost of goods sold, trade
spend, variable distribution cost, and sales force cost. Some of
the distribution and sales force costs are specific to a
particular customer, such as staff working specifically for that
customer, others are shared across customers and have to be
allocated. Emphasis to identify contribution per customer
was the result of both the drive towards greater customer
focus and the desire to trace costs down to activities, with
individual customers being considered an activity. The lowest
accounting level of detail was the stock keeping unit (SKU),
which could be aggregated across product, customer or
division up to company level. Given the level of detailed
reporting available now in FoodUK, it is possible for
information to be generated on category customer share, or
category channel and market share per customer. Knowledge
of these details is deemed important because the brand or
pack mix within a customer is one of the levels the sales staff
could tweak to achieve their target profitability.
The use of CCS involves differentiating customers by
distribution routes and routes to market. FoodUK growth was
assessed to be in newer channels with newer product types
that tend to be more expensive than established channels.
Fast moving consumer goods (branded goods) tend to be
shelf stable, have heavy brand awareness and hence are
subject to promotions. Their sales may increase marginally
but they are relatively mature markets and FoodUK has to
fight other competitors to keep its market share. Large
customers tend to have their own distribution networks,
suitably located large warehouses and big regional
distribution centres to which FoodUK can make few large and
hence economic, deliveries of fast moving consumer goods.
Medium sized or small customers tend to order smaller sizes
for which the route to market is expensive. Because of the
relative high cost of these deliveries, FoodUK recently
sub-contracted this service to a third party. Against this
apparent economy bias for larger customers must be
balanced the recognition that these customers are more
demanding on suppliers.
In preparing CCS, the top ten customers in each channel are
identified, which accounts for approximately 80%+ of the
channel. So, across all channels, there are probably up to
twenty-five customers for whom separate CCS are prepared.
No CCS is performed for the remaining customers because of
their relatively small size. The focus in this case is upon
grouping (e.g. group petrol stations forecourt sales instead of
sales per individual station) in order to assess volume sales,
frequency of transactions, cost of delivery and whether or not
sufficient profits are being earned from them. These details
are then used to decide on whether it is economical for a
sales person to call on those shops. CCS statements are
prepared monthly. It was not considered worthwhile to
prepare them for shorter intervals because brand promotions,
which are difficult to predict in advance, militate against
making such shorter reporting intervals sensible. Indeed,
these promotions made even monthly statements difficult to
interpret, hence the focus tended to be on year-to-date
comparisons. Analyses of CCS were made by the sales
support accounting staff on a monthly basis, including the
overall investment, volume, and mix of volume per customer.
Annual summaries were then prepared and submitted to the
Board for consideration.
5.5.3 The effect of discounts and penalties on customer
profitability
FoodUK offered discounts to its customers based on specific
conditions: ‘business efficiency discount’, based on the
volume of annual sales per customer, which ranges between
0.5% and 3%, and ‘logistics efficiency discount’ based on the
supply chain performance of the individual customer
concerning the size of the order. Customers could order in full
trunkers, full pallets or smaller than full pallets. The maximum
discount is 2% for a full trunker, and a smaller percentage for
a full pallet with no discount for smaller orders. Customers
were reviewed on a six-monthly basis so that the terms of
the discount were revised according to their buying
behaviour over the previous six months. Getting these
discounts ‘right’ is considered crucial because if the discount
was too high it reduced customer profitability but it had to
be sufficiently high to be attractive to large customers.
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Brand promotions also affect CCS. Typically, the customer
suggested to FoodUK the best times and conditions under
which a product promotion should be made. For example, a
promotion based on ‘buy one get one free (BOGOF)’, entailed
FoodUK bearing the direct cost of that promotion, in the
hope that this will result in stronger consumer loyalty to the
brand or, better still, increased future sales. The terms of
these agreements tended to be agreed verbally at the outset
between FoodUK and its customers, but there was increased
recognition that these terms should be written, and initial
steps were being taken in this direction. Disputed amounts
between customers and FoodUK were charged as trade spend
to sales managers and thus they impacted adversely upon
their customer volume and profit KPIs, so that sales managers
had a strong incentive to minimise these deductions by
getting their administration ‘right’. Their performance was
measured on the basis of net customer contribution, which
equalled the marginal contribution per customer minus the
cost of servicing that customer. If FoodUK made the wrong
delivery to a customer, for example in terms of the wrong
price, size order, packs or items then either the items are
returned to FoodUK at their own cost or some deductions
from the original price charged is effected. If disagreements
over deductions made by the customer occur, then
negotiations began to resolve the deduction.
5.5.4 KPIs and customer profitability
Profit targets (KPIs) were determined on the basis of a
product mix-based budget that was supposed to deliver these
targets. The challenge for FoodUK was to stick to that mix
throughout the year, but this could change because of
possible shifts from singles to multi pack formats with a
lower profit margin. Profitability analysis sought to establish
the extent to which a particular consumer bought because of
brand loyalty or because of opportunism with a view to
shifting to other cheaper brands in the future. This knowledge
was deemed crucial, for once it is gathered, FoodUK then
communicated with the customers with the hope of working
together to create demand. Although FoodUK’s big customers
gathered and communicated such intelligence consumer
information, FoodUK preferred to take a proactive approach
of not sitting back and waiting for the customers for fear that
they might approach competitors.
5.5.5 The supply chain and accounting for credit 
Until recently, separate functions existed for accounts
receivables and credit control. The problem with this
arrangement was that if prices were not set up on time or
were not determined correctly queries were initiated by one
of these two units and then the customer came back
complaining of overcharges. A decision was taken in 2001 to
group these two units into one function, commercial
administration, but with a reduction of staff numbers by
about 25%. This new department assumed responsibility for
setting up prices, agreeing bonuses/discounts, overseeing
credit control, and liaising with the sales staff by organising
financial awareness programmes to highlight the financial
consequences of their decisions. This new department is also
under pressure to justify its costs, by being asked to
benchmark itself.
The number of credit queries was one of the KPIs for this
department, in addition to the amount of overdue debt, so
the pressure was there for the department to keep the
number of queries as low as possible. Most of the problems
seem to occur in promotion arrangements, whereby FoodUK
agrees with one of its main customers for a promotion of
specific brand lines over a limited period, such as ‘BOGOFF’.
Sometimes errors crept in because after agreeing a discount
with the customer, the customer was then billed mistakenly
for the full price, leading the customer to delay payment or
pay a proportion of the invoice and complain about the error.
In other cases, the errors may have arisen because salesmen
agreed a discount with customers without obtaining
authorisation, or because of imperfections in the customer
information system. In this latter case the department
offered technical advice to the customer to help sort out the
problems, and the two sides exchange information on queries
to clear the backlog, so some measure of knowledge transfer
seems to flow between the company and its customers. Also,
the previous practice of allowing customers different dates of
payment has now been displaced by a standard system
according to which all customers have to pay their debts on
the 16th of every month.
5.5.6 Accounting and supply chain problems
FoodUK products can be broadly classified into three
categories: strong (household name) brand with high profit
margins, low profit margin products, and private labels
manufactured by FoodUK on behalf of and branded under the
name of one of its big customers which produce very little
margin, if any, for FoodUK, so they mainly just keep the
factories going. Up to a few years ago, FoodUK’s product
range was concentrated in the strong brand category, but
increased competition began to gradually erode this market
dominance through the emergence of private labels, so that
the market share of some key brands fell from about 90% to
20%.
The low profitability of many of the products was made
worse by incessant customer drive to push costs up the
supply chain. For example, it was much more economical for
FoodUK to deliver its products to customers in pallets to
reduce handling costs and also in full vehicles to reduce
transportation costs. The customers drive for lower supply
costs by carrying lower stock levels, however, led them to
demand ‘just in time’ deliveries of smaller loads (a small
number of pallets or even one part of a pallet) which also
tend to be delivered on vehicles that carry less than full loads.
The customer services staff would try to draw the attention
of the customers to the high cost to FoodUK of meeting
customer demands, and if the customers insisted,
negotiations began to agree a new price that reflected some
of this increased cost.
Customers quest for holding lower stocks through securing
just in time deliveries impacted on the cost structure of
FoodUK factories which, without exception, operated with
over-capacity and were fiercely competing against other
factories within the Group to remain open by keeping unit
production costs as low as possible. Customer pressure
necessitates focusing upon long production runs, which
undermined high production flexibility to meet just in time
customer orders. This pressure has led to quite
understandably divided views within FoodUK concerning
length of production runs and their associated costs, with
some supporting the interests of the factories in maintaining
long production runs and others arguing that FoodUK must
accede to customer demands for just in time supplies
notwithstanding resulting higher production costs.
Manufacturing costs were considered easier to quantify, in
contrast to the cost of the supply chain which was perceived
to quantify in terms of costs and benefits. There also was
wide recognition that KPIs are necessary to motivate
managers to perform and to hold them accountable. But
there was also concern that appropriate KPIs that are relevant
to the objectives of both the individual and FoodUK,
otherwise there was the real risk of outcomes being
inconsistent with the interests of the company, particularly
because the achievement of KPIs was directly linked to
managerial bonuses. Calls were therefore made by various
staff to ensure that KPIs were ‘balanced’ between individual
and company objectives. There was also concern that while it
may be relatively easy to develop KPIs at higher levels in the
hierarchy, it may be difficult, even impossible, to develop KPIs
that make sense at lower and shop-floor levels.
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6.1 History and context
Truststar is a large teaching NHS Trust Hospital in England
attached to a prestigious university. It has an annual budget
of over £170M, employs well over 5000 staff, and provides
care for nearly half a million inpatients, outpatients and
accident and emergency patients. It performs a wide range of
medical procedures, including heart and lung conditions,
transplantation, cancer, plastic surgery burns, mental health,
renal services, and rehabilitation of patients with physical
disabilities. Within less than a year of the beginning of our
interviews, a team of new, young executive directors were
appointed to all the board. This followed a crisis caused by
what were deemed by a national audit committee to be
manipulation of statistics of some key performance
indicators whose targets were set nationally, which resulted
in downgrading its previously awarded performance rating.
Truststar had a financial deficit of a few million pounds. It
was also involved in a major Private Finance Initiative (PFI)
which was launched just before we began our interviews, an
outcome of which was a 35-year outsourcing contract of
cleaning/housekeeping and building maintenance with two
external private suppliers.
Truststar was organised along a divisional structure, with
three main divisions covering medicine, heart and lung, and
surgery, each employing staff of around one1000 staff.
Moreover, the hospital had an Accident & Emergency,
Maternity, and Acute Units. The recent troubled history of the
hospital put greater pressures on its staff to cut costs,
improve the quality of health care delivery, meet the
nationally tight performance indicators targets, and restore
the public and institutional lost confidence in order to
improve its ratings. Interviews were held with board
members, medical directors and other senior staff in the
three main divisions, surgeons, ward sisters and nurses,
finance staff, HRM staff, and various administrative staff
involved managing outsourcing activities.
Our interviews uncovered three main types of outsourcing
activities in which Truststar was involved: (1) building
maintenance and housekeeping (the PFI concession
agreement); (2) recruitment of nursing staff; and (3) surgical
procedures. Each of these types of outsourcing was
motivated by different kinds of pressure upon Truststar.
6.2 Forms of outsourcing
6.2.1 Housekeeping, supplies and building maintenance:
legally forced outsourcing
An essential part of the PFI agreement was for certain
activities to be farmed out to private suppliers, chief among
these were housekeeping matters such as cleaning the wards
and other buildings, providing toiletries, food both for
patients and staff, laundry, beddings, ambulance services and
building maintenance. These activities were outsourced to
two private organisations, one for building maintenance and
the other for the remaining services. Truststar had to acquire
these services from these two private suppliers, with no
discretion to shop around. The management of contractual
relationships was organised through a consortium which
mediated between Truststar and the private suppliers, with
monthly meetings held between representatives of the three
sides.
These contracts proved to be extremely difficult to oversee
and monitor for four main reasons. First, virtually all senior
staff from Truststar who were involved in developing and
finalising these contracts had left almost as the contracts
were being launched, so there was no one there to clarify
contractual ambiguities when they arose. Secondly, many of
the contract clauses were found later to be quite vague to
the benefit of the suppliers. Whenever the monitoring staff
from Truststar were unhappy with what they deemed to be
below standard quality of service, the providers insisted that
they had observed the terms of the contract. Thirdly, the
duration of the contract was seen by virtually all our
informants to be prohibitive, in terms of reducing their scope
for action and the perceived potency of any sanctions they
felt they could exercise. Fourthly, a cultural gap between the
public sector ethos and the private sector focus upon profits
created a schism between the two sides in terms of both the
timing and quality of service delivery.
While a number of our informants have suggested that
progress on a number of issues and new detailed agreements
have been reached with the private suppliers, others felt a
‘loss of control’ over what they deemed to be fundamental
NHS services and that the problems were significant and
persistent. Many of these problems emerged in part with
different dimensions of the services delivered, and whenever
the contracts were consulted for clarifications they were
found to be wanting. Another reason was the difficulty of
quantifying performance targets for certain dimensions of
the services provided, such as cleanliness. It was also stated
that, immediately after serious complaints from Truststar, the
suppliers would improve service delivery substantially, but
only for a limited period of time after which service delivery
lapses back into lower quality. To move matters forward, a
team was set up with a member each from the Consortium,
Truststar and the supplier to conduct random, spot checks,
with immediate penalties whenever service delivery was
found to be wanting.
6. Truststar
6.2.2 Recruitment of nursing staff: organisationally
convenient outsourcing
The varied mix of nursing skills required in Truststar was
acquired via three sources: ward own regular nursing staff; a
back-office set up by Truststar that has a pool of nurses that
can be deployed on demand; and a private agency. An
outsourcing contract was set up for an initial two-year
period, which was later extended by one more year, with a
family-owned, small private agency. The terms of the contract
stipulated that the agency had to provide on Trust demand a
minimum of two thousand shifts per month, with a financial
penalty if provision falls below that. The agency undertook to
find and provide nurses with the levels of skills required
within an agreed period that varied from one or two weeks to
a few days for emergency situations. Out of the nine nursing
grades (progressing from A to I), only additional requirements
of three nursing grades, A, D, and E were outsourced. The
contract specified the responsibilities of each side and the
financial details involved, and accounting expertise was called
upon to help draft the financial details. The contract also
stipulated that Truststar did not have the right to shop
around with any other private agencies, not even if the
private agency engaged failed to find the required nurses; it
was up to the private agency to shop around on behalf of
Truststar. If the agency reported back to Truststar that other
private sources could not provide the required nursing skills,
the back-office engaged in spot checks verify the authenticity
of this claim simply by ringing other private agencies.
However, a get-out clause was written in the contract to
allow Truststar to seek another agency should the engaged
agency fail frequently to deliver required nurses.
The relationship between Truststar and the private agency
was co-ordinated via regular consultations and meetings. The
relevant staff in a ward or theatre would identify additional
needs and types of nursing skills and report those to the
back-office. The back-office will try to provide this
requirement from its own pool, and failing that will ask the
private agency to provide. Representatives of the agency met
regularly with staff from the wards and the back-office to
identify the additional nursing skills required by each ward or
theatre. Monthly monitoring meetings were held between
back-office staff and the private agency. Also, quarterly
meetings were held between the private agency, the Trust
Chief Nurse, back-office staff, the relevant divisional general
manager, and a senior management accountant to oversee
progress and iron out any emerging problems. Good
relationships were reported to have prevailed between the
private agency and Truststar, because of personal ties with
the family owners, and the high percentage of their business
conducted with Truststar. It was reported that during the
three-year duration of the contract, the agency never failed
to meet the minimum number of monthly shifts it had to
deliver.
This arrangement, however, came to an end by 31 March
2003 with the emergence of the NHS Professionals (NHSP),
an organisation set up nationally to perform exactly the same
role that the private agency played at a commission. The
NHSP claimed all work previously outsourced to the private
agency and also overtook responsibilities of the back-office. If
the NHSP could not provide the required nursing staff from
its own pool, it shopped around to acquire these nurses from
private agencies, but in this case it did not receive a
commission. Given the abolishment of the back-office, ward
or theatre, additional needs of nurses are now reported
directly to the NHSP, who try to provide from its own pool
and failing that have to shop around for a provider. The NHSP
overlapped with the private agency for a period of six months
to ensure the smooth transfer of nursing recruitment,
becoming the sole provider as from 1 April 2003. The
relationship between Truststar and NHSP is regulated through
national guidance and service level agreement.
6.2.3 Surgical procedures: politically imposed outsourcing
Truststar is expected to meet various nationally determined
targets for key performance indicators including very tight
waiting times. The current Labour Government has provided
all hospitals with additional funds to be able to meet these
targets, by outsourcing over-capacity surgical procedures to
private hospitals. Truststar began recently to farm out to a
small number of private hospitals surgical procedures it could
not handle in house because of capacity constraints. These
outsourcing activities are managed through written contracts
that specify the medical details, patient types, nature of
information flow, cost of each medical procedure, and
sanctions that could be exercised by Truststar in cases of
failure. A middle manager has been appointed to manage the
interface with the private providers, and an administrator has
been earmarked in each of the medical divisions (surgery and
heart & lung) where outsourcing occurs, to select those
patients who should be outsourced. The outsourcing of
surgical procedures has received mixed reactions in Truststar.
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First, most staff felt that NHS patients should not be forced
out of the NHS into the private sector but should be treated
within the NHS as a matter of right. Secondly, only
‘straightforward’ procedures were outsourced to the private
hospitals because their small size meant that they could not
support complex surgical procedures. This has resulted in
Truststar retaining all complex surgical procedures. This
impact on patient mix has led to: (i) increasing the cost per
patient and the cost profile of treatment; (ii) increasing
mortality rates per patient population, given the much higher
risks to patient lives in complex surgeries; (iii) increasing work
complexity for medical staff who now have to be able to deal
with a much higher percentage of the most complex, and
highly stressful cases; and (iv) depriving young medical staff
from an all-round learning through experience with a
balanced portfolio of surgical procedures. Thirdly, outsourcing
is seen to be both expensive (paying private rates) and
reducing the control of Truststar over its patients treated
privately. Although in the majority of cases these patients
have been operated on by consultants from Truststar, other
medical services are conducted by the staff of the private
providers. When problems emerge, Truststar staff feel their
own procedures should prevail, but this does not always
occur. Fourthly, the problems of managing the day-to-day
interface with the private providers have not always been
smooth, and commands considerable resources in terms of
staff, money and time. Additional problems have been caused
by differences in priorities and temporal preferences between
Truststar and private providers, in some cases leading to
cancellation by private providers of NHS surgical procedures
at very short notice because of preferential treatments for
their own private patients. Although these problems are
ultimately ironed out, and financial sanctions applied in cases
of delayed treatments, they continue to occur.
6.3 Accounting for outsourcing in Truststar
The accounting system used in Truststar collates and then
traces out costs to individual operating theatres and other
major functions using activities as cost drivers. Costs cover
staffing and non-staffing items separately, and are used to
derive an average cost of treatment per medical procedure, or
per speciality. Costs are also aggregated into monthly
statements for every type of expenditure, for example drugs,
bandages, needles, etc. over all specialities. At the time of its
negotiation, it was estimated that the PFI will lead to a
reduction in activities by 23%, but it was later found out
that, if anything, the number of activities increased post the
PFI. This was caused by the increased complexity of the
patient mix being treated at Truststar because outsourced
patients were the most straightforward cases.
6.3.1 Accounting for housekeeping, supplies and
maintenance 
A team of monitors was established to oversee the delivery
of these services, with representations from across the
various sections of Truststar. The monitoring team has
developed six performance indicators (PIs) by which to judge
the performance of their suppliers. These PIs are:
(i) cleanliness standards; (ii) response time to ad hoc requests;
(iii) valid complaints against the number of tasks suppliers do
in total in a week; (iv) suppliers meeting legislation when
carrying out domestic services; (v) suppliers meeting Truststar
policies and procedures relevant to the performance of
domestic services; and (vi) presentation and communication
of supplier staff. The leader of the monitoring team suggested
that the time spent on the cleanliness standard PI is larger
than the other five PIs because it is quite a specific
assessment and it can’t be office-based.
These PIs are quantified in order to facilitate their
measurement in more ‘precise’ terms. In particular, the
cleanliness standards PI is measured in terms of a ‘dust-test’;
a threshold of a given amount of dust measured by thickness
and length (one centimetre thick and over three inch long)
which signalled that the cleanliness standard has been
violated. It is therefore an output measure, rather than in
terms of how many times a particular part of Truststar had
been cleaned by the supplier in a week. Response time was
measured by the time that elapses between an ad hoc
request and the response by the supplier. Similarly, the third
PI was measured by the number of cleaning tasks over which
valid complaints have been made divided by the total
number of weekly tasks. Even the remaining three PIs were
converted into numeric measures showing how many times
the supplier failed to meet legislation on domestic cleaning
(PI4); how many times they failed to meet Truststar policies
(PI5) and how many times their staff appearance and
communication was below standard (PI6).
The relationship between Truststar and the private suppliers
in this area has been quite problematical, and most clearly
the worst of all three types of supplier relations specified
above. In part, this is because the PFI contract was felt to be
‘quite woolly’, leaving considerable room for disagreement
between the two parties. One senior member of the finance
staff claimed that, rather than drawing upon her financial
skills in managing outsourcing relations, she spends most of
her time working like a lawyer, attempting to sensibly
interpret the terms of the contract and then negotiate new
understandings of these terms with the suppliers. The
monitoring staff have also indicated that because of contract
ambiguity, they have been supplementing the contract with
various appendices to specify new agreed understandings of
service deliveries from suppliers. Considerable time has also
been spent by the monitoring team with the solicitors of
Truststar to seek legal advice in the many disagreements that
emerged with the private suppliers.
Financial sanctions, such as refusal to pay for all, or some of,
the full cost of the service have been exercised by the
monitoring team from Truststar whenever service delivery
was below agreed standards, provided that the consortium
was supportive. Given the various complaints made already,
and the refusal of the private supplier to concede that their
service delivery has been well below expected standards,
Truststar sought to impose a heavy financial sanction on the
supplier. The consortium intervened and proposed that the
sanction be suspended pending the outcome of an ad hoc
new monitoring initiative by a team made up representatives
of Truststar, the private supplier and the consortium on a
daily basis for a whole month. Each morning, the consortium
representative drew a number of cleaning tasks ‘from a hat’
to be monitored on that day (to reduce the opportunity for
the supplier to manipulate the results if those tasks to be
monitored were known in advance). The results so far
vindicate Truststar, as many of the monitored tasks were well
below agreed standards, and it looks like Truststar will be able
to activate its suspended financial penalty. These problems
combined has led a number of our respondents to suggest
that there is very little trust at this point in time between
Truststar and the private suppliers. To add to this problem,
frequent staff changes at one of the suppliers made it
difficult for personal relations and trust to be cultivated
between members of Truststar monitoring team and the
private supplier staff. It seems that the only reason why the
service is continuing is because of the written contract (along
with the clarifying appendices) and the threat of financial
sanctions from Truststar.
6.3.2 Accounting and the recruitment of nurses
The level of minimum monthly provisions of two thousand
shifts agreed with the private agency was calculated to be
about £170,000. Accounting expertise was directly drawn
upon in the writing of the contract with the private agency.
This not only included stipulating the minimum number of
monthly shifts that had to be provided and their average
total costs, but also the payments to cover employment
costs of nurses and the commission for the agency. Moreover,
a financial penalty clause was calculated and entered in the
contract to cover for the possibility that the agency might fail
to deliver the minimum monthly number of shifts. The
financial contractual agreements involved paying the private
agency the salaries of the nurses, based on the national cost
at mid-point of the relevant scale, plus 2% to attract good
quality nurses, in addition to other employment costs such as
national insurance and employer contribution. On top of
that, the private agency received 17 % of nurse salaries
(excluding additional employment costs). The private agency
could either make some savings or incur more costs if the
actual salary they paid the recruited nurses was below or
above the relevant mid-point on the scale.
Despite the good record of the private agency, at times things
went wrong, such as when the agency sent nurses who were
not judged by the ward nurse to be sufficiently competent.
When this occurred, a number of scenarios were followed.
The nurses provided by the agency were first ‘audited and
sort of watched and monitored just to see whether they are
capable of doing that job’ (Ward Nurse). If the nurses were
found to be wanting in competence, they were sent for
further training, or employed to perform lower grade jobs and
at the extreme simply sent back to the agency without
payment. It was up to the private agency whether or not they
made some nominal payment to the nurses out of their own
money. A senior management accountant was regularly
involved in these scenarios.
The financial penalty, which has never been invoked because
of the good record of the agency, was £5,000 minimum and
rose with the gap between the minimum monthly number of
shifts stipulated in the contract and the number actually
delivered by the agency. The incentive for the agency to
deliver was not simply to avoid paying this penalty and any
adverse reputational effects; it also stood to benefit because
the more nurses it delivered the higher the commission
amount it received. Yet despite the agency’s good record, the
financial penalties were thought to be essential because ‘if
you don’t have any sort of penalty clause then they could
just be left to do what they like and there’s no real incentive
to meet the terms of the contract’ (senior management
accountant).
The shift from external outsourcing (the private agency) to
‘internal’ outsourcing (NHSP) was not thought by Truststar
staff to offer real savings and was possibly more costly. The
rates stipulated by a government directive is to pay the nurse
the grade plus two percent, and the NHSP then receives 7.5%
fee from Truststar. NHSP have been hard selling their scheme,
by focusing on the quality side and also intimating that trust
hospitals would get better terms than if they dealt with
private agencies. Yet, the NHSP is seen as a more costly
alternative to the private agency. Truststar now pays the
NHSP 2% above the salary scale for a given grade for all
nurses and receives a fee of 7.5%, on nurses who previously
would have been recruited by the back-office; a cost not
previously paid. This cost was calculated to be well above the
17% commission that the private agency charged on the
much smaller number of nurses they provided. To add to the
cost of Truststar, while the abolition of the back-office was
calculated to save about £17K per year, new monitoring will
be required to manage the relationship with the NHSP. An
additional source of extra-cost was calculated to result from
having to pay more to private agencies whenever the NHSP
fails to provide nurses from is own pool and engages private
agencies.
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6.3.3 Accounting and outsourcing surgical procedures 
Five main KPIs, which are national indicators, were used:
financial bottom line; waiting time guarantee for inpatients
and day cases; waiting time outpatients guarantee for
consultation time; patients cancelled at last minute as a
percentage of total number of procedures carried out in
Truststar; and adherence to the two week cancer wait for all
surgical procedures. It is evident therefore that patient
waiting time is particularly prominent. This represents a
fundamental shift from the previous emphasis on waiting
lists (or waiting numbers). When hospitals had to meet
waiting list targets, all they needed to do was to farm out to
the private sector the requisite number of cases that would
reduce the waiting numbers to the desired level, and these
tended to be the simplest possible cases even if the patients
had not been long on the waiting list. Using waiting time as
KPIs meant that it was the surgical procedures of those
patients who waited the longest that had to be outsourced,
hence it became more difficult for hospital managers to
manipulate the numbers to meet the targets.
Outsourcing contracts have been three to six months in
duration, and very occasionally stretching to one year.
Demand for accounting and other information therefore
reflects this short-term emphasis. Outsourcing activities are
seen as a pot of money earmarked for private treatment that
had to be managed centrally by Truststar. Accounting is seen
to play a variety of roles. First, planning future numbers and
mixes of patients to be treated privately. This involved
working from previous year’s figures and taking into account
projections of numbers and mixes of patients for the
following period, theatre capacity, and surgeon capacity.
Excess numbers that could not be treated internally within
the appropriate time frame drawn from waiting time KPIs are
identified. Once the numbers to be outsourced were
determined, steps were taken to identify the appropriate
private hospital(s) to engage to get the best treatment at the
best price possible. The cases were put out to tendering, and
accounting staff became directly involved in drawing out the
terms of tendering and also in the selection of the best
private hospitals for the surgical procedures required.
Negotiations between Truststar and the private hospital took
place to determine prices for a given number of procedures.
This negotiating process over prices and times of treatment
was also infused with power relations between Truststar and
private hospitals. On the one hand, private hospitals seem to
command much relative power in this process because they
recognise the limited choice that Truststar could exercise. The
room for manoeuvre available to Truststar is further limited
by the extent to which its own surgeons preferred to operate
in these private hospitals. On the other hand, some private
hospitals had spare capacity, and NHS work represented a
relatively significant proportion of their total volume.
Truststar was able to more or less guarantee a given volume
of outsourced procedures to the private hospital which
allowed the latter to plan its activities better. However,
because of the nature of the flow of and uncertainty over
NHS funding, Truststar could only plan the dates and
numbers of their procedures for outsourcing only a few
months before the treatments were required. Truststar
attempted to convince private hospitals that whatever
numbers are being negotiated for outsourcing at a particular
point in time, was only the beginning with more volume to
follow in the future.
It was acknowledged that the success or otherwise of this
process depended on having a good flow of relevant
information. Partly, much of this information, particularly
that relating to forward planning of patients and specialities
to be outsourced, came from working with the relevant
divisions and speciality staff in Truststar. Information
concerning price was collected through the tendering process
and the stock of past information from previous outsourcing
activities. The Private Sector Project Manager also took active
steps to build up her own data base, by creating her ‘own
little discs and spreadsheets’, as well as soliciting price
information for specific surgical procedures from the
Strategic Health Authority (SHA) that has its own database.
However, it was recognised that the SHA database is of
limited value because ‘there’s nothing to say where that
data’s come from, in which organisation they have bought in
high volume, so it’s weak and not going to do anything for
you’, because she could not use it to challenge the price
tenders of a specific private hospital. Despite this information
flow, and the various skills exercised by the staff from
Truststar to get the best price possible, there was a general
feeling that ‘the private sector massively overcharges the
NHS and nobody’s getting to the bottom of that’ (manager,
private sector project team).
The other crucial item of information is the amount of
money Truststar was given by the Health Authority to pay for
outsourced procedures. This created a major uncertainty, for
while once agreed, the price of outsourcing to a particular
private hospital became fixed, but the financial resources
offered from the Health Authority could fall significantly
short of the price. This was because additional state funding
to reduce waiting times is based on average cost-per-case, in
turn based on previous year’s total spend and total case mix.
Because the private hospital charged on the basis of
speciality rather than each individual case, Truststar invariably
had a deficit which it had to renegotiate with the state. A
particular example illustrates this dilemma. Recently, Truststar
was allocated £1.5M to treat 1500 patients of different case
mixes in the private sector in order to achieve its waiting
time targets, funded at £1000 per case. When their treatment
was tendered for in the private sector, the price based on
speciality was significantly higher, reaching £2.9M. Truststar
went through a funding renegotiation process that saw its
budget raised, but only to £2.5M, prompting one manager to
say ‘it’s this whole triangle of you know achieving the
impossible again.’ It was felt that if such intelligence
information comes late, which made it difficult for Truststar
to get the budget properly adjusted.
Written contracts were then produced, which specified the
terms and conditions for speciality surgical procedures, prices,
breach day, penalties for failure to meet breach day, and get
out clauses. Breach day is the date by which the patient must
have been treated. If the private hospital failed to meet that
breach day for a particular patient (or group of patients), the
contract specified that the patient must be treated free of
charge. Despite the writing of these contracts, the general
view was that they were not legally binding, in terms of the
NHS guaranteeing to outsource the number of patients and
specialities specified in the contract, with either side having
the opportunity to ‘opt out’. However, there was mention of
the ‘civil’ dimension of the contract and the mutual
dependency between Truststar and private hospitals as forces
that tended to make contracts functional. Indeed, there were
a few cases when penalty clauses in the contracts were
invoked successfully when the private hospital in question
failed to meet the breach day and ended up treating the
relevant patients completely free of charge.
Once a private hospital is engaged, accounting was called
upon to provide a host of information items to ensure that
the process is managed appropriately. These included
ensuring that the right number of patients are being
outsourced and charged for, identifying their specialities, and
the specific private hospital to which the patient is sent.
Monitoring patient treatment in the private hospitals was a
major occupation for Truststar. First, in order to ensure that
breach date was observed, and clarify any potential financial
penalties that had to be exercised as well as face-to-face
negotiations that had to take place. Further, the provider
private hospital was expected to submit information to the
Private Sector Project Manager on calculated length of stay in
total cost, and other data needed for clinical audit. This
information is required not only for clinical audit, to clarify
the total cost that Truststar was going to be billed for, to
allow Truststar to monitor under-spending on its patients by
the private hospitals and claw the savings back, and to make
it easier for Truststar to sensibly plan its financial
commitments in a timely fashion.
These specific details of accounting-based monitoring are
nested within a broader set of monitoring and feedback
which involves the Trust own consultants operating on the
Trust patients privately, patient own feedback through
questionnaires, the Private Sector Project Manager who
meets with opposite numbers in private hospitals weekly and
is in daily contact with them by telephone/correspondence,
and finally in the worst case scenario when patients who had
been treated privately return to Truststar for further
treatment.
6.3.4 Differences in time frame between the private
sector and the NHS
For all this focus on cost control of outsourcing procedures,
the real concern for Truststar has been its ability to meet
waiting time targets, particularly in light of the initial low
assessment of performance (one star compared to three stars
achieved by comparable teaching hospitals). When the
private hospitals failed to meet breach days, the financial
savings arising from free patient treatment offered little
comfort to Truststar management. The problem with meeting
these waiting time targets seems to emerge for two reasons;
differences in the time-frames of the private hospitals and
Truststar, and the relative power of the private hospitals
compared to Truststar.
A basic reason for the difference in time frame between the
private and the public sectors is the fundamentally different
flow of work in both types of organisation. NHS hospitals
treat much larger volumes of patients with a greater variety
of medical complexities, a significant number of whom arrive
unexpectedly. NHS hospitals also need to have access to
several data items in real time, for example when a patient is
admitted and discharged in real time because they have to
report on length of stay. In contrast, most private sector
hospitals deal with a much smaller volume of essentially
self-pay patients and a few insurance companies and hence
they were perceived by our informants as having no need for
real time reporting. This difference in time frame has resulted
in what one informant called a ‘massive gap in information
that private hospitals provide on our patients and what we
need for our system.’
The other reason for time frame differences between
Truststar and private hospitals relates more to the perceived
lower priority by which private hospitals treat NHS work.
There is a general feeling that, despite some scope for the
NHS to exercise some influence, private hospitals are
considered to ‘still hold the cards’ (general manager,
Division C). In one case one private hospital cancelled a
previously agreed operation on an outsourced NHS patient
because of an unexpected demand for treatment by one of
the hospital’s own private patients.
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7.1 History and context
Retail UK is one of the largest UK supermarket retailers.
Historically, it has been primarily involved in UK – based
retailing sales from stores. In common with other UK
retailers, however, it has diversified its broad ranges of
product offering. Notably, it has massively expanded its wine,
beer and spirits offerings to a point where it is the largest UK
sales outlet for such goods. More recently it has diversified
into sales of a variety of major non-food items including
clothing, consumer electronics, white goods, pharmaceuticals,
books, recorded music etc. This diversification strategy moved
onto the sales of a variety of financial and credit services.
Mode of sales delivery has also diversified, including Internet
retailing, and with store sizes varying from very small and
‘convenience stores’ to extremely large 24-hour
‘hypermarkets’. UK-based store numbers have, for example,
increased by 20-25% per annum including the ‘garage-type’
stores with a turnover of £30 to 60,000 per unit, mainly
located in the south east. Home (Internet) shopping,
meanwhile, has grown to approximately £500 million
turnover per annum, with a longer term target of £2 billion.
The third type of diversification has been geographical, with
Retail UK internationalising, with 378 stores in 10 countries
outside the UK, notably in Ireland, Eastern Europe and East
Asia. While this is still minor compared to the UK operations
(nearly 2000 stores), overseas expansion has been fairly rapid
and fairly recent. This international expansion has, in part,
placed Retail UK in the top ten global retailers, although, in
common with all of its international competitors it is
dwarfed by the giant US-owned retailer Walmart, which owns
the UK retailer ASDA. These various diversification and
expansion strategies are reflected in all of its international
competitors.
Such diversification and expansion strategies are reflected in
various indices of growth. Turnover in 2001, for example, was
£26.3 million, compared to £13,900 million in 1997, and the
company employed over 188,000 staff.
7.2 Business strategy
Changes to the supply chain and the consequent changes in
accounting need to be understood within the context of
business strategy. As the introduction indicated, the
organisation has changed considerably since the mid 1990s
due to considerable expansion. These changes have been
driven by a particular, sometimes close to evangelical, style of
strategic management from board level and especially its
chief executive, but also the finance director. The company
has a mission statement aiming to be the outstanding
company in its sector for customer service by building
lifelong brand loyalty in its customers. To these ends, the
main changes in business strategy took place in the
mid-to-late 1990s. In order to compete directly with
competitors on the basis of their perceived business
strategies, Retail UK aimed to raise its quality to levels at
least those of the two competitors noted for quality levels,
while retailing products at the same price or below that of its
main competitor with a low price focus. This strategy, in turn,
is predicated upon changing customer demands, namely that
customers are increasingly sophisticated and demanding, and
are looking for different products and services. The
demographic profile of customers has also changed
considerably in the UK in the past 10 years. In particular the
growth of an ageing population, a major increase in single
person households, and the growth of the ethnic minority
population with different tastes and demands.
The key strategy driver in ‘growing the business’ relates to a
decision taken not to raise the level of margin on products
sold, fixing it at 6% (as opposed to the previous 9%) on most
retail produce. Any increase in dividends for shareholders
would, therefore, have to be achieved through overall
business growth, and particularly through opening new
stores. Any productivity gains from, for example, more
efficient supply chain management, would be routed back to
customers through cheaper prices and/or better service. As
such Retail UK has invested £1 billion over 5 years in price
reduction and £60 million in the current year.
Despite geographical diversification, the main focus has been
on UK operations. These are structured into three main
divisions, based on a buy-move-sell logic, namely commercial
(buying), logistics and IT (supply chain relations) and retailing
(stores). In addition to these three functional areas
represented at board level including group finance and
marketing. At a senior, and more operational level, there is a
matrix-type managerial structure, with managers working in
cross functional teams.
Retail UK’s broad business strategy has four main missions or
‘pillars’; to be as big overseas as in the UK; to be as big in
non-food as in food; to offer the lowest prices in UK (through
maintaining low margins and driving profits through growth)
and to create lifelong loyalty by customers through excellent
customer service. In particular, Retail UK is attempting to use
its name to represent a brand of quality, service and value
whatever particular goods or services it is offering, be it
groceries or financial services (the exemplar cited is Virgin).
Historically, the company has shifted its business strategy
considerably. In the 1970s the company was perceived (and
indeed sold itself) as a ‘pile-it-high, sell-it-cheap’ retailer with
discounts offered in the form of a dividend stamp. In the late
1980s the company closed all its UK stores for a three day
period, physically re-vamped the stores and dropped the
dividend stamp and concentrated on price competition. In
the late 1980s and early 1990s it concentrated its focus on
investment in the supply chain. In the 1990s it invested
heavily, both financially and culturally, in a ‘listening to the
customer’ ethos and a major investment in stores and
infrastructure.
7. Retail UK
Core capabilities within Retail UK are judged to be servicing
customers, supply chain management and site development.
The company regards itself as being ‘world-class’ at
understanding customer needs and being close to the
customer and at developing ranges. It considers itself very
good, meanwhile, at managing the supply chain (and
particularly good at fast stock turns) and at site development.
The supply chain is described as the ‘lifeblood of the whole
business’.
In terms of market segmentation, Retail UK serves upmarket,
middle market, and less affluent customers, with a product
range that reflects this. The company therefore has to
compete on both quality and price and senior managers are
conscious of the potential of falling between these two
positions and ending up with a bland offering.
7.3 Supply chain development
The supply chain function has changed considerably.
Historically, the ethos of Retail UK was that supplies were
bought, were sold and a profit made, with little regard for
what the customer wanted. Indeed, one of the interview
respondents (a supply chain director) described the
organisation as ‘very retarded’ in the mid 1980s in terms of
the supply chain. In 1985 the organisation decided to invest
heavily in its supply chain function, following a major
management shake up in 1983. Initially there was an
extensive recruitment drive to bring in specialists. A stock
management function was introduced with two prime aims.
First to manage distribution centre replenishment and
second, to ensure that one person was in charge and,
therefore, to introduce accountability. Prior to this there had
been a considerable lack of co-ordination. A buyer could, for
example, purchase huge volumes to ensure an extensively
competitive price but then flood distribution centres with
goods that they could not store. Moreover, the system was
extremely tardy; in 1985, for example, it took one week to
order. Seventy per cent of goods were supplied directly to
stores which created significant ‘book-room’ storage for the
stores. In 1985, therefore, the whole stock management
function was centralised. The stock management function
was further developed in the early 1990s with the advent of
electronic point of sale (EPOS) technology. The years 1985 to
1996, therefore, brought considerable developments in supply
chain management through new systems and efficiencies. By
1996, however, it was felt that there was a loss of a wider
business focus in the stock management functions, partly
because staff who had driven the change had been promoted
elsewhere in the organisation.
In 1996, therefore, the stock management function was
disbanded and integrated into the three main operating
divisions, namely commercial (i.e. buying), distribution and
retail (i.e. stores). This change, however, was not judged a
success; respondents described this time as one of ‘standing
still’ in terms of supply chain developments. There was little
improvement, for example, in key performance indicators in
the supply chain but this was, to a certain extent, ignored as
the overall business was doing well and the company
profitable.
In 2001, therefore, the stock management function was
re-introduced, albeit as a supply chain function. A similar
structure was reintroduced. The main difference, however, was
that new management principles were introduced, described
by the acronym RACI – responsibility, accountability, consult
and inform. This is a tool used across the organisation and
intended to concentrate a staff focus on the wider business
implications of a particular functional decision. If a Retail UK
buyer, for example, negotiates a particular product promotion
(such as a ‘buy-one-get-one-free’), they are obligated to
inform and consult with distribution and retail on the wider
implications of this move.
The mission of supply chain management is to be ‘world class
in availability and efficiency’. Supply chain specialists in Retail
UK acknowledge shortcomings. Company respondents, for
example, felt that it still holds too much stock and that it
cannot respond quickly enough in certain circumstances (for
example, the provision of fresh foods and reacting to weather
changes). As one respondent commented ‘the business is,
because of its size, a bit like an oil tanker’.
Contractually, the arrangements with suppliers are fairly loose
ones, with Retail UK brand products, for example, it is rare for
the company to have a written contract with suppliers.
Rather, the company has a relationship with suppliers based
on performance. Such performance is measured on the basis
of a ‘scorecard’, including such measures as delivery,
availability, quality and price. Inevitably, there are trade-offs
between these measures with, for example, lowest price not
always being the only criteria. These measures are reviewed
on a regular basis. Retail UK agree with suppliers specific
objectives around the scorecard which are measured and fed
back to suppliers on each of the dimensions. These
dimensions differ from supplier to supplier, as does the
relative weightings of dimensions, but there are common
generic measures such as service level. The brand supply chain
target is, therefore, ‘cost affective availability’.
An important key performance indicator (KPI) which drives
the group and is crucial for the supply chain is the
‘availability’ target, which currently stands at 98.7% (i.e. if an
‘average’ customer walks into a store, 98.7% of what they
want will be available in-store). Given that the cost basis of
the competing retailers are fairly similar, the supply chain is
seen to be a huge competitive advantage, and one that has
taken 7 to 8 years for Retail UK to make competitive. Stock
turnover is extremely quick, in the leading stores, 80-90% of
goods delivered will be sold on that day.
Effective chain management is not only core to achieving
customer satisfaction, but it has important financial
implications. Supply chain costs, for example, are 12% of
sales and two-thirds of these costs are labour costs (including
in-store staff responsible for replenishing shelves).
Accounting for new organisational forms Retail UK 45
Accounting for new organisational forms Retail UK46
The relationship with suppliers inevitably differs from supplier
to supplier, with suppliers ranging from small companies to
companies that are large multinational food and drink
producers in their own right. However, the main hold that
Retail UK has over such suppliers, in terms of price, is market
forces in terms of the price level that individual products can
be sold at. Nevertheless a Retail UK respondent described the
relationship with these major brand suppliers, as a ‘dynamic
tension’. A majority of sales (55%) are of Retail UK ‘own
label’ products and a further 15% are products primarily
produced for them. Thus some 30% of products sold are non
Retail UK brands, sourced largely from multinationals such as
Nestlé, Coca Cola, Kelloggs, Heinz etc.
7.4 Managing the supply chain
The central functional actor in Retail UK relations with
external suppliers was its supply chain division. The supply
chain was described by one of Retail UK’s senior directors as
the ‘lifeblood of the whole business, bespoke, and one which
we would never outsource’. The company undertakes no
manufacturing and, moreover, over 50% of is distribution and
warehousing is provided by external suppliers, using a
combination of national and regional distributors and
logistics providers. However, this figure is relatively low
compared to some of Retail UK’s major competitors which
have outsourced all of distribution and warehousing.
Moreover, Retail UK has largely resisted the temptation to
outsource other functions such as information technology
(IT) and human resource management (HRM) and its large
call centre operation. Indeed the major outsourcing is of
peripheral functions such as facilities management, catering
and cleaning etc.
Information exchange and the perceived need for the
company to control its supply chain management were the
prime focus. Retail UK regards itself as at the ‘leading edge’ of
best practice in their field, although market intelligence was
gathered on the practices of retail competitors (and, indeed,
non-retail companies). Indeed ideas for improvements above
were drawn from specialist manufacturers, distributors and
logistics companies.
The company efforts were concentrated on reconciling the
demands of quickly growing sales levels and rising market
share and stopping escalating costs in the supply chain. A
variety of innovations have been introduced. These include a
programme of ‘continuous replenishment’ with store
managers reporting twice a day on sales information.
Deliveries are adjusted to more accurately reflect actual, as
opposed to projected, demand. This has resulted in more
frequent deliveries and a greater need for accuracy and
co-ordination across the supply chain, with increased
pressure on suppliers to ensure their information’s correct
and their servicing accurate and on-time.
Supply chain management has also sought new practices for
working and relations with suppliers. For example, new
warehouse automation systems have been introduced, as
well as the co-ordination of ex-factory deliveries direct to
stores.
Tension exists with regard to the degree of
information-sharing between Retail UK and suppliers.
Suppliers were broadly regarded as contractors, with their
own business strategies and aims, rather than as partners,
with strong mutual interests. The high degree of market share
of Retail UK increased the hold that the company has over
suppliers which may not exist in smaller retailers. In general
there was recognition that there was a limit beyond which
information exchange between Retail UK and suppliers would
not extend. For example, while operational information could
be exchanged, longer terms contract and business planning
would not be. However, while certain UK retailers have
demanded ‘open book’ inspections of suppliers, Retail UK has
not pushed for this, accepting the commercial independence
of suppliers.
The current supply chain strategy has three ‘pillars’. First, to
develop a business plan whereby customers are incorporated
into the supply chain; second, analysis, which involves
understanding the business in terms of inventory, lead times,
waste, distribution centre operations, and process; third, to
incorporate certain principles such as making things better
for staff, simpler for staff and cheap by integrating
end-to-end processes. In order to develop this strategy Retail
UK’s supply chain staff are developing mechanisms to predict
stress points in supply and distribution.
Several new supply chain projects including ‘right place –
right time’ and flow through measures. The first of these is
aimed at imposing secondary distribution (that is from Retail
UK’s distribution centres to stores). Distribution centres (DCs)
are broadly divided into three types. First there are 8 ‘fast’
DCs, with 4000 products each and orders come in twice per
day. These 8 DCs are regional and supply to about 100 stores
each. Second, there are 3 ‘semi national’ DCs which stock
slower selling items, located again on a regional basis and
supplying to around 250 stores. Finally, there are four
national network DCs which store, for example, alcohol or
organic goods. Goods are ‘trunked’ from these through the
semi-national DCs to others. Over and above this, certain
bulky fast selling items such as milk and bread are supplied
directly to stores from regional suppliers. The company is now
trying to provide other suppliers of fast selling bulky items
(such as breakfast cereals) to supply directly from factories to
stores.
The products are ‘assigned’ to the various types of DC
according to ‘product categories’, but this has thrown up a
number of anomalies. Dog food, for example, is a product
category which is in the fast goods category, and yet only
three brands are fast selling. By contrast, alcohol is
categorised as a ‘slow’ line and yet certain items (for
example, vodka) are very fast selling. Thus stores need to be
supplied vodka twice per day, but are currently being supplied
every other day. This is one such anomaly which the ‘right
place right time’ programme is addressing.
Ownership and running of Retail UK DCs varies. Some are
owned by the company and run by it, some are owned by the
company but run by a ‘third party’ logistics and distribution
company with their own labour and others are owned and
run by a third party. There are a number of reasons for such a
mix. First there is the ‘legacy position’ whereby ownership is
largely for reasons of history. Second, outsourcing offers
Retail UK a degree of flexibility over labour. Third, the
company occasionally wants to access the expertise of third
party specialist, as was the case in a recently opened frozen
foods DC.
As indicated earlier the availability target is currently 98.7%.
In a large store, some 80-90% of deliveries will be sold that
day. This calls, however, for an extremely efficient supply
chain. Some 200 Retail UK lines account for 10% of the sales
with 6 lines that sell one million items plus per week
(including milk, bread, lottery tickets, bananas and breakfast
cereal). In total 15,000 lines are sold, but 500 account for
15% of lines and 90% from 50% of the lines. However,
customers wish to purchase from a range of brands, even if
they don’t buy them. Thus, for example, 50 brands of coffee
may have to be stocked even though only 5 sell. Similarly
there are ‘hero’ lines which sell slowly but are deemed
essential by customers (for example, Brasso) and so called
‘destination’ lines such as Bicodol, soya and organics which
are slow selling but necessary to get customers into the store.
The majority of food stuffs are either sourced from the UK or
a UK source, or from Europe.
A major problem bottleneck, or stress point, is in the
backrooms of stores where goods are delivered so frequently
that they cannot be shelved quickly enough. Thus while there
is 97.5% availability against a target of 97.8%, the dotcom
measure is 91-92% which reflects on-shelf availability as
opposed to in-store availability (including back-room).
‘Continuous replenishment’ is one major supply chain project
which is currently being implemented. This is a sales based
ordering system which has pervaded through all of the supply
chain. Essentially, this is an ordering system based on daily
fluctuations, almost measuring real-time variations.
Moreover, quick moving products are now delivered from
suppliers on wheeled trolleys which can be moved directly
onto shelves. As indicated earlier the ‘availability’ KPI is seen
as one of the company’s most important ones. The
introduction of the dotcom business has focused this
measure considerably.
Suppliers are ranked in a league table using a ‘traffic light’
system, with red a problem, amber means that the supplier
may be getting into difficulties or getting out of them and
green is satisfactory. There is information exchange between
Retail UK and suppliers on a weekly basis on, for example,
sales and in ‘common performance forward planning’ which is
process-orientated.
Typically, contracts are offered for between three and five
years and KPI’s are applied to them. For distribution centres,
for example, two major ones are unit per man hours (UPMN)
and costs per hour (as payroll makes up 65% of costs).
In terms of outsourcing functions, a fairly crude accounting
decision is made and that the organisation must decide it can
save over 15% due to outsourcing the function. Different
decisions are made, however, according to functions. Routine
information technology roles are, for example, outsourced
because they are seen as a distraction from core activities
(although the 15% rule of thumb is applied). In finance,
however, outsourcing is undertaken to gain key skills which
are hard to come by in the open labour market.
Contra to perceived wisdom (both in academic and
practitioners circles), certain UK Retail respondents felt that
outsourcing did not add to organisational flexibility, rather it
was inflexible in that the organisation ended up in permanent
contractual discussions with suppliers. Structured formal
contracts did not exist with suppliers but informal, open and
indirect ones did in the form of transparent service
agreements. The main disadvantages are that if service
provider suppliers do not perform to standard, then those
agreements are much more difficult to rectify than if the
work had been retained in-house.
A number of accounting measures are used for
sub-contracting services, a return on investment calculation
(15% plus), pay-back periods and then qualitative measures.
Each piece of outsourced work is measured as a separate cost
centre. Certain functions are monitored very frequently, due
to their importance (for example, hauliers) while other, less
critical, functions are monitored on an annual basis.
Rates-of-return on investment are typically around 30% over
a 12 to 18 month period. As indicated earlier, certain service
functions are under consideration for outsourcing by Retail
UK. Payroll is, for example, the next service function to be
considered for outsourcing, provided it can be done more
cheaply and at a similar quality. Certain functions, however,
would not be considered for outsourcing. Finance, for
example, has been outsourced by other large UK
organisations such as BP, but would not be outsourced by
Retail UK. This is because if the organisation was to undergo a
major change, they would need the flexibility of an in-house
operation. Thus Retail UK has outsourced services which are
considered ‘low risk’ activities, such as catering, cleaning,
security, training and ‘code crunching’ IT, but nothing that is
regarded as ‘value added’. The organisation is now considering
the outsourcing of ‘mid risk’ activities, but is conscious that
outsourced activities often have many ‘hidden costs’.
7.5 Management accounting
Management accounting at Retail UK is organised around the
principles of the ‘balanced scorecard’ approach, balancing
various aspects of the company operations (both financial
and non-financial). These, in turn, are predicated upon the
core mission and strategy of the organisation, particularly the
emphasis as customer focus. The balanced scorecard
approach was introduced in 1996, with the assistance of a
large management consultancy (Cap Gemini). The scorecard
is pictorially represented, and characterised as, a steering
wheel. The wheel is divided into four quadrants, reflecting the
competing needs of the business. These are, namely,
Customer, Operations, Finance and People.
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The four broad quadrant areas are reflected in a number of
key performance indicators (KPI) per quadrant, again both
financial and non-financial. The scorecard/steering wheel
approach is rolled out across the organisation, both
functionally and hierarchically, with a cascading system of
KPIs according to function and level of hierarchy, but all
within the context and forms of the steering wheel. In other
words each function and level of hierarchy would be a set of
individual KPIs within the four company-wide quadrants of
the steering wheel. These KPIs are fairly traditional, but all are
geared towards customers in one way or another. Set within
the context of the balanced scorecard approach, KPIs are
intended to focus the business in a forward looking manner
rather than backward looking, reliant on KPIs. Indeed, this is
part of a gradual change in financial roles, as indicated to us
by senior Retail UK financial staff, towards a more forward
looking system. This might include changing metrics, or
changes in reporting and calculation formats. Any changes
would, however, be tested alongside the existing methods. If
the new methods were judged to be better than previous
ones and, after the costs of changing systems was taken into
account, the new ones would be adopted.
Information on the ‘steering wheel’ (i.e. the various KPIs) is
compared to the previous year and against projected or
planned performance. Huge amounts of information are
gathered, controlled and used by Retail UK, from customer
satisfaction surveys, focus groups, the company’s loyalty card
and the company’s call centre. All is fed into a five year rolling
plan, which is directed by the board of directors. KPIs are
revisited and readjusted on a yearly basis, with some omitted
and others added.
The function of management accounting at Retail UK is to
provide clarity for meeting business aims, according to senior
management. To these ends, centralised accounting
information systems which co-ordinate standardised
information flow were introduced in the late 1990s.
Accounting metrics were revised in order to measure
particular aspects of performance and service provisions
more transparently.
While there is a central management accounting function,
the majority of the information required for reporting is
generated by non-accounting staff using standardised
systems co-ordinating stock and sales. Such systems include,
for example, an activity based costing approach rather than a
more conventional resource-based approach. This change was
introduced as it relates more accurately to financial costs,
such as overheads, and ‘hidden costs’ in distribution and
warehousing to the processes that generate such costs. This
enables decision makers with the organisation at all levels to
make the necessary improvements in working processes, as
well as identifying specific product costs. Hence there is an
attempt to identify cost and value information at every level
within the business based on the logic of working backward
from point of sale to the customer to assigning resources
necessary to deliver the product/service. Thus within Retail
UK there is an internal market, with each function and unit
having a supplier and customer interface.
Retail UK has also introduced specific cost models for each
product retailed or, in some cases, grouped-together similar
products. A number of variables, including size, weight, pack
size, method of storing, length of ‘on the shelf’ stay and
whether the products are chilled, frozen or ambient products,
are all taken into account in developing and assigning cost
models. These models, together with other improvements,
have assisted Retail UK in co-ordination of linked activities,
such as the ‘buy-move-sell’ function. The modelling of
customer demand, based as the historical performance,
enables predictions made of the daily sales per product. Thus
deliveries and stock levels are adjusted and streamlined with,
for example, 14 to 16 days stock held in stores and depots.
With a cross functional management team driving process
change and the use of a combination of financial and non
financial key performance indicators, the potential for
conflicts between functions arises. Conflict arises, however,
less than might have been expected, according to
interviewees. An example of this was the potential conflict
between purchasing, distribution and retail functions.
Purchasing staff were, primarily, concerned with margin issues
and thus seek economies of scale. Distribution staff,
meanwhile, were keen to reduce the value of unsold
stock-holdings. Finally, retail staff were concerned with
examining and rewarding performance. Thus progressive
fine-tuning attempted to strike a balance between ‘lean’
practices in servicing on the one hand and the need not to
run out of stocks in shops on the other.
Activity-based costing is being introduced along
process-streams which cut across operations and functional
areas, for example, the replenishment stream.
In terms of day-to-day accounting procedures, this is carried
out by Retail UKs Divisional Group reporting team. Their
duties include internal management reporting, external
financial reporting and new accounting projects and
techniques. In addition this team includes a small team
involved in updating Retail UKs board of directors on
developments in accounting standards. A key driver of this
team is the harmonisation of accounting standards. At
present the group company uses UK Gap but, by 2005, will
have to use international standards. This will entail changing
certain aspects of Retail UKs accounting practice.
The accounting year is broken down into weekly reporting
periods (i.e. monthly). In period (P) 3 and 6 the organisation
assesses its performance against a profit plan and works out
what the organisation needs to do to reach its profit target.
In P6 and P12, Retail UK produces six month and full year
figures, which is a formal report to the City of London. At
these stages, the accounting function examines how
performance-related projections and business strategy is
adjusted accordingly.
Although there are changes in finance roles in Retail UK, this
is a case of a gradual change in such roles, with an emphasis
on continuity rather than extreme change. While there is a
tension between what is described as ‘driving the business
forward’ and establishing continuity in reporting systems and
standards, these changes have, however, made the accounting
functions more ‘forward looking’ than before.
While accounts are done on a monthly basis, as indicated
earlier; the company consolidates every week and this
information is presented to the board. The division group
reporting board’s role, aside from the presentation of
accounts, is to look at any variance historically and to plan
and comment on it for the main board. Anything over half a
million pound variance would have to be explained (i.e. 1%
plus).
7.5.1 Capital return on investment (CROI)
The key management accounting measure is capital return on
investment, or CROI. All major spending decisions are referred
to Retail UK’s operational capital committee, comprised of a
number of key board members. For example, business
analysts could be asked to present a financial support case
for this. The time period for CROI would be three years for
major projects, although it might be less or up to 6 or 7
years, dependent on the project. One such project being
evaluated at the time of the study was the ‘right product,
right place’ one to reduce the number of times that fast
selling firms were transferred in the supply chain.
In line with the idea of the balanced score card approach,
measures which do not have an immediate financial impact
are also used. One of the major projects was called ‘one in
front’ whereby if customers had more than one person in
front of them in a checkout, then other checkouts could be
opened. This was introduced after considerable market
research which indicated that queues were a major irritation
to customers. This was a project which had few immediate
benefits (at least in CROI terms) and considerable staff costs.
Given that CROI could not be reasonably used in this case, a
series of financial costs alone were considered, for example,
cost parameters.
Accounting measures and conventions are set within the
philosophy of RACY mentioned earlier; identify responsibility
of who does the work; accountability – or who is
accountable, consult who is affected and inform who needs
to be informed. While all new projects have to deliver
productivity benefits and add to profits, they also have to
make sense for the whole of the business.
7.5.2 Management accounting and its impact on
performance
Interviews at Retail UK revealed a differentiation between
financial accounting and the production of reports and
information for internal management. Management
accounting reporting is driven strongly by the firm’s business
strategy. The weekly operations board meeting of Retail UK
drives the weekly management accounting reporting round.
These provide detailed aggregate information to the board on
financial performance measures (cost, sales value, value of
stock held etc) and non financial measures (volume, service
levels, delivery accuracy) and are assessed against
performance for the relevant week, the previous year and
planned performance. These are fed into a balanced scorecard
approach to the business’s planned performance, developed
by outside consultants. At lower senior management and
operational levels, the weekly information relates to different
business units and is broken down to the level of the region,
store, depot etc. at each level of the business. There are key
performance indicators relating to financial and non-financial
aspects of performance. These are tied to staff remuneration.
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8.1 History, activities and the market
Carco is a long established multinational automotive
producer operating in a number of locations in the UK, but
reporting to a European Division. Indeed, Carco’s UK plants
work, interchangeably, with sister plants in Europe, either
supplying them with major automotive subsystems to be
built into cars or vice versa. Moreover, this geographic
widening of the integrated production base is further
spreading to global scale, with UK plants producing either
models or subsystems for sale in Carco’s markets worldwide
(unlike previously, where North American plants would
produce for their own markets and European ones for theirs
etc.). UK turnover was over £9 million in 2000, and over
40,000 were employed.
In common with many of the major car producers, Carco
generally, and its European division in particular, is facing
intense competition which has led to major financial losses.
This stems from overcapacity in the industry following
Japanese auto producers’ success in Carco’s major markets in
the 1970s and 1980s, from ‘new entrant’ producers in the
1980s and 1990s (notably from Korea), from revitalised
smaller producers following take-overs (Seat, Skoda etc.) and
from, more recently, other automotive multinational
corporations building capacity in low cost eastern European
locations, such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
(a strategy Carco has eschewed).
In the early 1990s, Carco faced what has been termed a ‘life
and death’ crisis. Up until the 1960s, all Carco products sold
in the European market were based on North American
designs. In the late 1960s and 1970s, however, the company
completely reversed its strategy and produced cars designed
purely for the European market. This was an extremely
successful strategy and, ultimately, kept the company afloat
in that profits made in Europe subsidised huge losses in the
North American division. However, a world car strategy in the
1980s was largely unsuccessful and, in the 1990s, Carco came
under extreme competitive pressures in its main European
market, the UK. Nevertheless, the reversal of its fortunes in
the early 1980s represented a remarkable turnaround, from
close to extinction to the top of US automobile
manufacturer.
The turnaround was accompanied, however, by radical
changes in the organisation, both in the company philosophy
and its operations. In particular, the company invested heavily
in total quality management, in design and in simultaneous
car development and design. There were also major job losses
in both North America and Europe in the 1980s; in Europe for
example, approximately one third of the organisation’s jobs
were lost. Lean production techniques were introduced,
copied in part from a Japanese car producer in which Carco
took a major financial stake. The supplier base was
rationalised, with the number of suppliers decreasing from
2200 in 1980 to 1200 in 1990 and a systematic grading
system introduced for individual suppliers. Part of the
reduction of this supply base was due to a considerable
consolidation of the supplier industry through merger and
acquisition activity as individual suppliers strove to become
larger in order to achieve the economies of scale necessary in
an increasingly competitive environment. Increasingly,
suppliers supplied to the major manufacturers such as Carco
on a global basis for particular parts. This volume of business,
in turn, allowed Carco to leverage cost reductions. One
negative impact, at least for Carco and the other major
automotive manufacturers is, however, a reduction in
competition due to a smaller number of suppliers. A further
major change is that Carco has outsourced complex, but
non-core, activities which are not necessarily efficient for
Carco to produce. In particular, Carco has required suppliers
to make subsystems which may consist of several hundred
components which can be delivered line-side to be ‘plugged
in’ to the cars. Thus suppliers take responsibility for part
consolidation, assembling the subsystems and delivery in
vehicle line sequence. Considerable work is then eliminated
from the organisation and transferred to the supplier in an
area where they have expertise.
Carco has attempted to simplify the supply chain by
changing and introducing common components and
subsystems for a variety of different models and, in particular,
has introduced Carco parts and subsystems in models
produced by the niche manufacturers it has taken over. Three
volume produced models in the small to medium sized car
segment, for example, use a common platform.
Carco has responded to this competition in a number of
ways. First, it has made prolonged and sustained efforts to
increase productivity, both internally, in its suppliers and in its
supply chain generally. Second, it has cut its own capacity by
plant closures and partial plant closures, with considerable
job losses. In 2003, for example, the company cut its
workforce by 35,000 and closed several North American
plants. Third, it has taken a major part in the consolidation
and rationalisation of the industry by taking over, for
example, a number of smaller European-owned quality niche
producers and buying a controlling stake in a Japanese
producer. Fourth, and again in common with other major
MNC producers, it has focussed on its core business of
producing cars and divested itself of parts of its business. This
has taken a number of forms. Several major Carco-owned
parts divisions have been divested by selling them off, certain
parts of the production process have been subcontracted out
and, finally, virtually all auxiliary services are now third-party
provided. The end result is that a company (and industry)
which has been characterised by, and characteristic of,
vertical integration became vertically disintegrated. This
aside, while Carco is producing and operating in a mature
industry and represents a traditional engineering sector, the
firm has adapted to a new organisational form, namely the
vertically disintegrated core business type. Despite these cost
cutting and rationalising measures, the European division of
Carco is heavily loss-making.
8. Carco
After a business recovery in late 2001 and early 2002, Carco
returned to major losses in 2003. This has been largely as a
result of decreased margins due to price cuts and other buyer
incentives. While the company is expected to return to
profitability, has a large number of new models coming on
stream and is investing heavily in its premium division
(largely through takeovers), further job cuts in Europe are
anticipated (which are likely to be in the UK). Moreover, the
company has been outmanoeuvred strategically in the
marketplace by being slow to develop new models which
would meet market demand for certain types of vehicles
(multipurpose vehicles, or MPVs, and diesel cars). It has also
over-relied on its major European market, the UK.
8.2 Supply chain management
Supply chain management at Carco is extremely complex
with many different models, many derivatives and many
thousands of parts, given that there are approximately 2000
parts per car.
The supply chain at Carco has undergone a transformation
over the past twenty years first in response to intense
competition in core markets (the USA and UK) from new
entrant producers, second due to major productivity gaps
that emerged between US producers such as Carco and their
Japanese competitors and third, due to the more general
intensively competitive environment which has pervaded the
industry since then.
The supply chain overhaul has taken several forms. First, as
indicated earlier, Carco divested itself of several major parts
and components divisions which are themselves
multinational corporations in their own right. This was done
for reasons of ‘core competence’ (and ultimately cost
reduction) with Carco reasoning that it could make greater
profits if it focused on its core competency of the
manufacture and assembly of vehicles, while the parts
supplier could focus on its core competency and thus deliver
cheaper parts to Carco.
There are continued cost pressures on components and trade
offs between just in time production, sourcing low cost
components typically from low cost international locations
and quality and manufacturing who want continuity of
supply. Nevertheless, in a situation where major financial
losses are being accrued, the purchasing division is powerful,
with for example, a 5% material cost reduction required per
annum.
A senior financial manager expressed this tension within the
team value management philosophy.
‘I mean there’s two ways to go and get costs down, you
just go and tell the supplier you’re taking twenty percent
out of his cost and tell him to deliver it and he goes
bankrupt. Or there’s actually collaborating with them as a
team and that’s the philosophy. The closer we can work
with people then the better benefit we’ll get for everybody
and it won’t be all beating the suppliers up at the cost to
the supplier, it’s joint team effort and that’s the big culture
change.’
Despite this, there has been an increase in the number of
suppliers which are experiencing financial difficulties due to
the level of competition, which is of some concern for Carco
finance staff, particularly in situations where the company
relies on one supplier for a part. The supply base has,
therefore become more volatile due to the overall volatility
of the supplier, mergers and acquisitions amongst the supply
base and a change in the level of work that they are doing.
New suppliers are actively sought out but, having chosen a
new supplier, their components are not used for a year (a
company rule) while engineering tests are carried out. Price
levels are approximately set initially by benchmarking against
the previous suppliers but, as the financial manager indicated,
‘…there’s always lots of brinkmanship. We at Carco think that
we’re in the driving seat – we always feel that because we are
such a big player.’
Carco conducts a thorough history of a new supplier,
including their technical and engineering capacity. Initially,
however, they will dual-source the component, using the old
and new supplier (the new supplier initially has a third of
components) before gradually increasing the business with
new suppliers. Every supplier goes through a similar supplier
audit of financial capability, quality checks and logistics.
In the case of new components, Carco makes an ‘educated
guess’ based on initial calculations by their engineers.
Material costs are calculated plus production costs calculated
by industrial engineers and the process is, therefore, very
cost-driven. Occasionally, parts producers under-quote on
components. The supplier is typically then allowed to
requote, but Carco purchasing would be cautious of using
them in the future.
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Technology transfer will typically take place between Carco
and its suppliers, especially over production bottlenecks. One
major supplier, for example, had problems with component
quality and Carco loaned them an engineering manager for
seven months. Carco also does ‘spot-checks’ on suppliers
plants and industrial engineers go in to suppliers to check on
costings. Contract length with suppliers can be up to eight
years but will typically be in the range of five to eight years
or a model cycle. While these contracts are relatively long,
prices are re-negotiated every year. Moreover, there is a
notice period for both parties in which they can terminate
the contract. It is not common, however, for Carco to switch
suppliers mid-contract. In particular, if suppliers have invested
heavily in a contract through, for example, locating on one of
Carco’s industrial parks or investing in expensive presses, then
Carco would attempt to give the supplier several contract
periods. Thus Carco’s relationship builds with a number of
large key suppliers, whereas it has a more arms-length
relationship with other, smaller, ones.
Within the contract there are clauses which stipulate delivery
and quality expectations, in addition to cost details. If the
supplier does not meet the contract, there are penalty
clauses. For example, if Carco loses production as a result of
non delivery, the supplier is charged for Carco’s idle time plus
overheads and any special freight costs. Revenue based costs
are not recovered (for example, lost sales), however, as this
would be too complex. In extreme cases, Carco would
challenge the supplier legally.
Carco has, since the late 1990s, sought a year-by-year
reduction in parts costs. In 1999, for example, there was a
major material cost reduction programme which resulted in
savings of £90 million but there is a growing feeling that
further reductions would be more and more difficult to
achieve. Nevertheless, 75% of the cost of the material is in
the design in that once a product is designed, it is very
difficult to reduce material costs.
In the past, Carco has had a ‘league table’ of suppliers which
it published. However, this was felt to be counterproductive
and the company now relies on key performance indicators
on delivery, quality and cost. For example, Carco benchmarks
its individual models against other producers’ models which it
regards as ‘best in class.’ For one of its models it has 300
‘things gone wrong,’ compared to 100 for their competitor’s
best in class. The company is continually seeking to meet
these benchmarks. Metrics for delivery, quality and cost are
used, but they are not published. Given that the company has
thousands of suppliers, Carco tends to focus on larger
suppliers, largely based on the 80-20 guideline (i.e. they
concentrate their attention on the 20% of suppliers that are
responsible for 80% of supplies by value).
Typically, the product development stage in the automotive
industry is a long one, with five to six years from initiation to
mass production. Dealings with suppliers start at a fairly early
stage with Carco’s purchasing function working closely with
both engineers and suppliers and broad pricing targets are
set. These will be the basis for negotiation for the next stages.
This, then, is essentially an estimate for what the cost will be
for the part four years hence. Essentially these are estimates
for negotiations for the next few years based on
technological advances and prices. A document is then signed
between Carco and the supplier and, within Carco, with the
engineering and purchasing functions. There are continuous
pressures for cost-cutting both in-house and on suppliers. On
one engine, for example, materials costs are to be reduced
from £400 to £380.
Accounting principles for the supply chain have been based,
fairly recently, around the principles of ‘total value
management.’ This is an arrangement based around working
commodity teams which include staff from product
development, purchasing and finance which are charged with
getting the best value for parts. ‘Total value’ is not only
concerned with price but takes into account quality and
functionality of parts. Essentially, this is a change in reporting
philosophy away from reporting ‘bins’ (for example, design
cost changes, non-design purchase negotiations) to a process
of benchmarking against competition for suppliers in order to
decide if changes in suppliers are needed or to negotiate with
current suppliers. Given that a balance has to be achieved on
functionality, the term ‘total value management’ is used
rather than lowest cost management. A process of
‘continuous benchmarking’ is involved. This is described as a
new kind of philosophy and culture for the organisation,
based on multifunctional working. In particular, Carco is
attempting to advocate a closer working arrangement
between the engineering function (with its focus on design),
purchasing (with its focus on productivity) and finance (with
its focus on coat reduction).
Outsourcing of services and auxiliary functions has occurred
since the 1970s, such as janitorial services. This was done
purely for cost reasons because even though previously such
staff had been paid as unskilled operatives, they were still
relatively highly paid.
In terms of outsourcing, Carco works to a cost-benefit time
adjusted rate of 35% which amounts to 100% on most
projects, given that they are typically on a pay-back period of
three years. The only projects which are excepted are longer
term ones such as energy saving ones which are regarded as
‘political’ and good for public relations. Prices of components
are determined by costs plus full absorption, all overheads,
plus mark-up.
Purchasing is centralised at a European-level based
headquarters where cost-benefit analysis is done. The
individual plants are, therefore, price and product takers, apart
from certain auxiliary costs.
The vast majority of parts are subcontracted, either to be
machined or assembled. Those come from Carco internally or,
more typically, from external sources. Carco are attempting
to set up distribution and consolidation sites close to their
production plants (industrial parks), which will be run either
by suppliers or by specialist warehousing and distribution
firms. Essentially, this is subcontracting out stock holding
costs and is termed ‘bull’s eye’ sourcing. The financial
calculation for this is that it will be cost-neutral, but
eventually there will be cost savings, particularly on freight
costs. The main advantage will be logistical as it will enable
plants to have a month’s supply of parts on their doorstep
and will allow for flexible production. For example, it will
mean that the manufacturing plants do not have to rely on
‘premium’ freight costs if they are short of parts (i.e. high
speed quick delivery lorries and air freight).
In the 1990s the company introduced a world car concept
with similar models sold worldwide, common subsystems
(such as platforms) for cars and ‘global sourcing.’ This
involved Carco sourcing parts from suppliers throughout the
world based primarily on price. This has, to a certain extent
rebounded on the company because sourcing from distant
locations has posed logistical difficulties. For example, one UK
plant is supplied from one particular supplier in the Czech
Republic but supplies are occasionally late due to adverse
weather. Similarly, a supplier formally owned by Carco and
located thirty miles away from this Carco plant has
threatened to cease supplying Carco because of very low
margins. The alternative (and low-cost) supplier is located in
Northern Mexico, but this has a five-week freight lead time
(as opposed to one hour). Similarly in Carco’s French plants,
68% of parts are sourced from outside France.
Parts are thus ‘segmented’ into those essential areas that
need to be ‘line sequenced’ (i.e. supplied on a just in time
basis) and those that are not (typically smaller parts) and
which are thus sourced globally. The broad philosophy is thus
to get the best in quality and functionality at the lowest cost
and to achieve maximum efficiency at Carco’s car
manufacturing plants.
The total value management (TVM) concept is not dissimilar
from the balanced scorecard approach at RetailUK. Six to
seven years ago there was considerable infighting between
functions over, for example, performance versus cost
efficiency. The TVM concept is an attempt to break down
these functional barriers and achieve the lowest costs to the
company. Thus when potentially sourcing from a low cost
location such as China and India, the total cost package of
the decision is made involving quality and timing
implications. In this case, for example, trade-offs are made
between low costs and the costs of investing to ensure that
production is not disrupted. Typically, this will be for parts
which are not required for just in time production. For
low-cost ubiquitous items such as a fastener, for example, the
impact of disruption would be minimal and alternative
sources could be found quickly. For a big part, where
disruption could lead to plant closure different decision
criteria would be made and the decision could be made by
someone at a more senior level. Potential manufacturing
difficulties are therefore calculated against cost benefits. This
would be done in liaison with the logistics, product
development, manufacturing and engineering functions.
In a hypothetical case of a part potentially sourced from the
UK and a distant low-cost location, the price would be
calculated plus transport and shipping costs. Transport costs
may be reduced if a number of parts are sourced from that
country and they can be consolidated. Other relatively easily
quantifiable things such as quality risks are also included and
a bottom line cost reached. Initially, however, a human
judgement has to be made and Carco tends to be relatively
conservative given the safety critical nature of car parts,
reputation and the potential for a warranty campaign which,
in the longer term, would prove more expensive. Thus hard
elements (cost, quality etc.) are taken into account, as are
softer elements such as supplier reputation, track record,
financial record etc. There is, however, an element of
calculated risks which are taken by senior staff in the
organisation (vice presidents and directors).
Supply chain finance support staff at Carco essentially track
the financial aspect of the business. They provide data to
generate bills of material for every vehicle. These are then
used for Carco’s budgeting and forecasting system. These bills
are also compared to budgets and forecasts. These are
provided for senior managers and financial solutions are
offered. In short, therefore, they provide a set of information
that senior managers can use to forecast and run the
business. In Europe alone, for example, twelve and a half
million dollars of materials are purchased per annum. Clearly,
a one percent (or even half a percent) variation on forecast
represents a large amount.
Accounting for new organisational forms Carco 53
Accounting for new organisational forms Carco54
The basic fundamentals of the accounting system, in relation
to suppliers, have changed little in the past twenty years.
Management information systems have, however, become
much more sophisticated and have enabled the organisation
to go beyond the narrow metrics to a ‘total cost’ approach.
This has represented a significant change in reporting rather
than accounting, but there is far more analysis and
forecasting. Staff working in forecasting all have, however, an
accounting background, unlike ten years ago, and in particular
in management accounting.
Supply chain management at Carco is extremely complex,
with thousands of different parts (approximately 2000 per
car) and a major part of the accounting function is to track
and forecast, with checks undertaken at the end of quarters
to track major vehicle lines and assess cost savings. They also
liaise with the niche producers which have retained a degree
of operational autonomy.
There have been significant changes in the accounting
function, mainly associated with mechanisation of
accounting systems and procedures and information systems.
New accounting systems fit with other automotive systems,
including a parts co-ordination system and a parts controller
system. This has led, in part, to a decline in the traditional
accounting function with far fewer staff involved as it is
much less labour intensive. Much is now controlled centrally,
which is in keeping with the Carco organisational philosophy,
which is extremely centralised.
A scorecard system is in operation. At manufacturing plants,
for example, these are based on quality, safety, delivery, cost,
morale and environment and these cascade down from plant
managers. A ‘traffic light’ system is also in operation.
9.1 History, activities and the market
Chocco are a major integrated producer and retailer of luxury
confectionary. In common with many retailers, Chocco
started as a family firm (in 1911), based on one shop.
Although a publicly listed firm, (it was floated om 1985) it
retains a degree of family ownership with a grandson of the
founder sitting on the board. However, the family do not
control the company, with one board member out of eleven
(seven executive directors and four non-executives) and 80%
of the business publicly owned. The corporate goal is to be
the UKs leading retailer and distributor of specialist sweets
and foods. As such Chocco were included in our sample of
case study companies for a number of reasons. First, they are
unusual in that they are one of few medium to large
companies in the UK which both manufacture and retail their
own products. Clarks Shoes are another, but even they are
increasingly contracting out manufacturing to low cost labour
locations. Second, Chocco operates an extensive franchise
operation. This manufacture and retail mix is described as a
double-edged sword. The advantage is that the company
serves a niche as an un-market confectionary and is in
control of its own destiny in terms of deciding on how to
merchandise its product to its customers. The franchises work
to a blue-print which maintains the corporate image and
standards. Compared to the other private sector case study
organisations in our report, Chocco is essentially a
one-country operating and is relatively small, with a market
value of approximately retail £70 million.
The downside of such integration is that potential market
pressures which could be introduced if the manufacturing
and retailing were under different ownership are absent.
Moreover, although the organisation should be flexible and
involved in process integration, this is also seen as a
constraint (a lack of thinking ‘out-of-the-box’) and a lack of
outside experience.
Chocco has an extremely high market share of the luxury
boxed chocolates relative to its size. They are in a premium
niche market, within a huge overall market for chocolates.
(The only part of the chocolate market which has grown is
the premium one). Thus if the company were to increase its
sales of Easter eggs, for example, and take an extra 0.02%
market share from competitors such as Woolworths and
Tesco, this would add a 5 – 10% difference to Chocco’s Easter
egg turnover.
Chocco’s retail operations total approximately 570 shops
located across the UK. These 570 are divided into 390 shops
wholly owned by Chocco and 180 run on a franchise basis.
The business decision on whether to open or run a shop on
an own shop or franchise basis is largely made on store
turnover or potential turnover.
In terms of turnover, Chocco’s own shops dominate with an
annual turnover of £130 million, franchise accounts for £15
million turnover, of which mail order represents £7 million
and trading approximately £11 million turnover per annum.
In addition Internet sales are £6 to 7 million per annum, there
is a mail order business with flowers outsourced and the
company has 20 coffee shops, largely at out-of-town
discount outlets. Chocco has also embarked on a series of
initiatives where products (such as cakes) are licensed to third
party manufacturers and distributors and sold to major
supermarkets under the Chocco brand name. This represents
between 10 & 15% of manufacturing, the remainder being
produced in-house. This new business is, however, very
different from Chocco’s traditional business in that it
occupies a different market segment. In Chocco’s own shops,
and the franchises, some 1200 different products are sold
compared to 6 in the supermarkets. Moreover, the market is
considerably different. Chocco’s own stores, for example, have
extremely seasonal demand, whereas demand for their
products in the supermarket is far more even. In part, this is
because chocolate bars sold through supermarkets are
essentially impulse buys, whereas in Chocco’s stores
customers consciously go to the store to buy a product. Thus
competition in the supermarkets is from other bars whereas
it is from other gifts in Chocco stores.
The trading area has traditionally produced chocolates and
other confectionary items, using different recipes than those
used in Chocco’s own brand chocolates and sold in their
shops. These ‘traded’ chocolates are then sold by major
retailers on an own-brand basis. Up until two years ago
traded chocolates had largely been sold to one UK retailer on
an exclusivity deal. However, this segment of the business has
been targeted by Chocco as an area of major business
growth. While there has been gradual but consistent growth
in the own-store and franchise business, it is felt that this
market has largely plateaued. New stores are unlikely.
There was an attempted international expansion into
continental Europe, with shops opened in France and
Belgium. This was not, however, a financial success and these
shops were closed. Chocco do, however, have 9 shops in
Ireland including 5 in the Republic. In the UK, while Chocco
stores have a national presence, there is a greater presence in
the north and midlands of England than in the south east of
England, which reflects the historical origins of the firm.
Product mix also varies from store location to location
reflecting local demographics and socio-economic profiles at
least in great numbers, and in-store sales per store, are also
felt to have reached their peak. In addition, the pattern of
trading in-stores has become more difficult and
unpredictable. While overall volume has remained buoyant,
sales have become extremely temporally squeezed into the
week before Christmas and Easter (for chocolate eggs)
respectively. This has proved difficult both for retail planning,
but also for production planning in the manufacturing side of
the business.
9. Chocco
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The traded business has been expanded, therefore, with
Chocco now selling a newly developed bar to retailers. At
first, this was through an ‘exclusivity’ deal to Retail UK.
However, with that exclusivity clause ending, Chocco is now
selling bars to all of major retail chains in the UK. These sales
are largely seen as ‘impulse’ buys which do not take away
from Chocco’s core business (its own stores). It is envisaged
that the bar business sales will rise to between £10 to £12
million per annum, or equivalent to that of the current traded
business. Essentially, the bars sold to these retailers are
similar to those sold in Chocco’s own stores and the
company eventually envisages selling box selections through
retailers, with the exception of their premium range.
However, in order to maintain brand ‘specialness’ the
chocolates sold in supermarkets are marketed under another
brand name. While the growth of this side of the business
offers Chocco considerable opportunities, it also poses
considerable logistical problems. The company has increased
its customers base from one (with whom it has a long term
relationship) to thirty with each supermarket chain having
different systems. Instead of controlling storage, distribution
and handling which Chocco controls in its own shops, this
will transfer to the major retailers. Moreover, as the
percentage of this business grows, the company envisages
resource-balancing issues such as where to invest or how to
utilise production capacity. One major advantage, however, is
that the supermarket business is not seasonal, unlike sales in
Chocco own stores, which are highly seasonal. At the
manufacturing end of the business, such seasonality is coped
with by the utilisation of annualised hours, while in the shops
temporary labour, typically students, is used.
The growth of the supermarket business is also an acceptance
of changing market trends, with 60% of confectionary now
sold through supermarkets and major retailers. Thus Chocco
made a decision that it had to increase its product range and
customers. As one senior manager indicated, ‘we want to get
to a position wherever you can buy a kitkat, you can buy our
product’. He further added, ‘basically we had to bite the
bullet, there was saturation in some stores, some more
possible especially in franchises, but our margins are tighter
and tighter. Out of town malls and supermarkets are putting
major pressures on us. We’re fighting to stand still’.
The business portfolio is divided into four areas – retail,
trading, supply chain and mail order. Broadly, trading refers to
marketing to a third party, retail refers to Chocco’s own
stores and franchise activities while supply chain and mail
order are fairly self-explanatory.
The retail division is further divided on the basis of three
geographical regions which, in turn, have seven to ten areas
per region, and each one in turn has sixteen to twenty shops.
Chocco has restructured its retail operations in terms of
management and organisation, in order to prompt sales.
Under the previous organisational arrangement, area
managers would be responsible for up to 35 stores each, but
this resulted in the area manager having little time for each
store and largely being embroiled in routine administration,
such as personnel issues. An area manager, therefore, might
not visit an individual store for 3 months. Under the new
structure the number of area managers has been increased
and the stores-per-manager ratio cut. The rationale here is to
enable the area manager to act more strategically and seek
out new business opportunities. This was in response to
widely varying performances against target between stores
which could not easily be explained. Certain stores per area
might be performing at 110% compared to others
performing at 65%.
9.2 Franchising
Essentially, franchising at Chocco is regarded as a ‘second-
best’ option in that the franchises are in locations where
Chocco could not support a shop if it’s own, either because it
is in a small town or on the edge of a larger town. Franchises
provide a much lower profit margin for Chocco given that the
overheads are much the same, as are the product prices. The
Chocco finance department would therefore combine with
their property team to decide on whether the potential
franchise location would damage in any way the business of
any of Chocco’s own stores. Franchises are often
‘combination’ shops where there are effectively two
franchises within the one shop, one with Chocco and one
with an associated business such as greeting cards. Indeed,
Chocco has an arrangement with a large greetings card chain
with approximately fifty shops, half of which are managed by
Chocco and half managed by the greetings cards chain. As
such they are joint ventures.
Chocco rapidly expanded its retail operations three to four
years ago in order to increase sales volume, with a
consequent increase from 300 to 400 shops. Certain of these
shops, however, have not provided sufficient rates of return
and the estate (i.e. the number of shops) is currently
contracting slightly, with some of these shops now being
transferred to franchises.
Franchising is supported by a field team separate from the
mainstream retail estate team. However, the franchises are
expected to charge the same prices (although legally they
can charge more or less), stock the same product mix and
carry out the same events and promotions as the Chocco-
owned stores. This is to achieve consistency across the board.
Essentially, the franchise shops are mirror images of the
Chocco-owned ones, except that they are often joint
ventures selling other items such as gifts and cards. The
franchise owns the property and is expected to invest in all of
the shop fittings. Therefore Chocco has no capital invested in
the franchise shops, although it carries out the planning and
building work including the tendering to shopfitters, and then
invoices the franchise. The franchisee is, however, able to pay
in two instalments, the second payment being due after the
first full season, which will generally be within a year of
opening. A new franchise costs approximately £40,000 for
shopfitting etc., including a £10,000 initial fee. This fee covers
a percentage for the brand and brand name and another for
training materials, support and marketing assistance. There is
no fee beyond the initial one but Chocco obviously earns
revenue on its products. The franchise contract is for five
years with an automatic five year renewal. Occasionally,
when a franchise is very successful and the ten year period is
over, Chocco will transfer it to its main estate. In other cases
the franchise carries on beyond the ten year period but with
a three month notice period for both parties. There is an
element of ‘skill transfer’ from Chocco to the franchisee
which is part of the contract. As a Chocco representative
noted ‘we teach them how to sell’. This does not extend,
however, into any financial training.
Essentially, Chocco locates its own stores in places where
projected turnover is £250,000 plus, based on forecasts
carried out by a consultant. If there are locations with sales
potential but with a figure below a quarter of a million
pounds, then Chocco seeks a franchise partner. A franchise
development manager sifts queries from potential franchises.
Chocco advertises on a dedicated website, is a member of
the British Franchise Association and advertises in relevant
trade magazines. There is also a franchise element to
Chocco’s own website, this receives approximately 40
enquiries per month.
Chocco’s franchises vary from multiple joint ventures to
independent sole traders. Greeting cards operators offer
business synergies for Chocco in that, customers may buy
both products for, for example, Mother’s Day or similar
occasions. There are also a small number of franchises selling
glass and china gifts. At the other extreme there are
independent sole traders who operate a single, or several,
franchises.
The vetting process for potential franchises depends on the
individual franchisee. An initial point of departure is, however,
to pick partners for the franchise on the basis of synergy and
quality. As a senior manager indicated ‘we wouldn’t partner a
butcher or a greengrocer’. New independent franchises are
sent detailed information packs including financial details,
property details, projected sales (with a minimum expected
of £100,000 per franchise). Certain franchises do sell well
below £100,000 but £35-40,000 is regarded as an absolute
minimum. Individual franchise performance is monitored on a
monthly basis and their performance is compared with other
franchises. The potential franchisee will then have detailed
discussions and negotiations with the development manager.
Details and references are then taken up, and credit checks
and other financial checks undertaken. Chocco
representatives act as a ‘go between’ for the franchisee with
other franchises such as the greetings card companies. It is
then up to the franchisee to develop a business plan and
arrange funding with a financial institution. Chocco finance
staff advise on the business plan, with particular attention
placed on cash flow projections. The contract includes set
price margins which are standard across all franchises and are
maintained for the duration of the contract. Regular
monitoring takes place of franchises to ensure that serious
problems do not arise which may impact upon the Chocco
brand image. All the franchise shops are routinely visited at
six week intervals and, if problems emerge, a business
meeting is arranged. Franchise contracts have, occasionally,
been terminated, but in general arrangements can be made
and repayments rescheduled or another solution arrived at.
9.3 Supply chain management
Supply chain management is relatively simple compared to
the other case study organisations, given the degree of
vertical integration. Retail is regarded as the most important
part of the operation (compared to manufacture) and as
such, hypothetically, the organisation looks at its cost basis
and outsourcing options to maximise returns. However, given
that the organisation has a large manufacturing operation
which it has invested in heavily in the past five to six years,
this is more likely to be a method to promote internal
efficiency in manufacture than a real threat. The extent to
which this works will be returned to later. Moreover, the
organisation regards its product recipes as its ‘crown jewels’
and would be reluctant to give a third party manufacturer
access to them.
This vertical integration has a number of negative outcomes.
Forecasting is regarded as not as rigorous as might be
expected if a third party manufacturer was involved. There is,
for example, considerable friction between manufacturing on
the one hand and retail and marketing on the other because
the latter ask for time scales for development and packaging
design changes that would not be feasible if a third party
manufacturer was involved.
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While the new retail business with supermarkets has provided
major new logistical problems, it also offers a model for the
internal relationship between manufacturer and retail at
Chocco. However, while senior Chocco managers maintain
that this is a corporate goal, they concede that this does not
occur in reality. For example, box design changes take place
which break the time rules and which would not be accepted
by a third party manufacturer. Moreover, the manufacturing
division are often asked to produce goods which they would
never normally produce in terms of runs of products because
they are so small and would just not make money.
Formerly, the organisation (six years ago) was divisionalised
between manufacturing and retail and each were reported as
separate profit and loss (P&L) centres. However, the company
ended this arrangement as they were missing some of the
benefits of vertical integration by incentivising the two
individually. In part this was because it was regarded by both
centres, and particularly manufacturing, as an artificial divide,
as the retail division had little option but to buy from the
manufacturing division.
Although there is the potential for relocating production to a
lower cost, overseas location (shelf-life is four to six months)
this has been disregarded thus far for a number of reasons.
Firstly, because Chocco has invested heavily (approximately
£60 million) in its manufacturing facility, particularly in
automation. This includes warehousing and distribution in the
UK in the past decade, Secondly, because such relocation
would be contra to the specialist niche brand values that the
company is promoting.
Chocco employs approximately 5000 plus with between
1000 and 2000 at the manufacturing and head office site,
this figure depending on the season. Seasonal peaks are
found at Christmas and Easter, with smaller ones at
Valentine’s Day, Mothers’ and Fathers’ Days and Halloween.
Staff in franchise shops who are not Chocco employees.
Chocolates are also frozen to level manufacturing production
peaks and troughs. In addition, annualised hours have been
introduced whereby hourly-paid workers work a four day
week from April to June and the hours are made up over the
winter with a five-and-a-half day week. From September to
November (the peak production time) temporary workers are
employed in manufacturing (as they are in the shops at
Christmas and Easter). The combination of these methods is
used to manage the peaks and troughs of demand and to
minimise stock levels.
Due to the heavy investment in automation shift working is
used. The packing process, however, remains fairly
unautomated and thus relatively labour intensive, particularly
because chocolates are fragile and box sizes very considerably
and labour is more flexible than automation.
The supply chain logistics are complicated by being both a
retailer and manufacturer and, in addition, supplying to third
party retailers. If Chocco, for example, overproduces an item
for a third party retailer, these are then sold through their
own shops. This has led, in turn, to having to discount
chocolate bars produced for its own shops. These matters are
typically negotiated between the retail and commercial
divisional heads at a weekly meeting.
Overproduction is sometimes sold through Chocco’s 25
factory outlet shops but occasionally, if overproduction is too
great, product has to be sold throughout all of the shops.
Some of these products occasionally have an extremely short
shelf life which, if they were being supplied by a third party
manufacturer, would not be accepted (the franchises do send
such products back to Chocco). Thus decisions are made
which may not be in the best commercial interests of the
retail division but which make commercial sense for Chocco
as a whole.
The basic philosophy of the organisation is not to subcontract
out anything which is regarded as core to the business; the
core being the production of confectionary, toffee and fudge.
These are made to unique recipes and are thus regarded as a
core component. Ice cream is a good example of this. Ice
cream sales are important to Chocco, but are a very minor
proportion of turnover. Originally, production was carried out
in-house, but Chocco realised that this production, which is
very specialised and extremely prone to seasonal and climatic
fluctuations, could be produced by external suppliers who
could both produce better ice cream at lower costs than
Chocco could, and thus it was subcontracted out.
The financial competency of suppliers is one very important
selection criterion. Chocco reviews the finances, the financial
background and the credit rating of all suppliers and whether
suppliers have the ability to keep to contract. One of the
major questions is whether or not suppliers can cope with
both Chocco’s forecasting and that of its third party
customers. Supplier product quality is key given that the
whole Chocco brand is based on a quality niche. As one
senior finance manager noted ‘we don’t want to lose that
over a few quid’s savings on a supplier’. Key Performance
Indicators for suppliers are delivery on time, supply output
and responding to changing forecasts. These are important
given that Chocco tends to keep zero stocks, especially on big
items.
9.4 The perils of outsourcing: a case study
Several years ago the Chocco Board, heavily influenced by the
finance director, decided to outsource its information
technology (IT) function in its entirety. This included
approximately 40 employees including managers and
operators, and involved basic programming, personal
computer work, help desk operations etc. The majority of the
staff were transferred to a third party provider of IT services,
Compuco (pseudonym), although a few members of staff left
completely. All the transferred workers remained on site and
at first there was very little change in work routine for those
employees. Soon after, however, Compuco brought in
managers who carried out a ‘shadowing’ operation to review
current operations for all the main managers’ posts. All ex-
Chocco employees were then guaranteed a job (as they had
to be, under TUPE employment legislation), but not
necessarily at the Chocco site and not necessarily the same
one they had before.
Prior to outsourcing, IT at Chocco provided twenty-four hour
coverage. Essentially this entailed two members of staff
working a night-shift to ‘baby sit’ the system. If anything
went wrong with the IT system the ‘baby-sitter’ would either
fix the problem or call out somebody who could. This 24-hour
coverage is not provided by Compuco and consequently if
anything goes wrong with the system at night, the problem
may not be rectified until hours later (Compuco staff start
work at 8.30). The reason given for this is that Chocco cannot
afford to pay Compuco for 24-hour coverage, despite the
decision to outsource being primarily a financial cost cutting
one. This provides Chocco with a number of problems, not
least in manufacturing, where extremely expensive
equipment may lie idle because of a systems fault (with the
manufacturing staff also having very little to do).
If any problem arises with IT, Chocco staff have to ring a
help-desk located in the southeast of England (Chocco is
located in the English midlands). The help-desk then allocates
a member of Compuco staff at the Chocco site to do the job.
Prior to IT being outsourced, Chocco staff would simply
telephone Chocco IT staff and ask them for help. Under the
new arrangement this is not possible as ex-Chocco Compuco
staff are not allowed to do this as they have to account for
every hour of their time. Occasionally Chocco staff do ask
Compuco staff to help out in cases where a problem is very
small, but it has to be very small (5 to 10 minutes work) and
Compuco staff will only do this if there manager is not there.
Evidently, the outsourcing of IT has caused difficulties across
Chocco’s operations. However, it has also increased costs. For
example, when Chocco had its own IT function in-house, IT
staff were typically paid £25,000 per annum (approximately
£100 per day) plus on-costs. Compuco, however, charges its
staff at £625 per day. In addition, Chocco agreed to buy £1
million of extra services per annum from Compuco
irrespective of whether Chocco requires them.
The outsourcing of IT has posed considerable problems for
the accounting function as Compuco does not provide
itemised bills, some items of which can be claimed back for
tax purposes. Chocco finance functions’ workload has thus
dramatically increased directly as a result of the outsourcing
of IT. In addition, new staff have had to be employed. A ‘go
between’ has been employed by Chocco, for example, a
part-qualified accountant who works full-time with Compuco
on administration. Chocco has also employed an IT executive,
with two support staff members, to liaise with Compuco
staff. Despite outsourcing IT to cut costs, Chocco has an
annual IT salary cost of approximately £130,000 purely to
support and liaise with Compuco.
9.5 Management accounting
As indicated earlier, manufacturing and services were
formerly divided into two profit and loss cost centres but the
company is now a single profit and loss entity within the
organisation. There are sub-centres, which broadly follow the
organisations functional structure. In the retail division,
individual shops are regarded as profit centres and managed
accordingly. While shop managers report to the area manager
and ultimately to the retail director, they are in control of
what they spend in the shop including staffing costs, petty
cash spend and levels of reject and waste (unlike at Retail
Co.). They have no control, however, over pricing or profit
margins, which are decided centrally. Moreover, they have no
authority over product mix or seasonal promotion activities.
Thus while the shops are, nominally, profit centres, managers
have a limited degree over the operational decisions they are
able to make. Essentially, they are given shop-based staffing
budgets based on their budgeted levels of turnover and peaks
and their financial history, and they are targeted with
improving these.
While individual shops have, for some time, been designated
as profit centres, this was, however, described as national
rather than real until fairly recently. Previously, once or twice
per year a profit centre statement was prepared for each
shop using gross sales, stock wastage, stock losses, payroll
cost, property costs and rent, rates, security charges etc.
Essentially, the lowest level of cost centre was the region.
However, in the past year accounting systems have been
upgraded with a full financial suite and full purchasing
disciplines and software. Thus an individual shop-based
statement is readily available. Purchasing activities can now
take place relatively easily and this is a routine part of
Chocco’s accounting systems. This technology, in turn, has
facilitated the company in incentivising shop managers, and
also area and regional managers. Area managers have a
certain degree of flexibility and can ‘mix and match’ across
their range of shops and can adjust between them on sales
targets, staffing or products.
Accounting for new organisational forms Chocco 59
Accounting for new organisational forms Chocco60
While this new purchasing and accounting software enables
Chocco to manage its shops through a far greater level of
financial and stock information, finance managers
acknowledge the potential of information overload in a
relatively small organisation. While monthly profit and loss
information is thus available for 400 shops, the finance
division, together with the retail division, concentrate on ‘top
tens’ and ‘bottom tens’ in terms of various indicators on
specific cost issues in the shops. For example, if there are
problems of petty cash spend, it is narrowed down to about
five shops in any one area. Thus one function of central
finance is to provide ‘shortlists’ to regional and area managers
to indicate which shops are of concern for whatever reason.
While this broad structure has been in place for a number of
years, the level of information that has been available has
grown dramatically.
Shop-based performance reviews are over a relatively long
period. Sales are compared on a year-by-year basis with
adjustments made for good and lean financial years. New
shop openings are made based on demographic research,
from similar shops in similar locations and from other
research from market analysts such as Experion.
In Chocco’s core management accounting entries and
statements, manufacturing and distribution activities are all
cost-centre controlled. A standard costing framework is
employed which includes standard cost variances so, for
example, efficiency in terms of labour use is based on a
standard cost accounting approach. Similarly the supply chain
is cost, as opposed to profit, centre-based with no transfer
pricing. Retail is a little different with slightly more flexibility
because of variable costs. Nevertheless, the shops are
regarded as cost centres. However, with an increase in the
amount of financial and non-financial information available,
shops are increasingly also seen as profit centres and area
managers expected to treat them as such and seek business
opportunities for them at a local level (for example, through
selling chocolates to local businesses as presents).
The company has, on its manufacturing side, considered
bench-marking against other chocolate producers, but has
rejected this as the major chocolate producers are
manufacturing huge volumes of standard products (such as
Mars bars at Cadbury’s) and thus the benchmark is
inappropriate. Rather, Chocco uses internal historical
performance indicators to seek cost cutting either by
machinery investments or alternative labour deployment
measures. Standard costing are used for this.
The management of the supply chain, at least in accounting
terms, has, according to senior finance staff at Chocco, been
fairly rudimentary. Accurate purchasing control was extremely
difficult because the management and accounting systems
were poor and information was either unavailable or not
available on time. This has been transformed, however, not
least by the appointment of a new retail director. In
particular, while the organisation had extremely advanced
manufacturing technology and a sophisticated understanding
of brands and customers, the way that Chocco was
accounting for it was relatively backward.
The company is currently upgrading its sales database
systems so that it can analyse sales information quickly and
thus feedback into production possible unexpected runs of
demand on certain products, or lack of sales on others.
Nevertheless the lag times, particularly in box design, means
that it is very difficult to increase production in the face of
unpredictable demand. This is exacerbated by the shortening
of the Christmas and Easter seasons mentioned earlier
whereby, consumers are buying their products closer and
closer to those dates.
Metrics used, on the retail side of the business, include
contribution percentages, returns on capital and cash
generation. There is also a quarterly estates review where the
finance department studies every shop and what cash it
generates. External factors are taken into consideration (using
a market research company), such as local and regional
socio-economic changes. Strict capital investment appraisal
techniques are used, including returns on capital.
Market analysis feedback comes from both shop managers
and area and regional managers. Shop managers get a
questionnaire on an annual basis. In addition they get the
opportunity to feed back after every ‘event’ that Chocco runs,
through the events co-ordinators and through quarterly
events meetings which a limited number of shop managers
are invited to attend. Shop managers are also involved in any
new product launches and on estate and merchandising
issues.
A variety of accounting measures and metrics are used. For
shop managers and staff, for example, rewards have recently
been incentivised but this tends to be on a whole shop basis.
For example, a bonus may be paid to a particular shop for
outsourcing performance which is then shared out between
all employees in that particular shop, or extra holiday leave is
given to these employees.
Product price setting has shifted somewhat in the
organisation. In the 1990s there was considerable discounting
of confectionary, but this was largely abandoned as it sat
uneasily with the promotion of a quality brand and product.
As a senior finance employee noted ‘you wouldn’t buy a
Mercedes because they were offering £50 in vouchers’.
Discounting still occurs, to shift surplus stock after the
Christmas and Easter peaks, but this is not the norm and not
the prime driver of sales.
Individual shop profit ability is measured and analysed in a
number of ways. The main measure is contribution to profit
after cost (i.e. a contribution margin figure) after all overhead
costs have been taken into consideration. Retail turnover per
square metre is not used but a variation is, ‘profitability per
bay’, based on the number of bays per shop.
For manufacturing, there is a cost-per-chocolate measure
comprised of a bill of materials and the estimated yield.
Activity-based costing measures have been used for the past
two years (previously they used gross margin), but this has
been difficult to implement because employees are uncertain
about certain aspects, notably how overheads are allocated
within such a costing system.
The ‘balanced scorecard approach’ has not yet been
introduced but it is intended that it will. However, key
performance indicators are extensively used. For Chocco as a
whole a small number of KPIs have been devised, which were
largely chosen by the shareholders. That is, they were
externally driven by the capital providers. These include an
increased return on sales, an internal return on capital and
low gearing. In addition, the senior management have set the
organisation the KPI of strengthening the brand name.
In addition every employee in the organisation has a set of
individual KPIs which cascade from the top. Certain of the
individual KPIs are common to all employees and certain
ones are personal. For example, in the mail order side of the
business, number of new customers would be one KPI. These
individual KPIs involve financial and non-financial ones.
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The point of departure for this study was the emergence of
new organisational forms. Traditional ways of organising large
firms evolved throughout the twentieth century, but
particularly after 1980 become to be questioned by
academics, management specialists and organisations. These
forms were characteristically large, hierarchical and
bureaucratic, and were relatively vertically integrated.
Changes in the competitive environment, moves to
globalisation and technological change combined to pose
challenges to the traditional form, and led to advocates of
change calling for flatter, more flexible and less hierarchical
new forms, brought about, in part, by a concentration on core
products, services and functions, and outsourcing of non-core
functions.
Our first objective was thus to evaluate the extent of the
introduction of new organisational forms in contemporary
UK organisations. In order to answer this question, as well as
the role of and implications for management accounting, two
research methods were used. First, a questionnaire survey of
private and public sector organisations was used to give a
broad picture of change in the UK. Second, a case study
methodology was employed, comprised of multiple
interviews, in order to gain a more in-depth understanding of
such changes and, further, the ways in which management
accounting functions in such organisations were adapting
their practices to such changes.
Our research results on new organisational forms, from both
the questionnaire survey and case studies, points to
evolutionary, or incremental change, rather than
revolutionary or transformational change. As such, this
confirms recent literature on the subject, outlined in chapter
two. The questionnaire surveys, for example, indicated that
the greatest changes are in public sector organisations and in
particular the NHS, with 43% of NHS Trusts and one-third of
local authorities entering into some form of strategic alliance
or partnership. Nearly one half of private sector
organisations, meanwhile, had been subject to merger or
acquisition in the previous three years. Delayering, a
prominent feature of new organisational forms, was
reasonably evident across all organisations with over half of
local authorities, over 40 per cent of private companies and
37 per cent of NHS Trusts reporting it. Similarly, the numbers
of departments in local authorities had declined, although
they had increased in NHS Trusts, perhaps reflecting the
growing complexity of those operations, which is illustrated
in the Truststar case study.
New forms were thus common, in particular in the NHS, but
also in private firms and local authorities. The reasons for
change were several-fold. Most important were the
introduction of new senior management teams and due to
general market conditions. Also prominent, although of less
importance, were the desire to reduce staff and other fixed
costs and a wish to concentrate on core activities.
Turning to the case studies, all had gone through fairly
dramatic change, albeit that this was fairly gradual over a
relatively extended time period (with the exception of the
NHS Trust). All of the case study organisations were relatively
old ones, but were also in fairly intensely competitive
markets. All were also characterised by increasing complexity
in their competitive environment. Carco, representing a
previously traditional engineering organisation, was perhaps
the best example of a change in organisational form from old
to new. Significant delayering had occurred, and downsizing
had been facilitated by new information and communications
technology. The organisation had also shrunk considerably
with the divestment of extensive in-house, but non core,
activities. The organisation had, moreover, responded to the
extremely competitive market for cars by the introduction of
multi-functional groups in order to respond quicker to market
demands. These changes had been introduced, however, over
a fairly extended time period.
Truststar had also undergone a fairly dramatic
transformation, largely brought about by legislative change
and significant changes in the way that the NHS was
structured and devolved to local levels. Financial pressures
were intense for Truststar, as was the necessity to meet
various government targets. The organisation had also
restructured to reflect a greater interface with the private
sector, with outsourced activities introduced due to
government legislation, government imposed targets and the
need to deal with staff shortages.
Retail UK’s business had become much more complex for a
number of reasons. First, there had been a fairly dramatic
increase in business volume, certainly as measured by
turnover, profit and, to a lesser extent, employment. Second,
the company had undergone a fairly rapid diversification
process, in terms of the proliferation of products and services
sold, due to internationalisation of the business, and due to
the mix of different size of sales outlets and modes of sale
(for example, Internet sales). Moreover, the environment had
become increasingly competitive, with concentration of a few
dominant retailers and new entrants from outside the UK,
including Walmart (the world’s largest retailer) and low price
German retailers. A number of organisational innovations had
been introduced but, similar to Carco, the introduction of
multi-functional teams, with accounting and finance
prominent, perhaps the most prominent. Such teams are
representative both of the complexity of the business but
also the need to be responsive to customer demands.
10. Conclusions
The heightened competitive market was also a feature at
Food UK, largely caused by the demands of large food
retailers such as Retail UK. In particular, these large retailers
are placing great demands on Food UK, in terms of fitting in
with their own increasingly sophisticated supply chain
management systems. For example, Food UK are required to
provide far greater information for the retailers and to be far
more responsive to changes in the retailer’s customers
demands (as reflected in their sophisticated supply chain
modelling systems). In particular, the retailers are pressuring
Food UK in to supplying smaller batches to them on a basis
which is closer to ‘just-in-time’. This is, however, at odds with
the large batch production which Food UK prefers, as it
provides economies of scale in a capital intensive mass-
production system. Food UK’s major strategic innovation,
which has implications for organisational innovations, has
been to reverse the previous, somewhat haphazard
diversification strategy and to concentrate upon core brands
which offer the greatest opportunity for profits.
Chocco’s business has also been subject to heightened
competitive pressures from a number of sources, not least
the large food retailers. Consequently, Chocco has undergone
a diversification strategy, partly in terms of the products it
offers. However, the major diversification has been in the
types and range of sales outlets through which it sells its
products. For much of its history, Chocco has manufactured
its own products, which it then sold through its own retail
outlets. It then expanded into franchise operations and a
limited amount of supply to third-party retailers. However,
with the growing dominance of a few large food retailers in
the UK market, Chocco has readjusted its strategy to reflect
this, on the ‘if you can’t beat them, then join them’ premise,
and Chocco is now selling products through all of the major
UK food retailers. This poses major logistical problems for
Chocco, in terms of supply chain logistics to multiple
customers, as compared to the past when it has largely
supplied to its own shops.
The supply chain function has become an increasingly
important function of large organisations in the UK. This has
come about for a number of reasons. As the questionnaire
indicates, outsourcing has become increasingly popular, both
to the private and public sectors. Largely, this has been of
non-core service contracts, such as cleaning, catering and
maintenance, but also computing, IT, recruitment and
training. Primarily, the reasons given for this increase in
outsourcing are to save money by lowering costs and, to a
lesser extent, to concentrate on core activities and to
increase flexibility, quality and access to specialist skills.
This heightened importance of supply chain management
and, hence, functions are also evidenced in the case study
companies. Essentially, this function has become more
important for different reasons in the various organisations.
In Carco, for example, the amount of outsourced work has
increased markedly, due to the divestment of previously
in-house parts divisions. However, the management of
component logistics has also been recognised as a source of
major competitive advantage, given that a relatively high
proportion of each car comprises of bought in parts (2000
parts per car). At RetailUK, similarly, the supply chain function
has been increasingly important, given the growth of business
volume, but also the proliferation of products and
internationalisation of sales. Moreover, given that RetailUK
buys in all of its products, supply chain logistics are a crucial
competitive advantage. Internally, for example, supply chain
costs are some 12 per cent of sales of RetailUK and
two-thirds of this is labour costs.
The supply chain issues at FoodUK and Chocco are somewhat
different. Chocco, for example, manufactures what is
essentially a fairly simple range of products. The change in
supply chain relations at the company is largely due to the
proliferation of customers, all of whom have their own
logistical systems, whereas previously Chocco only largely
supplied its own retail outlets. Similarly, FoodUK has had to
adopt its supply chain, both to reduce its own costs and,
more importantly, to meet the demands of the large UK food
retailers.
Perhaps the biggest changes in the supply chain function
have been at Truststar, in that, prior to the hospital gaining
‘Trust’ status, there was no supply chain function as such, all
purchases being negotiated centrally. Moreover, the Trust had
outsourced what might be regarded as core activities
(i.e. surgery) as well as the recruitment of key staff (nurses)
and non core functions, through the PFI scheme.
Given the nature of the business that they were engaged in,
Carco have traditionally had the most sophisticated supply
chain management systems. Indeed, companies such as
RetailUK have often modelled their supply chain on, and
benchmarked it against, the car industry. Carco has
undergone a major rationalisation of its supply base and so
squeezed suppliers heavily on cost, quality and delivery, and
has moved increasingly to requiring large component
suppliers (multinational companies in their own tight) to
supply whole sub-systems, often on a just-in-time supply
basis.
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Both RetailUK and FoodUK have undergone radical overhaul
of their supply chains. RetailUK, for example, has introduced
sophisticated modelling of its supply chain, brought about by
major financial investment, with the main aim of simplifying
the chain. Their driving force is an organisation-wide supply
chain system, which can deliver a high percentage of in-store
availability (98.7 per cent). FoodUK, meanwhile, had no real
supply chain function prior to 1990, but underwent a major
supply chain re-engineering process in the 1990s, in order to
improve customer service performance. The keys to this were
integration and the use of information systems, based on a
demand-led model and concentrating on key customers.
Chocco’s supply chain management is perhaps less
sophisticated, which reflects both the relatively small size of
the organisation (relative to RetailUK and FoodUK), and the
fact that it is vertically integrated (manufacture and retail).
Indeed, Chocco senior managers admitted that it was not,
perhaps, as commercially ruthless in its internal supply chain
as it should be. Nevertheless, the company had invested in its
supply chain systems and was, at the time of study, investing
in internal supply change management systems through, for
example, improved information systems.
Truststar had to develop a supply chain management system
virtually from scratch. The systems were, however, very
different from those of other case study organisations, in that
they outsourced services, rather than products, and were on
long term contracts in some cases (the PFI). Organisationally,
however, this meant major innovations, with new specialist
staff engaged in developing contracting arrangements and in
contract compliance.
The next issue addressed was how management accounting
functions shaped these new organisational forms, and to
what extent they have adapted to these new arrangements.
The questionnaire survey indicated certain changes in
management accounting practices, but not dramatic changes.
This was, perhaps, unsurprising, given that organisational
changes had been noticeable, but gradual. For the public
sector, little change was obvious. The NHS Trusts, in
particular, tended to use ‘tried and tested’ techniques such as
cost-benefit analysis and a similar situation pertained in the
local authorities. While non-financial measures were used in
both services, they were not prominent. New cost centres
tended to be the main innovations in the public sector,
particularly in local authorities, where financial reporting has
taken on far more prominence. Moreover, there was a
relationship between the extent of outsourcing and the
growth of management reporting with the NHS Trusts, for
example, more likely to make specific calculations of the cost
of contractual failure on organisational performance.
Moreover, an increase in outsourcing led to modifications in
the budgeting process, with new techniques and
measurements developed in order to cope with the new
requirements it imposed.
The case study evidence also points to gradual changes in
management accounting. All of the organisations relied
heavily on the use of key performance indicators (KPIs), with
a range of financial and non financial measures and cascading
forms of key performance indicators across the organisations.
This was perhaps best developed in the three largest case
study organisations (RetailUK, FoodUK and Carco). The ways
in which these were used was, perhaps, the major innovation
in these organisations. All three used one or other variation of
the ‘balanced scorecard’, with the numerous KPIs balanced
against one another as part of the overall corporate strategy,
and a fourth (Chocco) was about to introduce this approach.
The balanced scorecard was innovative in that it tended to be
used in a far more forward-looking way than previously had
been the case, when historical data had been relied on to a
far greater degree. The management accounting functions in
these organisations had, therefore, undergone a shift from
having primarily a financial reporting role to a financial
analysis (plus reporting) role. The second change in function
was an increase in integration of management accounting
into the other mainstream business areas. This was part of
the change in organisational form indicated earlier, that of a
multifunctional team-based organisation. For new projects,
for example, multifunctional teams were developed to
analyse the business case and see through implementation.
The management accounting function is integral to these
teams, and is thus involved from the earliest stage, and is
heavily involved in forecasting and financial analysis. Thus
while many of the management accounting techniques are
traditional ones (cost-benefit analysis, net present value,
payback, discounted cashflow etc), the broad philosophy of
the function has, arguably, changed in these organisations;
and changed markedly. Such a change in philosophy is
reflective of changes in strategy and structure which, in turn,
are responses to a heightened competitive environment for
these organisations.
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Cardiff Business School is conducting research into the role played by management accountants in processes of
organisational change. We are keen to interview key financial decision-makers, project managers and associated
employees in a variety of organisations.
The main issues we are examining include:
• How decisions about whether to sub-contract and outsource from organisations are made.
• The influence of sub-contracting arrangements on management accounting systems.
• How buyer-supplier relations are managed.
• The degree to which there is a transfer of accounting and other skills and knowledge between buyer and supplier.
• How these features impact on organisational performance.
The personnel involved in the project form an interdisciplinary team, drawing on expertise in management accounting,
accounting information systems, human resource management, and organisational theory.
The interviews
In examining these issues, we are interested in interviewing a range of people in a franchise organisation. We would
particularly welcome the opportunity to interview management accountants involved in different organisational roles,
management accounting systems designers and end-users, project and contract managers, and senior finance
professionals and executives. The interviews would be semi-structured in form and of 60-90 minutes’ duration. In order
not to make unreasonable time demands on interviewees, the team would prefer to tape-record interviews, where
possible. The transcriptions and use of interview material in the research outputs will be presented in a manner to
preserve the anonymity of interviewees and participating organisations.
Output from the research
The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) are sponsoring the project, which consists of a large-scale
questionnaire survey, in addition to the in-depth case studies. The research findings will form a CIMA monograph and
article for Financial Management, and additional articles in leading academic and practitioner accounting and
management journals. In each case, all participating case study organisations will be anonymised to assure
confidentiality.
If you would be prepared to participate in the research, please contact ***** by telephone on ***** or by email to
*****.
Appendix 1
Preletter to interviewees
Appendix 2
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Respondent’s agenda
I. Deciding to Outsource
II. Managing Suppliers
III. Accounting Implications
IV. Company Performance
Interviewer’s agenda
V. Deciding to Outsource
VI. Managing Suppliers
VII. Accounting Implications
VIII. Company Performance
Preamble
This interview is aimed at investigating the ways in which
management accounting is influenced by developments
in organisational forms. The key issues we are interested
in include: the influence of subcontracting on your
management accounting systems; the ways in which you
manage buyer-supplier relations in the organisation; and
the impact that any changes in your organisational form
have had on your business performance. We appreciate
that you personally may not be in a position to respond
to all of the sections we cover, so we shall skip over any
that are not relevant.
CIMA, the Chartered Institute of Management
Accountants, have sponsored our research, which we are
conducting by holding direct meetings with people like
you, following the agenda that we sent you earlier. We
hope that this study will contribute to our understanding
of: why organisations decide to outsource; how the
supplier chain is managed; and the impact that
outsourcing or subcontracting has on accounting systems
and corporate performance. We should like to thank you,
in advance, for agreeing to help us in our work.
Semi-structured interview schedule
Interviewer
Respondent
Respondent’s job title
Company name
Address
Tel Date Time
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Outsourcing is an arrangement whereby a third party
provider assumes responsibility for performing functions
at a pre-determined price and according to
predetermined performance criteria.
Section 1 asks you to think about the rationale behind
outsourcing your organisation’s functions.
1. To what extent are your business activities outsourced?
(Probe: percentage or number of total business functions; specific examples)
2. What effect on costs do you hope to see through outsourcing?
(Probe: Reductions in fixed costs? Economies of scale?)
3. To what degree is your decision to outsource influenced by your desire to free up more time for concentrating on
your core business?
4. How important is the fact that you are gaining access to specialised skills, when making the decision to outsource?
5. What impact do you expect the increased flexibility offered by outsourcing to have on your workload?
(Probe: Outsourcing during peak periods? Savings in fixed costs?)
6. How do you expect outsourcing to affect accountability in the organisation?
(Probe: Clarification of responsibilities? Helping management focus on key deliverables? Quality improvement?)
I. Deciding to outsource
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We should now like to discuss the process by which you
manage the supply chain within your organisation.
7. How do you decide on the size and duration of the contract with specific suppliers?
(Probe: Try small, short-term contracts initially? Long-term contracts tie company down? Disadvantage if changing
company direction/strategy? Need for back-out clauses?)
8. How do you manage the supervision and monitoring of contracts?
(Probe: Transaction costs? Administration of tendering? Separate department? Costs allocated to specific contracts?)
9. Can you identify any ‘hidden’ costs that have occurred through outsourcing?
(Probe: Erosion of staff skills? Other drawbacks?)
9.1 What has your organisation done to alleviate the problems this causes?
10. What measures have you put in place to maintain control over the companies that provide outsourcing services
for you?
(Probe: Supervisors? Other costs? Imposed changes in accounting systems? Required reporting of financial
measures?)
II. Managing suppliers
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11. What impact has outsourcing had on your existing staff?
(Probe: Disaffected staff? Changing nature of job? Less overtime?)
12. To what degree do you feel that you have lost some privacy, having decided to outsource?
13. Have you experienced any breach of confidentiality since outsourcing?
(Probe: Rights over intellectual property?)
II. Managing suppliers continued
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We are now going to talk about the influence that your
decision to outsource has had on accounting information
systems.
14. What types of accounting calculations do you undertake to assist in making the decision to outsource, and in
choosing between alternative suppliers?
(Probe: NPV, DCF, breakeven, cost/benefit?)
15. How have you modified existing accounting practices in order to make your outsourcing decisions?
(Probe: What has changed in your organisation? Do standard techniques provide adequate analysis? Did company
develop own procedures or methods of analysis?)
15.1 Where do your new ideas for accounting practice come from?
(Probe: Consultants? Imitation? Internal development?)
16. How have the ways in which you use accounting information changed since beginning to outsource?
(Probe: Change in frequency of reporting; level of reporting; types of decision in which information is used?)
17. How are management accountants involved in deciding which functions are ‘core’ activities, and which should or
could be outsourced?
III. Accounting implications
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18. How much control or influence does your organisation have over the outsourcing company’s accounting system?
(Probe: Receive management/financial accounts? Suggest changes, e.g. in terms of job or process costing?)
19. How do you account for the outsourced work in your own management accounts?
(Probe: Set budgets? Treat each outsourcing as a cost centre?)
20. How do you evaluate the financial cost/benefit of your outsourced activities?
(Probe: Treat each contract as a one-off? Continual monitoring of specific tenderers?)
21. How has your own accounting information system been modified to incorporate the new outsourced activities?
(Probe: Change in frequency of reporting? Change in nature of reporting? Responsibility? Budgeting? Introduction of
new cost centres? Any new techniques?)
22. If outsourcing contracts break down, what role do management accountants play in evaluating the costs of failure to
the company?
(Probe: Impact of failure on company/departmental performance?)
III. Accounting implications continued
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Finally, we should like to assess the impact that
outsourcing has had on the performance of your
company.
23. How do you feel the service and/or product(s) your organisation provides have been affected by outsourcing?
(Probe: Change in quality? Change in financial performance?)
24. How do you specifically measure the impact of outsourcing on your organisation’s performance?
(Probe: What is regarded as success? Payback periods? Hurdle rates of return? Defined profit level? Bench-marking?)
25. Could you please indicate on this sheet the degrees to which these various features of your organisation have
changed since you started outsourcing.
26. Finally, can you identify anything that you think you could have done better when setting up the initial outsourcing
contract(s)?
Many thanks for your time. That is the end of our interview. In due course, we might like to come back to you to clear up
any query; and will send out copies of the summary results of our findings, once completed. Meanwhile, thanks again for
your cooperation.
End of Interview
IV Company performance
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Could you please indicate below the degree to which the following features have improved, or declined, since
outsourcing began in your organisation.
The scale runs from -3 (greatly declined), through 0 (stayed the same) to +3 (greatly improved)
please circle choice for each feature (a) to (g)
Feature Nature of change
Greatly Stayed Greatly
decreased the same increased
(a) Quality of product/service -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(b) Extent of cost savings -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(c) Efficiency of management accounting system -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(d) Access to specialised skills -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(e) Degree of flexibility -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(f) Level of accountability -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(g) Financial performance -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
Thank you – please now hand this sheet back to the interviewer.
Sheet 1 (respondent’s copy)
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Could you please indicate below the degree to which the following features have improved, or declined, since
outsourcing began in your organisation.
The scale runs from -3 (greatly declined), through 0 (stayed the same) to +3 (greatly improved)
please circle choice for each feature (a) to (g)
Feature Nature of change
Greatly Stayed Greatly
decreased the same increased
(a) Quality of product/service -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(b) Extent of cost savings -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(c) Efficiency of management accounting system -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(d) Access to specialised skills -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(e) Degree of flexibility -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(f) Level of accountability -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
(g) Financial performance -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
Sheet 1 (interviewer’s copy)
Appendix 3
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Information for respondents to questionnaire survey
We enclose a questionnaire seeking the views of financial decision-makers in the UK’s largest companies on the role of
management accountants in processes of organisational change. We emphasise that all information provided will be
treated as confidential, and should be grateful if you could take time to complete and return the questionnaire.
This research is part of a Cardiff Business School project investigating the role of management accountants in processes
of organisational change such as subcontracting and outsourcing. The personnel involved in the project form an
interdisciplinary team, drawing on expertise in management accounting and management. The main issues we are
examining include:
• How an organisation’s decisions about subcontracting and outsourcing are made.
• The influence of subcontracting arrangements on management accounting systems.
• How buyer-supplier relations are managed.
• Whether there is a transfer of accounting and other skills and information between buyer and supplier.
• How these processes affect organisational performance.
CIMA, the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants are sponsoring the project, which includes a series of case
studies in addition to the questionnaire survey. The research findings will form a CIMA monograph and article for
Financial Management and additional articles in academic and practitioner accounting and management journals.
Please complete this questionnaire and return it to us as soon as possible in the enclosed Freepost envelope. We should
be grateful if you could return the completed questionnaire before Date.
We are grateful to you for assisting us in this project.
How to complete this questionnaire
Please answer all questions where appropriate by either writing in your answer in the space provided, ticking the
appropriate box, or circling the appropriate number.
The questionnaire should not take too long to complete. We would like to assure you that all information provided will
be regarded as confidential.
We would be grateful if you could return the completed questionnaire to us in the Freepost envelope as soon as
possible.
Thank you in advance for your co-operation.
Covering letter for questionnaire survey
Appendix 4
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The questionnaire is divided into five sections:
I. Company information
II. The decision to outsource
III. Managing suppliers and the supply chain
IV. Accounting implications
V. The impact on company performance
Please answer as many questions as possible. If you are
unable to answer a question, either leave your answer
blank or circle the ‘irrelevant’ response.
Private sector mailed questionnaire
Main operations
Manufacturing
Energy and water
Construction
Retail/wholesale
Hotels/restaurant
Transport/communication
Financial services
Business/IT services
Other (please specify):
No. of UK employees
0-500
501-1000
1001-2000
2001-5000
5001-10,000
10,001-20,000
20,000-30,000
30,001-50,000
Over 50,000
I. Company information
1. Company ownership and background
Please tick in the table below which of the following best describes your company.
No change Extreme change
0 1 2 3 4 5
2. The extent and form of organisational change
2.1 On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘no change’, and 5 is ‘extreme change’, how would you describe the extent of
organisational change during the last 3 years?
(please circle the most appropriate response, where 0 indicates that the question is irrelevant)
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Unimportant Very important
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
a) General product market conditions
b) Competition from rival companies
c) Changes in customer demands/tastes
d) New leadership/senior management
e) Focus on core activities
f) Emulation of best practice
g) Reduction of fixed costs
h) Reduction in staffing costs
2.3 On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘unimportant’ and 5 is ‘very important’, how important have the following factors
been in influencing changes in organisational form?
Formal/legal changes
Merger/acquisition
Demerger/divestment
Strategic alliance/partnership
With an external company
Other (please specify):
Other comments on change in organisational form:
Internal changes
Increase in no. of divisions
Reduction in no. of divisions
Removal of managerial layers
Shift to a new structural form
Shift to a new structural model
Other (please specify):
2.2 Which, if any of the following main changes in organisational form have taken place during the last 3 years?
(tick all that apply)
Accounting for new organisational forms Appendix 4 81
2.5 Does your organisation use MA consultants?
Yes No
a) Have used
b) Currently use
c) Currently use for all MA functions
d) Currently use for all new MA projects
e) Currently use to develop new MA techniques
f) Use as a last resort
g) Plan to use in future
h) Do not plan to use
Other comments:
2.4 Does your organisation have a specialist Management Accounting (MA) function?
Yes No
If yes, how many MA staff are directly employed?
0-5
6-10
11-20
21+
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II. The decision to outsource
By outsourcing we mean an arrangement whereby a third party provider performs functions for your company to meet
pre-determined price and performance criteria.
1. The extent of outsourcing and subcontracting
1.1 On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘no outsourcing’, and 5 is ‘a great deal’, how would you describe the extent of
outsourcing in your company?
(please circle the most appropriate response, where 0 indicates that the question is irrelevant)
None A great deal
0 1 2 3 4 5
1.2 Please tick the boxes in the table below which areas of your operations have been contracted out, the main reason
and the outcomes of these processes.
Service/activity Contracted Previously Main reason for contracting out Activities now cost
out in-house? (tick one only)
Save Improve Focus Improve More Less About
costs service on core flexibility same
activity
a) Cleaning of buildings
b) Security
c) Catering
d) Building maintenance
e) Print/photocopying
f) Payroll
g) Transport/distribution
h) Computing/IT
i) Training
j) Recruitment
k) Core business
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Unimportant Very important
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
a) Reductions in fixed costs
b) Economies of scale
c) Focus on core business
d) Access to specialised skills
e) Improved flexibility
f) Improved organisational accountability
g) Clarification of responsibilities
h) Improvement in quality
Other comments:
2. The main factors in decision-making
2.1 On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘unimportant’ and 5 is ‘very important’, how important to you are the following
factors in making decisions about what to consider for subcontracting or outsourcing?
2.2 Looking at the reasons for contracting-out, which you gave above, how do you distinguish between ‘core’ and
‘non-core’ activities or business? (please tick one box only)
Business strategy
Adoption of best practice
Advice from consultants
Cost of buying compared to cost of producing
Other
Other comments:
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III. Managing suppliers and the supply chain
We use the term ‘supply chain management’ to refer to the co-ordination of all aspects of manufacturing,
purchasing, distribution and sales, whether performed within or beyond the organisation.
1. In deciding on the nature and form of your subcontracting and outsourcing relationships, how strongly do
you agree with each of the following statements, where 1 is ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 is ‘strongly agree’?
(please circle the relevant response, where 0 is ‘irrelevant’)
a) It is important to try small, short-term contracts until
we get to know our suppliers better
b) Long-term contracts tie the company down and are
too restrictive
c) Being tied into contracts is a disadvantage if we want
to change our company strategy/direction
d) We need to incorporate back-out clauses in case we are
unhappy with suppliers
e) The administration/transaction costs of monitoring
contracts are burdensome
f) We need to modify our existing administration
practices for our outsourced functions
g) We treat every outsourcing supplier as a separate cost
centre
h) Outsourcing has led to an erosion of staff skills within
our company
i) We have employed supervisors to oversee our
outsourced functions
j) We impose changes on our outsourced suppliers’
accounting systems
k) We require regular reporting of financial measures from
our outsourced suppliers
l) Our existing staff are unhappy with our decision to
outsource
m) Our existing staff have experienced a change in the
nature of their job since we started to outsource
n) Since we started to outsource, we feel we have lost
some privacy
o) Since we started to outsource, we have suffered a
breach of confidentiality
Other comments:
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
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IV. Accounting implications
1. Accounting techniques
1.1 How important are each of the following methods or techniques when you are assessing the decision to outsource,
and/or choosing between alternative suppliers?
(Please circle the relevant response, where 1 is ‘unimportant’, 5 is ‘very important and 0 is ‘irrelevant)
a) Net Present Value (NPV) analysis
b) Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
c) Breakeven analysis
d) Cost-benefit analysis
e) Payback period
f) Other:
1.2 Do you use any key non-financial measurements or calculations in your MA approach?
Yes No
If yes, please tell us about these measurements or calculations.
Comments:
Unimportant Very important
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
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2. Changes in accounting systems
2.1 How strongly do you agree with each of the following statements, which inquire into the nature of change in your
accounting systems since you began to outsource, where 1 is ‘strongly disagree’, 5 is ‘strongly agree’ and 0 is
‘irrelevant’? 
a) We have had to make major changes in our MA systems
b) Standard accounting techniques provide adequate
analysis for our organisation
c) We have had to develop our own methods of analysis to
cope with outsourced contracts
d) Our new ideas for MA come from hired consultants
e) Our new ideas for MA come from imitating other
organisations
f) Our new ideas for MA have been developed internally
g) There has been a change in the types of decision for
which MA information is used
h) Deciding which functions are ‘core’ and which should be
outsourced depends largely on cost considerations
i) We exert considerable control over our outsourcing
suppliers’ accounting systems
j) We set budgets as part of our master budget for each
outsourced activity
k) We treat each contract as a one-off
l) We see our outsourced suppliers as on-going ‘partners’
m) We evaluate each contract primarily in financial terms
n) We are continually monitoring our outsourced suppliers
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
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2.2 To what extent have the following changes and effects on MA taken place since you began to outsource and
subcontract? 
(please circle the relevant response, where 1 is ‘not at all’, 5 is ‘greatly’ and 0 is ‘irrelevant’)
a) We have changed the frequency of reporting
b) We have increased the level of detail in our reporting
c) We have increased the level of responsibility of those
staff involved in reporting
d) We have modified our budgeting processes
e) We have introduced new cost centres to account for
outsourced activities
f) We have developed new MA techniques and
measurements to cope with new requirements
g) MA staff are involved in evaluating the costs of a failure
in contractual relationships
h) We make specific calculations on the cost of
contractual failure on company performance
i) There has been a significant transfer of accounting skill
and information to suppliers
Other comments:
Not at all Greatly
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
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V. The impact on company performance
Finally, we should like you to assess the impact that outsourcing and subcontracting has had on the performance of
your company.
1. How strongly do you agree with each of the following statements which inquire into the impact that
outsourcing has had on your company, where 1 is ‘strongly disagree’, 5 is ‘strongly agree’, and 0 is
‘irrelevant’? 
Outsourcing/subcontracting has improved:
a) The quality of our product/service to customers
b) Our financial performance
c) Our access to specialised skills
d) Our company responsiveness/flexibility
e) The extent of our cost savings
f) Our MA systems
We measure the success of our outsourcing contracts:
g) In financial terms
h) Against a predetermined profit level
i) By benchmarking against industry norms
j) By benchmarking against competitors
k) By benchmarking against ‘best practice’
l) We are happy that we have the best possible contracts
with our outsourced suppliers
Other comments:
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please now return it in the envelope provided.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
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